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BENDING THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT’S
REGULATORY ARC
Joseph A. Franco*
“[P]ast performance does not guarantee future results . . .”1
ABSTRACT
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”) and its regulatory
purview have changed dramatically over the life of the statute. The
statute began as a simple registration scheme with barebones
conduct integrity prohibitions for wealth managers and purveyors of
investment newsletters. Although the statute’s original minimalist
cast was deficient, the IAA’s regulatory scope has undergone a
fundamental transformation, both in terms of the expanding class of
advisers covered by the statute’s substantive provisions and the
statute’s expansive structural integrity requirements. Over a span of
decades, the IAA’s focus has been reoriented so that it is directed at
least as much, if not more, at institutional asset managers rather than
wealth managers who advise retail investors. As matters now stand,
the IAA is the primary mechanism for regulating institutional asset
managers that manage trillions of dollars in assets while retaining its
legacy purpose of enforcing conduct integrity norms in delivering
investment advice. This transformation is a product of the regulatory
scheme’s enhanced reliance on structural integrity safeguards
attained through rulemaking.

* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. The author is grateful to Buddy

Donohue and Bob Plaze for sharing their perspectives in early conversations about
several themes in the article and for helpful comments from Arthur Laby. The views
expressed, however, are the author’s own. Finally, the extraordinary diligence and
dedication of the editorial staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
in seeing this project through to its completion was very much appreciated.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2003) (mandatory cautionary language required
in any Rule 482 mutual fund advertising prospectus that uses performance data). Cf.
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(2) (2019) (Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-1, which,
prior to its amendment in 2020, required that any past recommendations permissibly
shared with a client contain the cautionary legend that “it should not be assumed that
recommendations made . . . will be profitable [in the future].”).
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This historical assessment offers useful lessons for crafting
successful regulatory strategies in this area, as well as lessons that
expose deficiencies in recent SEC initiatives. The SEC’s recent
efforts to restate a standard of conduct for advisers under the IAA
(the “Interpretation”) illustrates this point well. The Interpretation
was not well-conceived and, if anything, represents a missed
regulatory opportunity to rethink existing models of investor
protection for retail investors in the investment adviser context. The
Interpretation was part of the SEC’s multi-part Regulation Best
Interest rulemaking initiative (the “Initiative”), which sought to
reconcile the standards of conduct governing the two main types of
securities professionals serving retail investors: broker-dealers and
investment advisers.
Wholly apart from the overall merits of the Initiative, the
Interpretation is disappointing both as a matter of law and policy.
As a matter of law, the Interpretation is a deeply flawed construction
of the IAA because it completely disregards contemporary principles
of statutory interpretation. It asserts that the statute mandated a
federal fiduciary duty, even though the statute is silent as to any such
duty. Moreover, while laudable in its aspirations, the agency’s
interpretation is meek in substance. The asserted fiduciary duty
accomplishes little more than what a natural reading of the statute’s
text mandates, namely a heightened standard of disclosure (as
opposed to the SEC’s asserted generalized fiduciary duty). More
importantly, the SEC’s interpretation is disappointing as a matter of
policy; it restates largely undisputed principles of accountability and
does not offer any new meaningful benefits in terms of investor
protection for average retail investors. If, instead, the SEC had
embraced a more ambitious objective to rethink the issue of investor
protection for average retail investors under the IAA, it could have
more usefully pursued targeted default conduct rules to affirmatively
enhance investor protection for average retail investors.
Although the SEC chose not to pursue rulemaking for investment
advisers, the elements for such a rulemaking strategy can be
sketched out. Such an approach would design conduct rules with
a consumer-protection cast. In order to enhance investor protection
under the IAA for average retail investors, conduct standards should
go beyond mere fiduciary principles and incorporate targeted default
rules that offer affirmative investor protection guideposts. Such rules
eventually might serve as a template for analogous rules for brokerdealers when providing average retail clients with personalized
investment advice on a non-discretionary basis.
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INTRODUCTION
Most statutes have stories of how they came to be, and of their
original and enduring significance as pieces of legislation. Frequently,
these stories are static, and the said statute reposes within its original
conception, not wavering from its pre-ordained purpose. The Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”)2 is not such a statute.
The IAA has not exhibited a fixed and unwavering storyline.
Rather, its broad contemporary mandate evolved incrementally from its
original limited scope. The IAA’s original focus was modest oversight
of wealth managers and non-managerial investment advisory services.
Today, it is the principal source of financial regulation of asset managers
(primarily institutional money managers), while it continues to regulate
personalized forms of investment advice. Not only is the class of
regulated advisers very different today from those covered under the
humble IAA of 1940, but so too is the scope of the substantive
requirements by which regulation is effected.
Enacted in tandem with the Investment Company Act of 1940
(“ICA”),3 the IAA has become a full statutory co-partner with the ICA
in regulating a vast investment management and advisory industry
involving tens of trillions of dollars in securities in the United States
alone. In contrast, when enacted, the IAA seemed like a legislative
afterthought to the ICA; the IAA’s statutory purpose was originally
dubbed a form of industry census taking.4 That reality has long since
given way to the modern IAA, which establishes a framework for
significant federal regulation of a capacious class of firms known as
investment advisers. The category encompasses firms that perform one
or more advisory roles, ranging from mere personalized investment
recommendations to retail clients, to managing securities portfolios in
the billions, and in some cases, aggregating in the trillions of dollars.5
2.
3.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-1.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1. The two statutes, the ICA and IAA, were enacted on August
22, 1940 and share a single public law number—Pub. L. No. 76-768 (1940). The
original ICA is set forth at 54 Stat. 789 and the original IAA is set forth at 54 Stat. 847.
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. Although it is difficult to come up with strictly comparable figures on assets
under management (“AUM”) across different segments of the investment management
industry, various sources are sufficiently precise to convey the differences in order of
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A. A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT
The IAA’s regulatory arc has changed dramatically over the
statute’s relatively short life, affording robust investor protections in a
business that has undergone explosive growth and transformational
change.6 This article shows how this outcome was not the result of a
single unifying vision at the outset, but rather of a confluence of factors
that resulted in a readily adaptable framework to regulate this dynamic
segment of the financial services industry. This history not only
provides an understanding of how these different factors worked
together, often in an unintended fashion, to produce a readily adaptable
scheme of regulation, but also provides the basis for an argument with a
contemporary focus. Specifically, notwithstanding notable successes,
the SEC has also recently missed opportunities to enhance investor
protection under the IAA’s regulatory scheme.
The shape of the IAA’s regulatory arc was not foreordained. Every
statute is different, and the circumstances that occasion each statute may
be more (or less) amenable to legislative and regulatory amelioration.
Though adaptability has been an important feature in the IAA’s
biography, this feature is a product of the originally spare statutory
framework, amended at critical junctures, and the statute’s heavy
reliance on delegated rulemaking authority to the SEC. This historical

magnitude across industry segments. The Investment Company Institute (“ICI”)
compiles the most reliable figures as to registered investment companies, such as
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. As of the end of 2019, it reported roughly $26
trillion for registered funds. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACT BOOK 31 (60th ed. 2020) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK],
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2020_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4TA-LXF3]. The SEC’s
Division of Investment Management compiles AUM figures for private funds, such as
hedge funds and private equity funds, showing $9.7 trillion in AUM for the same time
period. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANALYTICS OFFICE, PRIVATE FUNDS STATISTICS
(May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics/
private-funds-statistics-2019-q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES2D-A3X2]. Finally, the SEC
reported that registered broker-dealers held approximately $4.3 trillion in AUM in their
customer accounts. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of
Conduct, Exchange Act Release No. 86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 33318, 33407 (July 12, 2019).
These categories combined double-count assets. Moreover, the figures for the brokerdealer category almost certainly involves some double-counting within the category.
6. This preliminary statement presumes familiarity with basic terminology
relevant to the IAA. A roadmap to the terminology follows immediately after this subsection and may be useful for readers unfamiliar with the IAA’s subject matter.
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assessment illuminates the regulatory methods and choices available to
the SEC.
The IAA’s unfolding story has been shaped by three institutional
participants: Congress, the SEC, and the Supreme Court. Congress, a
somewhat irregular partner, has nevertheless consistently made critical
adjustments to the statutory scheme. The SEC has been an indispensable
participant in the legislative process (as an advocate of reform) and in its
role of administering the regulatory process. In the former role, the
agency has been a leading advocate for legislative amendments; in its
rulemaking capacity, it has focused on critical structural regulatory
objectives that have expanded the scope and robustness of the IAA’s
regulatory framework. The Supreme Court’s contribution has also been
significant, yet uneven. Its decisions involving the IAA have tugged in
different directions but ultimately have provided the SEC with sufficient
flexibility to vindicate investor protection interests.
Historical and economic factors affecting the investment
management industry have played an instrumental role in guiding the
shape of the IAA’s regulatory arc.7 These factors are themselves
independent, or at best, indirectly related to the IAA’s regulatory
scheme. Thus, many significant factors fueling changes in the regulatory
arc are probably non-legal, such as the rising tide of national economic
prosperity and the consequent increase in investment savings and assets
under management. This article is not focused on an examination of
these factors, but this trend nevertheless led to a very different financial
industry today relative to the one that existed in 1940. In conjunction
with the vast increase in investable wealth, the financial services
industry has undergone many changes that have contributed to economic
efficiency in managing assets and advising investor accounts. Over the
last fifty years, this trend has been especially pronounced with respect to
information technologies, finance theory, new financial products
(including an explosion of pooled investment products), and capital
markets. These economic and financial changes undoubtedly have
served as a catalyst for regulatory evolution.
The regulatory scheme (consisting of statute and administrative
rules and practice) combines conduct integrity requirements and
structural integrity requirements.8 Over time, the number and mix of
7.
8.

See infra Section I.A.
There is no established definition for these two categories as used in this
article. By “conduct integrity requirements,” I mean requirements in the nature of
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such requirements under the IAA and the rules thereunder (i.e., the
IAA’s regulatory arc) have changed through timely (and sometimes,
overdue) statutory amendments and agency rulemaking. This evolution
produced fundamental changes in the IAA’s regulatory arc both in terms
of the scope of the IAA’s coverage (principally expanded coverage of
asset managers) and the regulatory scheme’s substantive obligations.
The regulatory arc slowly shifted from an almost exclusive focus on
conduct integrity to a scheme combining conduct and structural integrity
requirements, and indeed has become one in which the significance of
the structural integrity mandates arguably outweighs that of the conduct
integrity mandates. The regulatory arc is no longer limited to a narrow
range of practices within a sleepy industry that caters to wealthy retail
investors, but rather encompasses an expanding array of institutional
asset managers and touches on every aspect of an adviser’s operations.
The delegation of significant rulemaking discretion to the SEC has
allowed the IAA’s regulatory arc to adapt to the evolving asset
management and financial services landscape through administrative
regulation while statutory amendments serve to enlarge and re-order the
scope and manner of federal regulation.
While the SEC has routinely pursued strategies to effectuate the
IAA’s broadening regulatory sphere and has achieved notable success
(such as the implementation of a sweeping compliance rule), it has also
stumbled at times. Most recently, it has stumbled in failing to advance a
regulatory vision under the IAA of existing models of investor
protection for retail investors. To some extent, this failure is
understandable, since the agency’s efforts under the IAA were collateral
to a much larger nine-year project to rethink investor protection for

conduct prohibitions. Such requirements consist of generic antifraud protections and
specific proscriptions on conduct, such as trading with a client or acting as an agent
with respect to trades among clients. Structural integrity requirements are requirements
and obligations that provide assurances of reliability, credibility, validation, and
transparency beyond any deterrence effects arising from conduct integrity requirements
(such as the fear of the consequences from detection of prohibited conduct). Structural
integrity requirements encompass a broad spectrum of protections ranging from record
keeping and filing requirements, to requirements that mandate disclosure or impose
conditions on business operations (such as custody or compliance obligations).
Structural integrity requirements tend to be more complex in substance than conduct
integrity requirements and frequently involve congressional grants of rulemaking
authority coupled with agency rulemaking. To be sure, the two categories are not
airtight and may overlap. These two types of requirements, nevertheless, are distinct
building blocks for investor protection.
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retail customers of broker-dealers known as the Regulation Best Interest
Initiative (the “Regulation BI Initiative” or “Initiative”).9 In the
Regulation BI Initiative, the SEC attempted to articulate a grand
compromise regarding the standards of conduct when dealing with retail
investors that govern the two major categories of retail-facing securities
professionals: broker-dealers and investment advisers. Specifically, the
Initiative attempted to better harmonize the standards applicable to these
two types of securities professionals (broker-dealers under the Exchange
Act and investment advisers under the IAA) when broker-dealers and
their associated persons provide personalized investment advice that is
purely advisory in nature to retail clients.
The SEC benchmarked a standard of conduct for investment
advisers in dealing with all clients—retail and institutional—in a 2019
agency interpretation (the “Adviser Conduct Interpretation” or
“Interpretation”).10 Leaving aside Regulation BI and the broker-dealer
prong of the issues, the Interpretation is itself deeply flawed in
articulating (or more accurately, attempting to restate) a standard of
conduct. The standard of conduct managed to confuse existing legal
standards in this area, and more importantly, offered little that was new
in terms of investor protection for average retail investors dealing with
investment advisers. Essentially, after a nine-year period in which it
considered the relative differences between the conduct standard for
broker-dealers and for investment advisers, the SEC largely restated the
status quo view for the conduct standard for investment advisers in a
more formal framework.
The latter part of this article explores the major deficiencies of the
SEC’s Adviser Conduct Interpretation, both as a matter of law and

9. The Initiative collectively consisted of four regulatory components. See infra
note 265 and accompanying explanatory text. Regulation BI itself, the single most
significant component of the Initiative’s regulatory package, addressed the standard
governing the conduct for broker-dealers (and their associated persons) when providing
retail customers with personalized advice while, as discussed in the text below, another
component of the four-part Initiative addressed the standard of conduct governing
investment advisers generally.
10. See Commission Interpretation Regarding Standards of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33669 (July 12,
2019) [hereinafter Adviser Conduct Interpretation]. The approach to standards of
conduct for investment advisers actually sweeps more broadly than Regulation BI in
that it encompasses the standard of conduct with respect to all advisory clients rather
than merely retail clients. Id. at 33677.
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policy. The agency eschewed rulemaking to achieve its ends, and
instead, has sought to secure its objectives by means of statutory
construction. The Interpretation, however, is a sandcastle of sorts: A
structure erected on an unsound foundation, helpless before the
incoming tide of contemporary statutory interpretation jurisprudence.
Put more bluntly, as a matter of statutory construction, the interpretation
is all but indefensible. The statute’s text and the Supreme Court’s
precedent can reasonably be read to impose a heightened standard of
disclosure on investment advisers, but a heightened disclosure standard
commensurate to the disclosure obligations of a fiduciary is not the
same as an unqualified fiduciary duty. Moreover, by attempting to cover
the conduct of all types of advisers under a single fiduciary umbrella,
the interpretation creates ambiguity rather than clarity regarding the
metes and bounds of any fiduciary duty under the IAA.
Second, while laudable in its aspirations, the Interpretation is meek
in substance. Although the SEC’s articulation of a standard of conduct
for advisers may appear comparatively robust, this appearance is
deceptive. The Interpretation mistakenly asserts that the statute imposed
an unqualified statutory fiduciary duty on investment advisers.11 The
established heightened standard of disclosure achieves virtually
everything accomplished by an independent fiduciary duty (save for a
requirement of due care untethered to any disclosure violation). The
injection of a novel due care obligation does little more than what is
already accomplished by more precise structural integrity requirements
relating to adherence to the compliance rule.12 Moreover, as a matter of
SEC practice, the SEC has never sanctioned an investment adviser for
fiduciary misconduct, absent deceitful conduct (i.e., statements or
omissions that violate the adviser’s heightened duty of disclosure).
Of course, the SEC likely has the authority to re-promulgate its
interpretive rule as a legislative rule and could, if it chose, establish a
stand-alone fiduciary duty, thereby reaching a result similar to the
Interpretation (i.e., imposing a fiduciary duty by rule rather than trying
to derive such a duty from the IAA’s text).13 But, for the reasons already
discussed, this would be ill-advised. Very little would change in terms

11.
12.
13.

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section III.B.1.
Such an approach may have been separately unappealing to a majority of the
Commission members because such a rulemaking might trigger rulemaking obligations
as to broker-dealers that the Commission wished to avoid. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(g) (as
amended by the Dodd–Frank Act, discussed in Section I.E. infra).
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of existing enforcement policy relative to the heightened standard of
disclosure imposed on investment advisers, but the approach might open
the door to a vague and boundless duty of care. Such issues are best left
to more precise structural integrity requirements, such as the compliance
rule. More importantly, the entire regulatory project ignores a more
pressing need for new conduct integrity rules with a consumer
protection orientation—rules that would afford greater investor
protection for average retail investors.
Although the Adviser Conduct Interpretation seems to be a missed
regulatory opportunity, such a deficiency is remediable. In this respect,
the Interpretation could serve as a useful interlude in crafting a more
meaningful investor protection initiative. As noted, the SEC has
extensive rulemaking authority under the IAA. Such rulemaking
authority could be used to adopt targeted rules that provide greater
investor protection for average retail investors in particular situations.
While the optimal substance of the rules is not the focus here, rules
in the form of rule-based defaults could be an appealing option. Such
rules, moreover, could serve as a template for standards governing
broker-dealers as well as when acting with respect to clients in a similar
capacity. The result of such rulemaking would likely be more consistent
with the spirit of the Dodd–Frank Act14 that directed heightened scrutiny
of personalized advice to retail investors. In addition, such rulemaking
offers a path to go beyond mere fiduciary principles as a means of
enhancing investor protection.15
This article is divided into four parts. The first three sections
address sequentially the contributions of Congress, the Supreme Court,
and the SEC to the regulatory arc of the IAA. Part I analyzes the history
of the IAA’s structural changes through the amendments that broadened
the Act’s narrow original focus. Part II addresses the Supreme Court’s
role in shaping the IAA’s regulatory arc, a role that has been fairly
muted and uneven. Two of its decisions have been important in shaping
the IAA’s regulatory arc, while the remaining decision is simply

14.
15.

See infra Section I.E.
This latter point is an important qualification to the undisputed importance of
the Act’s fiduciary aspirations. Indeed, it suggests a lesson of topical significance:
Fiduciary principles alone are not always sufficient. Rather, as argued below, the SEC
should evaluate augmenting fiduciary principles in some areas with rules-based
standards to achieve investor protection objectives that are not solely grounded in
fiduciary duties (e.g., rules with a consumer-protection orientation).
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misconceived. Part III focuses on the SEC’s role in administering the
IAA (as opposed to its contributions as an informal legislative advisor to
Congress). The significance of the SEC’s administrative role has grown
commensurately with its rulemaking and enforcement powers, and the
agency has used these powers creatively to create a robust regulatory
structure for an industry whose size and scope have dramatically
increased. Part IV uses lessons derived from this taxonomic account of
the IAA to inform an issue of topical significance under the IAA:
investor protection for average retail investors, where the SEC’s role has
been less successful. It illustrates the deficiencies of the SEC’s
Interpretation, both as a matter of law and policy. The section concludes
with a discussion of how the prevailing IAA antifraud standard
(including its heightened standard of disclosure), supplemented by
targeted investor protection rules—specifically, rules that elevate the
applicable standard of conduct for investment advisers in providing
advice to average retail investors—can be used to enhance protection for
those investors. Before beginning this analysis however, a brief roadmap
on terminology and the industry is provided to make the subsequent
exposition easier for the uninitiated reader to follow.
B. A ROADMAP TO TERMINOLOGY
One of the challenges in conceptualizing the IAA’s scope is the
wide range of different functionally related advisory activities addressed
by the statute. Congress was aware of the existing differences when
enacting the IAA and dealt with these varied activities under a single
regulatory umbrella. This proved feasible because at its inception, the
IAA imposed minimal regulatory demands. Over the past 80 years, these
different activities have developed along different trajectories, leading to
a sharper delineation of the types of services provided by investment
advisers. An unfortunate by-product of this history is the proliferation of
sometimes confusing and redundant terminology. This terminology can
contribute to the confusion of underlying issues because problems and
issues characteristic of one type of advisory service are not always
relevant to other investment advisers.
In the interest of analytic clarity, a brief review of the terminology
is provided, followed by a box diagram that provides a conceptual
taxonomy for thinking about different types of advisers and the activities
and services associated with each one. Many of the issues discussed in
this article assume basic familiarity with a series of dichotomous
categories relevant to the fault lines underlying the issues.
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A fundamental distinction in the investment adviser space concerns
the difference between advice that is purely “advisory” (meaning that
the investment adviser merely makes recommendations to a client), and
managerial advice where the adviser manages the client’s assets
(meaning the adviser makes investment decisions with respect to the
client’s assets on behalf of the client). In the former context, the adviser
is acting in a non-discretionary capacity, while in the latter context, the
adviser acts in a discretionary capacity with respect to client accounts.
Institutional asset managers and wealth managers exemplify two
different types of advisers that provide investment management
services.
In talking about investment advice, the adviser’s advice may be
“personalized,” meaning that the advice is directed at an individual retail
client as opposed to being impersonal in character. Advice may be
impersonal in two distinct respects. Advice is impersonal if the same
advice is given to many individuals without regard to the recipients’
specific financial circumstances. Alternatively, advice may be
impersonal when an asset manager makes investment decisions for a
pooled investment vehicle where the effect of those decisions will be
uniform for all participants.16 Personalized investment advice is closely
linked to retail investors and does not apply to the independent interests
of each underlying beneficiary in an institutional investment
arrangement.17
Finally, there is a fundamental distinction in federal securities law
between investment advisers (and their personnel) who either manage
client assets or provide securities advice as part of a regular ongoing line
of business) and securities advice rendered to a client which is merely
incidental to acting in another capacity, such as a broker or dealer. 18

16. For example, funds, such as mutual funds or exchange-traded funds, are
managed by investment advisers on an impersonal basis (i.e., without regard to the
personal characteristics of the holders of the fund shares).
17. “Retail investors” refers to investors who are natural persons or investors that
are extensions of an investor’s personal interests, such as families or personal trusts. See
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)(2).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (IAA Section 202(a)(11), giving the definition of
“investment adviser”). See generally Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to
Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 1092 (Oct. 16, 1987), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/1987/ia-
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Broker-dealers (and their personnel), who are primarily regulated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),19 are
particularly problematic because their activities straddle the divide
between the Exchange Act and the IAA.20 Broker-dealer personnel may
provide investment advice in two respects, with differing statutory
consequences for the broker-dealer. First, personnel of the broker-dealer
may provide advice incidental to servicing a brokerage account of a
commission-paying customer without the broker-dealer becoming in any
respect an investment adviser (i.e., there is no need to register as an
investment adviser or conform to the IAA’s requirements).21 In such
cases, a broker-dealer and its personnel are governed by the
requirements of the Exchange Act and FINRA, the relevant SECregistered self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers and their
associated professionals. In addition, however, broker-dealers (and some
associated persons) may undertake a non-incidental investment advisory
role; for example, a broker-dealer or an associated person may manage a
customer’s account. In such circumstances, the broker-dealer must
conform both to its regulatory obligations as a broker-dealer, and with
respect to such advised accounts, the broker-dealer must also conform to
1092.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D7V-UY4J] (influential, SEC-ratified staff interpretation as
to basic features of the definition).
19. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
20. This distinction is at the heart of the Regulation BI Initiative alluded to above
and developed below. See supra note 10; infra Part IV. For competing explanations of
the state of affairs with respect to the distinction of investment advisers and brokerdealers around the time of the Dodd–Frank Act’s enactment (i.e., pre-Regulation BI),
compare Arthur B. Laby, Harmonizing the Regulation of Financial Advisers, in THE
MARKET FOR RETIREMENT FINANCIAL ADVICE 275, 276–77 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent
Smetters, eds. 2013) (“[Under the IAA] an adviser’s recommendation must not only be
‘suitable’ [as in the case of brokers and dealers], it also must be in the clients ‘best
interests’ . . . . The adviser’s best interest standard is analogous to a fiduciary best
interest standard in other areas . . . and the duty has been called the ‘highest known to
the law.’” (citations omitted)), with James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A FactBased Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers
and a Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–4 (2012)
(describing as a “mischaracterization” the interpretation “that advisers are subject to a
stringent fiduciary duty . . . while broker-dealers are subject to a weaker duty that
merely requires their recommendations be suitable for their customers”).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) and its broker-dealer exclusion. The technicalities
of this particular result are summarized in Commission Interpretation Regarding the
Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of
Investment Adviser, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5249, 84 Fed. Reg. 33681,
33684–85 (July 12, 2019).
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the regulatory obligations imposed on investment advisers. Brokerdealers, in this respect, can be so-called “dual registrants,” registered as
broker-dealers generally and, with respect to any accounts managed for
customers, registered as an investment adviser.22 As will become evident
in Section IV, there is enormous legal significance in this distinction
(i.e., whether a person acts in the capacity of an investment adviser and
is therefore subject to regulation under the IAA, or in the capacity of a
broker-dealer subject to regulation under the Exchange Act).
However, at this juncture, it is important to keep in mind the four
basic distinctions within the investment adviser category itself: (i)
Personalized non-discretionary advice; (ii) personalized discretionary
(managerial) advice; (iii) impersonal non-discretionary (purely advisory)
advice; and (iv) impersonal (institutional) managerial advice. For ease of
reference, the resulting classification is rendered in the box diagram
below:

22. Dual registration is a highly detailed topic relating to broker-dealers that first
emerged on the SEC’s radar screen in the 1940s. Suffice to say, it introduces a concept
that overlaps the dividing line between broker-dealers and investment advisers, but is
not the focus of this article. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 404 n.68 (2010)
[hereinafter Reforming Regulation]. This issue figured prominently in the Regulation BI
Initiative discussed in Section IV.B and note 265 infra.
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Table 1: Simplified Taxonomy of Investment Advisory Services
Personalized
Box 1
Pure investment advice made
to a retail customer.

Advisory
(non-discretionary)

Ex.: Financial planners and
robo-advisers

Impersonal
Box 3
Securities research firms,
rating agencies,
investment newsletters.
[adviser only]

[adviser, unless definitional
exception, applies (such as
broker-dealer exception)]
Box 2

Managerial
(discretionary)

Ability to manage a
customer’s investment
portfolio, such as that of a
retail customer (i.e., make
investment decisions for
individual clients in terms of
securities bought and sold).
Ex.: Wealth managers or
financial advisers
[adviser only, including
broker-dealer arrangements
that involve dual registration]

Box 4
Asset managers (or
money managers) who
manage pooled
institutional accounts (or
institutional accounts with
defined objectives or
involving many beneficial
owners).
Ex.: Mutual funds, ETFs
and hedge funds, pension
funds
[adviser only]

This simplified taxonomy can be used to more concretely restate
the issues addressed in the Preliminary Statement above. First, even
though the basic structure of the IAA adequately functioned as an
umbrella regulatory scheme in 1940 for the four areas identified in the
taxonomy, the changing sweep of the IAA’s regulatory arc reflects
changes in the relative economic significance of the activities conducted
in each box. Initially, Box 4 activities were largely outside the purview
of the IAA. In its initial decades of administering the IAA, the SEC
most heavily focused on improper advisory activities in Boxes 2 and 3.
Over time, especially over the last four decades, the managerial
activities in Box 4 have grown tremendously relative to the activities in
Box 1 and 2. The SEC has correspondingly recalibrated its activities to
give regulatory priority to those issues particularly relevant to Box 4. In
addition, however, the SEC has maintained significant attention to the
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activities in Box 2 involving advisers (including broker-dealers) who
manage the assets of retail customers.
Part IV addresses the relevant standard of conduct for investment
advisers. As noted, the SEC’s interpretation arose in connection with a
different controversy, namely parity in regulatory treatment of advisers
and broker-dealers in certain retail contexts. While broker-dealers may
engage in activities in Box 2 (i.e., act as a discretionary investment
adviser), when they do, they are subject to the same standards as
investment advisers. The parity issue solely implicates activities arising
in Box 1 where broker-dealers provide non-discretionary personalized
advice under a less demanding conduct standard than that applied to
investment advisers. This continues to be true even under the recently
adopted Regulation BI. The recommendations advanced at the end of
Part IV suggest that investment advisers (and by extension, brokerdealers) should be subject to higher default conduct standards (through
targeted rules) when dealing with average retail investors.
I. A REVERSAL OF REGULATORY FORTUNES: EXPANDING THE IAA’S
SCOPE
As originally conceived, the IAA dealt with a relatively small
investment niche, while the more substantial ICA was intended to
squarely address abuses which had emerged with respect to the
relatively recent development of investment trusts (pooled investment
vehicles) sold to the public.23 The ICA heavily regulated the investment
companies, while asset managers of these vehicles were only lightly
regulated by the ICA and, in most cases, not at all by the IAA. 24 Over
the ensuing years and through subsequent significant changes in the
financial services landscape, a different regulatory calculus has given
birth to a new statutory reality for the IAA: a statute that directly
regulates institutional asset managers (i.e., asset managers who manage
pooled investment vehicles or cater to institutions) as well as regulating
the more traditional providers of investment advice contemplated in
1940. This new reality does not negate the IAA’s legacy as a statute

23. Closed-end funds in particular collapsed spectacularly during the Great
Depression. See John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. REGUL.
343, 358 (2013).
24. See infra Section I.C. (describing elimination of the IAA registration
exemption for most fund advisers).
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about personalized wealth management and advice, or other categories
of investment advice providers, but rather indicates the need for a more
encompassing view of the IAA and its statutory mandate.
How did a statute conceived to lightly regulate personalized wealth
managers and purely advisory services morph into a regulatory scheme
that has extended its reach into the much larger realm of institutional
asset management, all while still retaining its legacy oversight of
personalized wealth managers and non-managerial investment advice?
Much of the story derives from the reality that the business of managing
pooled investment vehicles has grown at a staggering pace relative to
the business of personalized wealth management. The other part of the
story is legal, reflecting the cumulative effect of amendments to the IAA
over a sixty-year period that transformed the statute’s scope and focus,
which in turn triggered regulatory changes.
The IAA’s transformation has been fueled by two important
categories of statutory amendments: first, amendments that have steadily
expanded the class of investment advisers required to operate under its
purview, and second, amendments that have expanded SEC rulemaking
authority, especially in its ability to add structural integrity requirements
to the regulatory scheme. Together these amendments enabled the SEC
to update and tailor the IAA’s regulatory scheme to a rapidly growing
and evolving industry. In short, as a result of the statutory amendments
discussed in this section, the IAA ended up somewhere very different
from where it began.
Remarkably, the transformation of the IAA’s scope and focus did
not reflect a sustained comprehensive legislative vision granting the Act
primacy in oversight of asset managers. Rather, the concomitant effect
of changing industry economics and various statutory amendments,
scattered over intervals of ten to twenty years combined, produced this
serendipitous outcome. Any appearance of an enduring intentional
prospective design is, in fact, a figment of hindsight. This section
addresses this aspect of the article’s broader exploration, namely, the
incremental changes to the statutory text that have made the change in
the IAA’s focus possible.25

25. This exposition focuses solely on changes to substantive regulation rather than
changes to remedial features of the regulatory scheme, except where those features
materially differ from other federal securities statutes. A variety of commentators have
traced different aspects of this history of the IAA emphasizing different issues. See
Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers
Act after Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 407–16 (2016);
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A. THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT AS ORIGINALLY ENACTED
The scope of the Investment Advisers Act at its enactment in 1940
was modest.26 That statute was paired with another piece of legislation,
the Investment Company Act,27 that expressly addressed pooled
investment vehicles marketed to the public. Indeed, the original
conception of the two acts showed a stark contrast. In the case of the
IAA, Congress settled on a minimal regulatory scheme for a broad
category of investment advisers: investment counsel (an antiquated term
for personal wealth managers), sponsors of investment newsletters,
investment professionals who provide only advisory services, and all
other professionals that provided investment advice other than on an
incidental basis.28 As to the Investment Company Act, urged on by the
SEC, Congress exhibited a far different sensibility. Investment
companies had been a source of manifest abuse, especially in the case of
highly levered closed-end funds, and Congress mandated a heavyhanded and intrusive form of regulatory discipline for pooled investment
vehicles marketed to the public.29
The statutes were products of the historical circumstances from
which they emerged, taking shape as an outgrowth of a comprehensive
study of investment trusts, congressionally mandated in 1935.30 The
Investment Trust Study was four years in the making and involved an
unprecedented gathering of information, data, and personal statements

Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, The Varieties of Investment Management Law, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 71, 130–61 (2016). See generally Arthur Laby, SEC and
Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1051 (2011) [hereinafter SEC, Capital Gains, and the IAA]. While these pieces are
instructive about various themes and are clearly cognizant of the expansion of the IAA,
they do not provide a similar integrated account of the statute’s evolution.
26. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (1940).
27. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940).
28. The definition for investment adviser and its enumerated exclusions is found at
15 U.S.C § 80b-2(a)(11).
29. The legislative findings accompanying the ICA are set forth in two paragraphs,
the first reciting findings showing that investment companies engage in and affect
interstate commerce and the second identifying eight areas identified in the Investment
Trust Study where existing activities have “adversely affected” the interests of
investors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)–(b).
30. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 74 Stat.
687, 837 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1263,
119 Stat. 594, 974.
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from industry executives.31 The portion of the study dealing with
investment advisers was a supplemental report (the “Investment Counsel
Report”).32 As the SEC staff explained in that report, it was “of limited
coverage and comprehensiveness because it does not include all
investment counselors, and does not detail their basic problems,” a result
dictated by the fact that the topic was beyond the agency’s jurisdiction
to investigate and was only “incidental to its main study.” 33 The
Investment Trust Study’s discussion of investment companies (2801
pages in three parts, followed by a 384-page summary of
recommendations)34 dwarfed the 70-page Investment Counsel Report.
A record of pervasive abuses is conspicuously absent from the
Investment Counsel Report, although there is reference to some
problems in a brief four-page section. The SEC conceded that “the
survey by the Commission did not include a detailed investigation as to
the existence of specific abuses and defects of investment counselors.” 35
The Investment Counsel Report relied instead on anecdotal statements
from a public conference of investment counsel and questionnaires from
a small subset of investment counselors. What emerged was a list of
potential areas of abuse: (1) “‘tipster’ services masquerading as bona
fide investment organizations”;36 (2) “trading by investment counsellors
for their own accounts in securities their clients were interested [in]”;37
31. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT
TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES PURSUANT TO § 30 OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (1938-1942) [hereinafter INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY].
The Investment Trust Study had five parts that were released as follows: H.R. DOC. NO.
707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. DOC. NO. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R.
DOC. NO. 279 ch. 1-6, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939-40); H.R. DOC. NO. 136, ch. 7, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); and H.R. DOC. NO. 246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
32. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT,
INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 477
(1939) [hereinafter INVESTMENT COUNSEL REPORT]. This supplemental report was the
only material that related to the IAA in the Investment Trust Study. There were five
other supplemental reports that are not relevant here: H.R. DOC. NO. 380, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939); H.R. DOC. NO. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939); H.R. DOC. NO. 482,
76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939); H.R. DOC. NO. 567, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R.
DOC. NO. 659, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
33. INVESTMENT COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.
34. See generally INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 31.
35. INVESTMENT COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 32, at 28.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 29–30. A student comment several years later described this practice in
these terms: “Instead of buying and selling in the interest of the client there was
frequently a shifting of high quality securities to the adviser’s personal account and the
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(3) “arrangements for contingent compensation”;38 (4) “custody of
clients’ securities” without adequate protection for clients;39 and (5)
indirect transfer of the control of client accounts by corporate advisers
through change of ownership of the adviser “without the knowledge or
consent of the client.”40
A comparison of the legislative findings and policies that
accompanied the two statutes, the ICA (title I) and the IAA (title II),
reveals an overall diminished sense of urgency in the case of the IAA. 41
Similarly, the legislative reports were largely devoted to the ICA and the
need for robust legislative responses to the alarming problems revealed
by the Investment Trust Study.42 The legislative reports’ discussion of
the IAA was another matter. Although they noted a need to address
isolated abuses, that concern was combined with another articulated
reason: the need to preserve the reputation of “honest” investment
advisers.43 In testimony in support of the original draft legislation, the
SEC’s chief counsel for the Investment Trust Study described the “basic
approach” of the IAA: It would implement basic antifraud protections

placing of his unwanted issues in the client’s account.” W.T. Mallison Jr., Comment,
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 1 VAND. L. REV. 68, 70 (1947) (citation omitted).
38. INVESTMENT COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 32, at 30.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (and the discussion of ICA findings supra note
29), with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (IAA’s findings limited to a single paragraph on the
interstate nature of investment adviser business without findings of abuse).
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 7 (1940) (“The record of the study and the
reports to the Congress of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the testimony
taken before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency contains many examples
of abuses in the organization and operation of investment trusts and investment
companies. These abuses have been persistent and have occurred and recurred
constantly during the last 10 years.”); S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 11 (1940) (“However, the
record does indicate that some of the grossest abuses were perpetrated in most recent
years, in fact during the very course of the Commission’s study. The conclusion is clear
that the perpetrations of these misfeasances and the recurrence of these abuses cannot
be completely abated nor the deficiencies eliminated without the enactment of adequate
Federal legislation regulating these institutions.”).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 28 (1940) (“The essential purpose of title II of the
bill [the IAA] is to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of
unscrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the honest investment adviser against
the stigma of the activities of these individuals by making fraudulent practices by
investment advisers unlawful.”).
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and allow the SEC to gather information that “approximate[d] a
compulsory census.”44
This frequently cited comment regarding a mere census bears
closer scrutiny.45 The legislative record strongly suggests that the
description is far from what the agency actually intended as its final
legislative goal. The phrase was used by David Schenker, the chief
counsel for the agency’s Investment Trust Study, at the outset of the
congressional hearings, apparently to defuse industry opposition.46 In
one sense, the SEC’s description was accurate: The statute’s registration
and basic antifraud provisions were merely a starting point, while the
agency endeavored to learn more about the industry and formulated an

44. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency on S. 3580, 76th Cong. 48, 319 (1940)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings on S. 3580] (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel,
Securities and Exchange Commission Investment Trust Study). There was considerable
uncertainty at the time regarding the numbers involved in what today would be called
the investment advisory business. To complete the Investment Counsel Report, the SEC
relied on questionnaires from 394 more substantial investment counsel firms of which
56 were associated with an investment company or an affiliate thereof. See INVESTMENT
COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 32, at 2. Two-thirds were located in four states. Id. at 6.
The Investment Counsel Report noted an estimate of somewhere between 3,000 and
4,000 investment counsel firms nationally (using a very broad classification). Id. at 2
n.6. In the Senate hearings, the SEC’s David Schenker estimated that the number of
investment adviser firms was anywhere from 6,000 to 10,000. See Senate Hearings on
S. 3580, supra, at 49. This contrasts with the narrow swath of firms that were actually
involved in the hearings, principally from the Investment Counsel Association of
America (“ICAA”) and some major Boston investment counsel firms. The ICAA had
been formed in 1937 to promote self-regulatory objectives, such as a code of
professional conduct and professional publications. See Senate Hearings on S. 3580,
supra, at 723–42 (statement of Dwight C. Rose, President of the Investment Counsel
Association of America (association’s membership comprised of 18 firms with 61
professionals with $600 million in assets under managements, a significant sum for the
time)). He also estimated that investment counsel as used in the proper sense by wellestablished investment counsel involved roughly 150 to 200 firms nationally. Id. at 736.
This sentiment was reinforced by other witnesses. See, e.g., id. at 711 (statement of
Douglas T. Johnston) (“The definition of ‘investment adviser’ . . . covers a number of
services which are entirely different in their scope and in their methods of operation.”);
id. at 717 (statement of Charles M. O’Hearn) (“We do not deal with the general public.
Our clients represent substantial amounts of capital and have adequate means to inform
themselves about us through their banking and legal affiliations.”).
45. See, e.g., Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 245 (1959); Reforming
Regulation, supra note 22, at 403; Bines & Thel, supra note 25, at 130–31 n.234.
46. See Senate Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 44, at 48.
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appropriate regulatory scheme. However, omitted from that testimony
was what the SEC actually proposed in the original S. 3580 bill as
introduced in the Senate: rulemaking authority with respect to books and
records, the ability to obtain information regarding customers, and an
unusually broad mandate to continue public hearings into the industry
with full subpoena powers and unfettered rulemaking authority.47 These
additional features, as originally proposed, proved to be a source of
contention for investment counselors who participated in the
congressional hearings, especially because the SEC seemed to be
extending a dragnet with only a thin predicate.48
The SEC’s position had a logic to it. The Investment Trust Study
mandated by Congress had not actually directed a study of investment
advisers broadly, or even investment counselors more narrowly.49
Rather, the staff of the SEC had construed the mandate for the study as
extending to investment counselors that advised investment trusts as
well (a much smaller sub-class of investment counselors and a mere
fraction of the estimated total number of investment advisers).50 The
SEC explained that its initial goal was to gather more information about
the industry before devising a regulatory scheme. Broad rulemaking
authority would have essentially allowed the SEC to create, by rule, an
appropriate regulatory framework once the agency gained a better
handle on the industry. Given the significant statutory regulatory scheme

47. See id. at 721–22 (statement of Alexander Standish, President, Standish, Racey
& McKay, Inc.) (discussing specific language in title II [the IAA portion] some
borrowed from title I [the ICA portion] objected to by investment counselors). While
the proposed statutory language was eventually jettisoned, the resulting organic process
of amendment has restored these structural features (less the ongoing public hearings
and unfettered rulemaking authority) to the IAA’s regulatory scheme.
48. Id. at 712 (statement of Douglas T. Johnston, Johnston & Lagerquist, Inc.)
(“Here the cart would seem to be before the horse—a bill is being proposed to include
all investment advisers with certain important exceptions, not to correct predetermined
abuses, but to discover whether they exist.”); id. at 718 (statement of Charles M.
O’Hearn, Clarke & Sinbaugh & Co.) (urging rejection of title II of the IAA legislation
because “the bill gives the Commission power to do anything it wishes.”); id. at 741
(statement of Dwight C. Rose, President of the Investment Counsel Association) (“[W]e
believe the public interest can be better served without imposition of the additional
legislation and uncertain and indefinite inquisition and regulation proposed in this
bill.”).
49. See id. at 47–48 (statement of David Schenker); INVESTMENT COUNSEL
REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.
50. Senate Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 44, at 51.

2021]

BENDING THE REGULATORY ARC

23

that the SEC had proposed in the ICA, the investment counsel
community was apprehensive regarding giving the SEC these powers
and sought their elimination from the legislation.51 The final legislation
was shorn of the expansive rulemaking and investigative authority
sought by the SEC,52 and representatives for investment counselors were
only too happy to give the revised and defanged bill their blessing.53
As a result, the IAA, as enacted, was notable for just how little it
actually required.54 The legislation dealt with the issue of registration
and four of the five problematic practices initially identified in the
Investment Counsel Report.55 Ironically, a major focus in the original
statute has become something of a dead letter in contemporary times –
the use of the term “investment counsel.” The IAA originally, and still,
prohibits use of the moniker “investment counsel” by registered
investment advisers unless that is either the adviser’s principal business,
or a substantial portion of the adviser’s business involves “investment
supervisory services” (i.e., managing client assets).56 The term itself,
intended to allow investment counsel to distinguish themselves
qualitatively, has fallen into disuse with the emergence of other forms of

51.
52.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Shortly after termination of the Senate hearings in April, the SEC engaged with
industry representatives from closed-end and mutual funds and with investment
counsel, resulting in substantial revision of the legislation’s two titles. See, e.g., Walter
P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 677, 683–84 (1969).
53. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com. on H.R. 10056, 76th Cong. 86
(1940) (statement of James White, representing Scudder, Stevens & Clark) (“My firm is
heartily in favor of this bill.”); id. at 92 (statement of Dwight Rose, representing
Investment Counsel Association of America) (“The Investment Counsel of America
unqualifiedly endorses the present bill [the ICA and the IAA] . . . [and] urgently hope
passage of the bill may be expedited at this session of Congress so the public may have
the benefit of the bill and its provisions without further delay.”). The unqualified
comments of support in the House hearings contrast with the deeply critical statements
barely two months before.
54. See INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 31, at 383 (“In addition to its
provisions relating to investment companies, the Act contains a title providing for the
registration of investment advisers and in a small degree for the regulation of some of
their activities.”). In contrast, the SEC described the original legislative proposal as to
investment companies (pared back before enactment) as “comprehensive in scope.” Id.
55. The unresolved issue of custody and safeguarding of client assets would await
resolution for another 20 years. See infra Section III.A.1.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8.
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professional certification and the dominance of large asset managers.57
Even the Investment Counsel Association of America, so influential in
the passage of the IAA, changed its name in 2005 to the Investment
Adviser Association.58 This issue is of note because it shows that the
trajectory of the IAA’s arc changed not only as the result of regulatory
additions, but also because of the declining significance of some issues
that were very much part of the IAA when enacted (e.g., allowing
investment counsel to differentiate themselves as a class from other
investment advisers).59
Thus, the IAA as enacted in 1940 was merely a starting point that
addressed a very different world of financial services than what it has
become in the 21st century. Congress and the SEC were preoccupied by
the larger issue of investment companies, and neither body envisioned
how integral the interface between the two statutes would become. The
most salient feature of the IAA as enacted is that it established a
minimal statutory framework with little rulemaking reserve for the SEC.
One can speculate on what would have happened had the SEC’s original
57. See generally Richard Sloan, Fundamental Analysis Redux, 94 ACCT. REV. 363
(2019) (presidential scholar remarks before the American Accounting Association)
(summarizing history of certified financial analysts’ embrace of fundamental analysis
and subsequent rise of quantitative methods of financial analysis). In addition, during
this period, the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) was
formed and established the formal CFA test and guideline standards for financial
reporting. AIMR eventually changed its name to the CFA Institute. See NANCY REGAN,
THE GOLD STANDARD: A FIFTY-YEAR HISTORY OF THE CFA CHARTER 208 (2012).
58. This history is set forth in summaries on the CFA Institute’s website. See
Background & Mission, INV. ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.org/
about/background-mission [https://perma.cc/KU5S-DAQF].
59. Interestingly, an analogous proposal—to reserve use of the name or title of
“advisers” to registered investment advisers (thereby, prohibiting its use by noninvestment advisers, such as broker-dealers)—was revived in the regulatory proposals
for the Regulation BI Initiatives (see Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments
to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the
use of Certain Names or Titles, Exchange Act Release No. 83063, 83 Fed. Reg. 21416,
21459 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 275, and 279)), but the
SEC declined to adopt this portion of the rule proposal. See infra note 265 (discussing
Regulation Best Interest and declining to adopt rules that would have restricted brokerdealers and their associated persons from using the terms “adviser” or “advisor” as part
of a name or title when communicating with retail investors); accord Form CRS
Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 86032, 84 Fed. Reg. 33492, 33623 (July 12, 2019) [hereinafter Form CRS
Relationship Summary].
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version of the IAA legislation been enacted, but its inadequacy at
inception guaranteed that it would need to be revisited by Congress and
the SEC in the future. Indeed, interspersed efforts of Congress and the
SEC attempted over time to adapt the regulatory scheme to the everchanging realities of the world of investment management. The
unintended consequence of the statute’s inadequacy at the outset paved
the way for the flexible development of a structure that has proven
responsive, notwithstanding many twists and turns along the way.

B. THE 1960 AMENDMENTS AND THE ACT’S STRUCTURAL
INADEQUACY
The inadequacy of the IAA was not lost upon the SEC. Within
five years of its enactment, the SEC reported to Congress:
The Commission, lacking authority under the Investment Advisers
Act to inspect the books and records of investment advisers, has no
means of ascertaining the correctness of the representations made in
connection with registration, and no authority to determine whether a
greater percentage have accepted custody of clients’ securities and
funds or to determine the amounts of funds and securities held by
investment advisers. What is also most important, the Commission
has no authority to make periodic inspections to determine whether
the funds and securities of clients are intact . . . .
The Investment Advisers Act thus deals with a field with respect to
which neither the Commission nor any other government agency can
do more than set punitive machinery in motion after the public has
been defrauded . . . . Prevention is more desirable and valuable.60

Nothing came out of these efforts and the SEC continued to
advocate for major substantive amendments. On the eve of the initial
breakthrough in 1960, an SEC division director (who subsequently
became the agency’s general counsel and thereafter served as a
commissioner) summed up the state of the Act as containing “only” four
substantive provisions61 and noted that “[i]n view of the limited
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON EMBEZZLEMENT OF CLIENTS’ SECURITIES
FUNDS BY TWO INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR AMENDING
THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 1 (1945). The Commission’s legislative
recommendations were later introduced in a congressional bill by the House sponsor of
the original IAA, Representative Clarence F. Lea. See H.R. 3691, 79th Cong. (1945).
61. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 247 (1959).
60.

AND
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prohibitions” of the IAA, “it is not surprising that the number of civil
and administrative proceedings under that act is relatively small.”62
The Act’s perceived inadequacy led to the enactment of the IAA
Amendments of 196063 and was an overriding theme in the
accompanying legislative history.64 Although the 1960 IAA
Amendments addressed a number of perceived deficiencies in the statute
and its operation, three features bear special note. First, the amendments
empowered the Commission to adopt rules requiring advisers to
maintain books and records and permitted periodic examinations by the
SEC.65 The industry, as noted, had successfully blocked such a measure
in 1940.66
Second, the amendments expanded the IAA’s and SEC’s regulatory
focus over investment advisers in two respects. Section 206 of the
IAA—the Act’s antifraud provision—had originally applied only to
registered investment advisers, thereby excluding both exempt and
unregistered advisers. This feature of the statute led to a counterintuitive
result in the case of unregistered advisers: Advisers who deliberately
shirked their obligation to register—precisely the sort of adviser for
whom the risk of abuse is great—could not be held to account under the
Act’s provision directed at fraud and deceit.67 The amendment fixed this

62. Id. at 248. In a speech to the Investment Counsel Association of America in
1960, Commissioner Sargent urged the organization’s support for a menu of proposed
amendments recommended by the SEC so that “the industry will be able to cleanse
itself of any malpractices that now exist.” James C. Sargent, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, The SEC and the Investment Counselor, Address Before the Investment
Counsel Association of America, Inc. (May 19, 1960) [hereinafter Sargent Investment
Counsel Address].
63. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 750 (1960) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 15 of the U.S.C.) (the 1960 IAA Amendments).
64. See S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 2 (1960) (“Of the five acts administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission . . . the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is the
most inadequate.”); H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 3 (1960) (“Administration of the
Investment Advisers Act since its adoption in 1940 has indicated to the Commission
that it is inadequate in many respects and does not afford the necessary protection to
clients of investment advisers and other members of the investing public.”).
65. See 74 Stat. at 886 (inserting books and records provision into IAA Section
204).
66. See Senate Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 4 (1960) (noting inadequacy of excluding
advisers evading registration from the antifraud provisions).
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gaping loophole.68 Moreover, the amendment necessarily also made
clear that the antifraud provisions applied to advisers exempt from
registration, which in 1960 implicated two significant then-existing
exemptions for advisers that have since been repealed: advisers that
primarily serviced registered investment trusts,69 and advisers that
served fewer than fifteen clients annually.70 In other words, prior to
1960, the IAA’s antifraud provisions would not necessarily apply to
asset managers of registered investment companies or advisers with a
limited number of clients, including, potentially, advisers to a limited
number of private funds.71
Third, and most significantly for purposes of this article, the
amendments greatly expanded SEC rulemaking authority under socalled prophylactic antifraud rulemaking. Specifically, Congress gave
the SEC the power to promulgate rules “to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent” fraudulent and deceptive practices.72 This power
enlarged the SEC’s rulemaking power to broad areas of conduct,
including some not intrinsically fraudulent or deceitful themselves, to
encompass measures designed to aid the prevention of fraudulent or
deceitful conduct.73 In describing these changes, then-Commissioner
68. See 74 Stat. at 887 (striking the restrictive clause advisers “registered under
section 203”).
69. The registration exemption for that category was repealed in 1970. See Act of
Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1417–18, 1430 (codified as amended
in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2) (1970). See infra Section 1.C.
70. The registration exemption for that category was substantially repealed in
2010. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a)
(repealing IAA Section 203(b)(3)). See infra Section I.E.1 & n.118.
71. The repeal, noted above, of the blanket exemptions for many mutual fund
advisers (in 1970) and large private fund advisers (in 2010) applied the 1960
amendment extending Section 206 to unregistered advisers. However, the problem of
investment advisers deliberately circumventing their registration obligations would still
exist. Moreover, the 1960 amendment also had a future benefit after Congress
embraced a bifurcated federal/state registration system in 1996 that relegated smaller
advisers (constituting a significant majority of the total) to state registration (see infra
Section I.D.): It preserved SEC antifraud jurisdiction, whether the adviser was SECregistered or not.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4).
73. Nearly identical language in Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act has
been construed broadly in this fashion. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11
n.11 (1985) (the statute gives the SEC the “latitude to regulate nondeceptive activities
as a ‘reasonably designed’ means of preventing [unlawful] acts.”); accord United States
v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672–73 (1997) (“A prophylactic measure, because its
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Sargent alluded to the flexibility of the rulemaking authority,74 and the
abbreviated statements in the House and Senate reports made clear that
they were intended to clarify the SEC’s authority to regulate beyond the
confines of common law fraud and deceit.75 SEC rulemaking, as
discussed in Section III below, would prove a critical factor in
recalibrating the statute’s regulatory arc.

C. THE 1970 AMENDMENTS EXTEND THE IAA’S SWEEP TO ASSET
MANAGERS
The second wave of amendments that moved the IAA toward
becoming a full-fledged asset management statute occurred over the
next 40 years, from 1970 to 2010. The first step in this process, the
Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970,76 introduced
incremental changes that continued reorienting the SEC’s focus in the
adviser space to deal more effectively with asset managers.
The SEC began to address rulemaking initiatives under the IAA in
the aftermath of the 1960 IAA Amendments,77 but also addressed the
IAA and different aspects of the investment adviser industry in three
major reports, submitted to Congress prior to or contemporaneously
with the 1970 ICA Amendments.78 The reports themselves are of

mission is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited.”).
The prophylactic rulemaking language was derived from what is currently codified in
Securities Exchange Act Section 15(c)(2)(D)—15 U.S.C. § 78o-(c)(2)(D)—and was
originally codified in an amendment to Section 15(c)(2) in 1938. See Maloney Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070, 1075. The language was incorporated into the
new IAA Section 206(4) as part of the IAA Amendments of 1960. Congress used this
same language in amending the Williams Act (Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 457) in
1970 and specifically Securities Exchange Act Section 14(e). See Act of Dec. 22, 1970
Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497–98.
74. See Sargent Investment Counsel Address, supra note 62.
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 7–8; S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 8.
76. See Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
77. See infra Section III.A.
78. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, pt. 1 (1963)
[hereinafter Special Study Report]. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337
(1966) [hereinafter Public Policy Report]; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, pt. 8 (1971) [hereinafter Institutional Investor Study].
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varying significance. The Special Study Report focused significant
attention on oversight of broker-dealers, but also made specific
recommendations touching on investment advice and investment
advisers.79 The Institutional Investor Study grew out of Congress’s
direction to the SEC of the need to address fundamental informational
gaps regarding the role and impact of institutional investors on securities
markets. Notably, this study documented the rapid growth of asset
managers—from mutual fund advisers, to institutional money managers
of separate accounts, to sponsors of hedge funds—and the need for
better disclosure relating to risk and performance.80 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the Public Policy Report made specific legislative
recommendations relating to the IAA and ICA that served as the
springboard for the 1970 ICA Amendments. Taken together, the reports
nevertheless attest to the fact that the process by which the IAA took
shape was uneven and subject to incremental development, rather than a
clear path from the outset.
With respect to the IAA, the 1970 ICA Amendments eliminated the
IAA’s registration exemption for advisers who primarily advised
registered investment companies and made the investment advisory
contracts subject to the fee limitations found in Section 205. The
specific provision had been a recommendation from the SEC in the
Public Policy study.81 As noted, IAA Section 206 had already been
amended to encompass unregistered investment advisers, including
those exempted. Eliminating the registration exemption meant that
mutual fund asset managers would be directly subject to the IAA in all
phases of their business, especially in terms of books and records.
Another major concern of the 1970 ICA Amendments was
insufficient accountability for the management fees of money managers.
Here too, the amendments directly addressed asset managers. However,
in this case, the amendments to the ICA, rather than the IAA, were
notable. Congress imposed new obligations on advisers with respect to
their role as advisers to registered investment companies. Most directly,
a new provision, Section 35(b), “deem[ed]” advisers as having “a
79. See Special Study Report, supra note 78, at 386–87 (recommending enhanced
scrutiny of subscription services, investment advice delivered through market letters
and similar communications, and the “reckless dissemination of written investment
advice,” along with the establishment of a self-regulatory organization for investment
advisers).
80. See Institutional Investor Study, supra note 78, at pt. 2 (Chapters IV–IX, and
summarized in Part 8 at Chapters XII–XXI).
81. See Public Policy Report, supra note 78, at 344–45.
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fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation” from a
registered investment company.82 While the provision created an express
private right of action in addition to SEC enforcement powers, what is
more significant is that it extended the ordinary fiduciary duty of an
adviser under state law to a novel federal fiduciary duty with respect to
receipt of compensation for such advisers—a provision without any
parallel in state law. As a result, a significant and growing segment of
asset manager fees (namely, managerial fees for mutual funds and
eventually ETF advisers) would become subject to legal scrutiny.
Congress made corresponding changes to the statutory requirements
relating to the initial approval and subsequent board review and renewal
review by requiring advisers “to furnish such information as may
reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms” of the investment
advisory agreement.83 Though lodged in the ICA, these steps established
enhanced processes and scrutiny of asset managers of registered
investment products.

D. NSMIA’S 1996 AMENDMENTS TO THE IAA, AND BIFURCATING
FEDERAL AND STATE REGISTRATION OF ADVISERS
By 1996, nearly a quarter-century after the 1970 ICA Amendments,
assets managed by mutual funds had grown exponentially.84 Not only
were the investment assets of U.S. households rapidly growing, but
retail securities professionals (including advisers) were instrumental in
this process.85 The differences between large asset managers at one
82. See Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428–30 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(b)).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
84. In 1970, there were 361 mutual funds which held $47.6 billion in AUM.
By 1996, 6,246 funds managed $3.52 trillion in assets. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note
5, at 196.
85. While difficult to document precisely, the pattern of retail penetration is
unmistakable from numerous proxies. For example, in 1995, roughly 29% of U.S.
households owned mutual funds, while five years later the share had increased to 46%.
See id. at 140. Brokers had historically been the principal means of selling mutual fund
shares since their creation which declined to roughly 36% by 2004. See LEE
GREMILLION, MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY HANDBOOK 160, 170 (2005). While a smaller
percentage of the distribution channel, this was more than offset by the total asset pie.
During this period, the SEC adopted a number of rules under the ICA to enable
investment companies to use new types of fee structures to support retail distribution
activities. See generally John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Fee Mess,
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extreme, and small financial advisers at the other, exposed weaknesses
in allocating federal and state resources in regulating the adviser space.86
In addition, federally-registered investment companies chafed under
parallel systems of uniform federal regulation and balkanized state
regulation.87 Finally, private funds (notably, including hedge funds) had
begun to proliferate and sought ways under federal law to expand their
means of accumulating assets.88
In the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996
(“NSMIA”),89 Congress responded to these diverse challenges. Most
significantly, Congress (and the SEC) sought to rationalize the
overlapping schemes of federal and state regulation of advisers.
Congress adopted a bifurcated registration scheme that allocated
registration obligations between federal and state regulators in terms of
asset size and market significance.90 While intricate and full of
exceptions, the bifurcated registration scheme essentially relegates small
personalized advisers (both asset managers and small advisory-only
advisers) to state registration schemes, while making large asset
managers and personalized advisers with interstate networks SEC
adviser-registrants.91 The number of registered advisers is in the tens of
32 J. CORP. L. 739, 761–67 (2007) (describing these changes and concluding that new
fee arrangements between 1980 and 1998 “completely transformed the economic
relationship between the fund industry and large brokerage firms”). To be sure, the
trend in retail distribution was greatly aided by sharp increases in the fund assets held in
IRA and 401K accounts. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 165 (documenting the
growth).
86. See S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 2 (1996) (noting relationship between federal and
state regulatory regimes is “confusing, conflicting and involves a degree of overlap”
that leads to unnecessary costs, and that state and federal regulators are “overwhelmed
by the size of the task.”).
87. See Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyler, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and
the National Securities Markets Improvements Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419, 446–51 (1997)
(discussing industry perspective that duplicative features of state regulation imposed a
burden on mutual funds and other investment companies).
88. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-622, at 18 (1996) (describing one purpose of the
legislation as “significantly reduc[ing] regulatory restrictions” on private funds in view
of “the important role that these pools can play in facilitating capital formation for U.S.
companies”).
89. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
90. The particulars, as amended, are set forth in IAA Section 203A (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3a) and the rules thereunder. The provision was amended as part of the
Dodd–Frank Act to increase the size of advisers qualifying for the federal registration
scheme. See infra Section I.E.1.
91. 15 U.S.C. §80b-3a.
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thousands, but not all advisers warranted the same level of scrutiny
given the vast differences in size and assets under management. The
resulting scheme allowed the SEC to allocate its regulatory resources
toward large asset manager-advisers by excluding smaller advisers from
the federal registration scheme.92 The congressional scheme carefully
preempted some aspects of state regulation of federally-registered
advisers, but just as significantly, it preserved other aspects of state
concurrent regulation.93
NSMIA further consolidated SEC federal power over asset
managers indirectly. It broadly preempted state regulatory authority over
the securities offering process and disclosure obligations of registered
investment companies (the means by which mutual funds and other
registered vehicles gather assets) and certain private fund offerings.94
While not precisely directed at altering regulation of asset managers,
these amendments expanded the practical scope of federal regulation of
the class of the largest asset managers, since securities offerings are the
principal means for such asset managers to gather assets. Here, in
contrast to the bifurcated registration scheme, Congress used a broad
form of preemption to expressly preempt state law, except with respect
to matters involving fraud.
A final aspect of the NSMIA figures in the narrative regarding
reorientation of the IAA’s focus and scope. The 1996 amendment
addressed an obstacle faced by private funds in gathering investor
assets. At the time, the number of investors in a private investment fund,

92. In 1996, there were approximately 23,500 SEC-registered advisers. See Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Adviser Act Release No. 1633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28112 (1997). The new registration
scheme significantly reduced the number of SEC-registered advisers, which can be
approximated by the fact that almost 15 years later, in 2011, the SEC estimated the
number of SEC-registered advisers after implementing the Dodd–Frank Act registration
amendments would be around 11,500, notwithstanding the significant growth in the
financial services sector in the intervening period. See Rules Implementing
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Adviser Act Release
No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42950, 42994 (2011) (estimate reflecting furthering reductions
in SEC-registered investment advisers as a result of higher asset thresholds for federal
registration coupled with increases resulting from the elimination of certain registration
exemptions).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b) (containing the express preemption and savings
clause provision).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r-(a) & (b)(2).
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such as a hedge fund, was effectively capped at 100 investors.95 NSMIA
introduced a new exemption–Section 3(c)(7)–for non-publicly offered
funds limited to ownership by qualified purchasers.96 Under the ICA,
such funds could have an unlimited number of qualified purchaser
investors, provided that all investors met the qualified purchaser
threshold.97 As noted, this change had negligible immediate effects on
the IAA’s focus. However, by broadening the scope of exemptions from
the ICA for certain pooled investment vehicles, the change spurred the
formation of many kinds of private funds, most notably hedge, private
equity, and venture capital funds.98 The funds were managed by asset
managers frequently exempt from registration under the IAA. As these
entities developed in later years, the question arose whether some type
of regulation would be needed to fill the regulatory gap and, if so,
whether such regulation should be under the ICA (i.e., private fund
regulation) or under the IAA (i.e., regulation of advisers to such
funds).99
Shortly after the NSMIA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”)
provided an additional amendment to the IAA that is of note to this
narrative.100 The legislation easily represented the most significant piece
of banking legislation in a generation or more, and notably repealed the
famous Depression-era banking legislation known as the Glass-Steagall
95. Private funds, such as hedge funds, would ordinarily meet the ICA’s threshold
definition of investment company, which is found in ICA Section 3(a). See SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT TO THE COMM’N: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS 11 (2003) [hereinafter SEC Staff Hedge Fund Report]. At the time, the
only available exclusion for hedge funds from that definition was for non-publicly
offered funds with 100 or fewer investors in ICA Section 3(c)(1). See DIV. OF INV.
MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 105–06 (1992).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-(3)(c)(7)(A).
97. Such funds could trigger Exchange Act reporting requirements that resulted in
an informal (but much higher) cap on the number of total investors in such funds. See
SEC Staff Hedge Fund Report, supra note 95, at 13. Nevertheless, the Section 3(c)-7,
greatly increased the ability of private funds to gather assets from investors.
98. See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
Investment Adviser Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054, 72054–55 (2004)
(noting 260% increase in hedge fund assets over the preceding five years).
99. See SEC Staff Hedge Fund Report, supra note 95, at 88–96. See also infra
Section I.E.1.
100. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 12 and 18 of the
U.S.C.). As noted below, GLB repealed the Depression-era Glass–Steagall Act (Pub. L.
No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)).
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Act. Prior to the GLB, banks that provided asset management services
were excluded from regulation under the IAA because the IAA’s
definition of investment adviser expressly excluded banks from that
definition. Banks, however, were (and still are) significant players in the
asset management field in terms of registered investment companies
under the ICA (e.g., advising mutual funds),101 overseeing pension assets
(including collective trusts), common trusts of bank customers, and trust
accounts for bank clients. However, banks enjoyed an exclusion from
the IAA because they were not deemed investment advisers within the
meaning of the IAA. The GLB amended the IAA to redraw the
jurisdictional lines for banks. To the extent that a bank or its affiliates
advise—or manage the assets of—registered investment companies, the
affiliate or designated group of personnel with the bank is deemed to be
an investment adviser required to register as such under the IAA. 102
Other asset management by banks or bank affiliates remain outside the
realm of the IAA.
Although GLB’s contribution appears to be no more than a
technical agency jurisdictional issue, the adjustment is noteworthy. The
amendment, once again, underscored the reorientation of the IAA’s
regulatory arc toward a regulatory scheme that prioritizes oversight of
asset managers. To be sure, GLB was at best half a loaf. After all, while
a significant share of banks’ asset management services remained
excluded from the IAA, it also sounded the steady drumbeat to bring
unregulated asset managers of securities portfolios under the umbrella of
the IAA, a theme that reemerged in the Dodd–Frank Act discussed
below.

101. Bank access to the registered investment company market was the subject of
litigation that found its way to the Supreme Court. Banks were precluded from
sponsoring and advising registered funds (see Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
621, 639 (1971)), but successfully circumvented the obstacle by conducting such
activities through bank affiliates. See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Inv. Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 78 (1981).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
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E. DODD–FRANK’S 2010 IAA AMENDMENTS: OF ASSET MANAGERS
AND FIDUCIARIES
The Financial Crisis of 2008 led to major reforms in the financial
sector with respect to banking, derivatives, and financial institutions. 103
Tucked within the massive legislative response, known as the Dodd–
Frank Act,104 were amendments and provisions that touched on the
Investment Advisers Act: (i) significantly revising the exemptive
scheme for investment adviser registration under the IAA, especially for
private funds (the “2010 Registration Amendments”);105 and (ii)
expressly recognizing a federal interest in a standard of conduct,
including fiduciary standards, to govern not only investment advisers,
but also broker-dealers (together, so-called “securities professionals”) in
delivering personalized investment services to retail clients (the “2010
Conduct Parity Provisions”).106 Interestingly, the motivation for the
2010 Registration Amendments and the 2010 Conduct Parity Provisions
was not directly linked to the Financial Crisis.107 Rather, the genesis for

103. The literature on the 2008 Financial Crisis is enormous. For the official
government report, see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT].
104. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (formally known as the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) (herein referred to as the
“Dodd–Frank Act”); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 40 (2010) (“Th[e] devastation
[caused by the Financial Crisis] was made possible by a long-standing failure of our
regulatory structure to keep pace with the changing financial system and prevent the
sort of dangerous risk-taking that led us to this point, propelled by greed, excess, and
irresponsibility. The United States’ financial regulatory structure, constructed in a
piecemeal fashion over many decades, remains hopelessly inadequate to handle the
complexities of modern finance.”).
105. This is set forth in Article IV of the Dodd–Frank Act. See 124 Stat. 1376,
1571–74.
106. These provisions were part of Article IX of the Dodd–Frank Act. See 124 Stat.
1376, 1824–30 and specifically Section 913.
107. This is evident since these types of provisions were not addressed in
government assessments and recommendations focused specifically on causes of the
Financial Crisis. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 103
(highlighting role of corporate governance and risk management at systemically
important financial institutions, erosion of mortgage-lending standards, shadow banking
liquidity practices, over-the-counter derivatives markets and credit-rating agencies, but
not regulation of private funds or standards of conduct of securities professionals); U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION: FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS
NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS
SYSTEM (2009).
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the provisions lay in important issues that had emerged and been
allowed to dangle in the preceding decade.108 The dangling issues
resonated with Congress when Congress embarked upon a massive
legislative response to the Financial Crisis.109 Nevertheless, the
amendments to the IAA pushed the regulatory arc of the IAA in new
directions. As discussed below, the 2010 Registration Amendments
resolved the fundamental status of private fund asset managers (and
indirectly how private funds would be regulated) under the IAA and
introduced additional refinements to the bifurcated registration scheme.
In the case of private funds, many, if not most, private fund advisers, not
previously registered with the SEC, became subject to enhanced
oversight under the IAA, along with their activities. In an unrelated vein,
in the 2010 Conduct Parity Provisions, Congress expanded SEC
rulemaking authority and specifically invited the SEC to expand the
standard of conduct of broker-dealers to retail investors, suggesting that
the purpose would be to establish fiduciary parity or uniformity with
investment advisers under the IAA. Congress, however, did not mandate
parity, and somewhat problematically refrained from prescribing the
exact scope and nature of investment advisers’ fiduciary duties. Each of
these initiatives is discussed separately.
108.
109.

See infra Section I.E.2.
The Obama Administration’s blueprint for regulatory reform, reflecting
legislative proposals that had already begun to circulate, was set forth in a
comprehensive white paper from the Department of Treasury. See generally U.S. DEP’T
OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM–A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY REFORM
REPORT]. While the report was meant as a broad-based response to the Financial Crisis,
and the subject matter of the amendments was reflected in the report’s
recommendations (e.g., registration of advisers, see id. at 37, and harmonization of
investment adviser and broker-dealer fiduciary standards, see id. at 71), it was
recognized that those proposals had an origin independent of the Financial Crisis.
Regarding private funds, see H.R. REP. NO. 111-686, pt. 1, at 6, which accompanied the
Dodd–Frank predecessor bill Private Fund Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R.
3818, 111th Cong. (2009–2010) (noting the financial crisis, but then recounting history
of the SEC’s efforts to extend regulation to hedge fund advisers in the preceding
decade). Regarding revisions to the fiduciary standard applicable to securities
professionals, see H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 49–50 (accompanying a Dodd–Frank
predecessor bill, H.R. 3817–the Investor Protection Act of 2009) (noting that the
substance of the bill took shape independent of the financial crisis, and tracing interest
in fiduciary standards of securities professionals to a study prepared for the SEC by the
RAND Corporation (RAND CORP., TECHNICAL REPORT: INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008))).
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1. Expanding the IAA to Cover Private Fund Asset Managers
As noted, NSMIA expanded the exemption private funds enjoy
from treatment as investment companies, thereby relieving them of
obligations arising under the ICA.110 This may have appeared innocuous
in 1996, but after the Long-Term Capital Management debacle in
1998111 and the rapid growth in assets managed by hedge funds, the SEC
became uneasy.112 While continuing to bring enforcement actions
relating to hedge fund abuses,113 the SEC attempted a rule change–the
so-called Hedge Fund Rule—that effectively would have required
virtually all hedge fund managers (but not private equity and venture
capital managers) to register with the SEC as investment advisers.114 The
rule was challenged and struck down by the D.C. Circuit as beyond the
SEC’s statutory authority.115
The SEC had little recourse from this regulatory defeat, except to
bide its time, absent statutory changes. Its maneuvering room was
significantly constrained. It retained residual rulemaking power, such as
its prophylactic antifraud rulemaking power, to enhance protection of

110.
111.

See supra Section I.D.
See THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999). See
generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001) (a colorful retelling of the events).
112. See generally SEC Staff Hedge Fund Report, supra note 95.
113. The SEC Staff Report enumerates some of these proceedings. See id. at 72–75
(summarizing civil and criminal proceedings against principals); see also Christopher
Cox, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds Before S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 25, 2006) (summarizing thenrecent hedge fund enforcement actions in 2006). One particularly famous hedge fund
Ponzi scheme that led to an SEC action involved Bayou Management and was
estimated to have generated tens of millions of dollars in losses. See Samuel Israel III,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2515, 87 SEC Docket 2864 (May 9, 2006) (order
concluding administrative proceeding summarizing successful civil litigation against
respondent).
114. The rule related to how clients of hedge fund asset managers were counted for
purposes of the then-existing registration exemption for advisers with fewer than 15
clients. The Hedge Fund Rule would have required the asset manager to treat each
hedge fund investor as a client of the adviser. The rule had exclusions for private funds
that generally barred redemptions of ownership interests in less than 2 years. See SEC
v. Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 874–77 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (summarizing history and features
of the rule amendment). These elements, of course, are moot by the court’s decision.
115. Id.
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investors in private funds,116 and, of course, it retained the ability to
bring enforcement actions when necessary.117
In response to the Financial Crisis, Congress completed the
Dodd–Frank Act, the massive legislation that introduced substantial
regulatory reforms to all facets of the financial services industry. The
final legislation in the 111th Congress was an amalgamation of a
number of component legislative proposals that ultimately found
their way into parallel, but not identical, omnibus bills from each
house of Congress: the omnibus House bill (the Frank Bill or H.R.
4173) and the omnibus Senate bill (the Dodd Bill or S. 3217). The
Dodd–Frank Act, as enacted, was the reconciliation of the two
omnibus bills.
The legislative parent of what was to become Article IV regarding
amendments to the private fund adviser registration provisions of the
IAA was H.R. 3818, known as the Kanjorski bill. It is worth noting that
the legislation was independent of any specific SEC advocacy, but the
SEC and its staff were favorably disposed to the basic approach. Most
significantly, Congress amended the IAA’s registration requirements to
remove the fewer-than-15-clients exemption that had previously allowed
private advisers to avoid registration.118 This exemption had been
utilized by many advisers of private funds (hedge, private equity, and
venture capital funds). In its place, Congress adopted a new scheme that
requires advisers of private funds to register if AUM of domesticadvised private funds exceeds $150 million,119 or the adviser exclusively
advises venture capital funds.120 For the first time, the SEC would have
reliable means to regulate private funds (i.e., funds exempt from the
ICA) indirectly through its regulatory mandate over private fund
advisers. In addition, the amendments also made very detailed revisions
to the bifurcated federal-state registration scheme to allocate a bigger
116.
117.

See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the private fund rule).
The reach of Section 206 is not limited to registered investment advisers. See
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
118. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–72 (effectively repealing IAA Section 203(b)(3) and
replacing that provision with a narrow exemption for small entirely foreign advisers
with fewer than 15 U.S. clients).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1) (IAA Section 203(m)).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(I)(1). In addition, Congress required exempt private funds to
file reports with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 4(b)-5 & 17 C.F.R. § 204-4 (2001)
(implementing reporting requirement for Exempt Reporting Advisers).
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chunk of the total class of advisers to state registration schemes.121 The
combined effect of these amendments was to further tilt the SEC’s
resources toward institutional asset management by extending the SEC’s
oversight of private fund advisers and forcing more small personalized
wealth managers to switch from the SEC registration scheme to state
oversight.122 In other words, the SEC could focus its scarce resources on
advisers that managed more assets.

2. The Push for Parity and the 2010 Conduct Parity Provisions
The Dodd–Frank Act also introduced another series of provisions
relevant to understanding a fundamental thematic feature of the IAA–the
standard of conduct applicable to investment advisers. Unlike the 2010
Registration Amendments that addressed the IAA directly, the 2010
Conduct Parity Provisions (“Parity Provisions”) implicated the IAA
peripherally. The Parity Provisions urged consideration, but seemingly
did not mandate adoption of proposals to elevate the standard of conduct
for broker-dealers in giving personalized investment advice to retail
customers so that the standard was more closely aligned with that
applicable to investment advisers in similar circumstances. The Parity
Provisions essentially sought to align the standard of conduct applied to
broker-dealers and investment advisers competing in Box I of the
Simplified Taxonomy set forth at the outset of this article.123 Some in
Congress may have assumed that the applicable IAA standard was a
fiduciary one, even though the statutory amendments were silent in that
regard.124
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2). This section sets forth the registration treatment
of so-called “mid-sized advisers,” a new category of advisers that had the effect of
raising the AUM thresholds on advisers precluded from registering with the SEC
(i.e., advisers to be overseen by state rather than federal regulators). There is no record
of SEC participation on this particular issue.
122. The amendments caused the regulatory transfer of more than 2100 investment
advisers to the state regime, increasing the number of exclusively state-registered
investment advisers from 15,000 in 2010 to over 17,000 by 2013. See NAT’L AM. SEC.
ADM’RS ASS’N (“NASAA”), THE IAA SWITCH: A SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION TO
ENHANCE INVESTOR PROTECTION 2 (2013). In 2020, NASAA reported 17,533 stateregistered investment advisers (by primary state location), 80% of which had two
employees or less. NAT’L AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA 2020 INVESTMENT
ADVISER SECTION ANNUAL REPORT 1, 15 (2020).
123. See supra Table 1.
124. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 49 (2009) (summarizing testimony
regarding fiduciary duty “emanating” from SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
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So, what was the impetus for the 2010 Conduct Parity Provisions?
The answer involves a somewhat twisted narrative going back many
years.125 The basic thrust of this story is the steady erosion over time of
the retail business model of broker-dealers over several generations.
When the IAA was enacted, broker-dealers typically depended on
revenue generated from commission-based compensation in their retail
business at a time when commissions were fixed.126 The fixed
commission model differed from the business model for investment
counsel, a business model that was based on asset-based or fee-based
compensation models (i.e., a percentage of the value of client’s assets
under management or a regular, recurring charge of some sort).127 The
broker-dealer commission-based model had been in decline for years
due to numerous factors, most notably the elimination of fixed-rate
commissions in 1975.128 Competition among broker-dealers led to lower
(and in the case of discount brokers, sharply lower) brokerage
commission rates, and online access to brokers further fueled

Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)), and H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 75 (2009) (“The Committee
aims to apply the current state of law to brokers and dealers and does not intend to
undermine or dilute this fiduciary standard and market practice for investment
advisers.”), with S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 105 (2010) (agnostically noting need for study
“whether there are legal or regulatory gaps or overlap in legal or regulatory standards in
the protection of retail customers” with respect to brokers-dealers and investment
advisers with delegation of rulemaking authority).
125. See Laby, supra note 20, at 277–87 (providing an extended summary of key
aspects of this history). For an insider’s perspective on the history of the events that
culminated many years later into the Regulation Best Interest Initiative (see infra note
265) from a former Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, see
Andrew J. Donohue, Keynote Remarks at the Conference on Regulation Best Interest at
the McCombs School of Business: The Long Road to Regulation Best Interest (Feb. 11,
2020); Andrew J. Donohue, Best Interest or Fiduciary Duty (unpublished summary of
2018 SEC proposal on Regulation Best Interest) (on file with author).
126. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(summarizing history relating to brokerage commission model for incidental investment
advice); see also infra note 265 (discussing the Solely Incidental Interpretation).
127. Id. at 485.
128. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424, 20425 (2005) (in
adopting the rule that was later struck down in Financial Planning Association, the
SEC was motivated by “changes in the market place for retail brokerage”); see also
Laby, supra note 20, at 279–81. For an overview of the history relating to the end of
fixed commission rates, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
481–86 (rev. ed. 1995).
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competitive pressure on broker-dealers’ commission-based revenue
models.129
In 1995, the broker-dealer industry with the encouragement of the
SEC issued a report–the so-called Tully Report130–which formally
recommended that broker-dealers diminish the role of commissionbased compensation with respect to non-discount retail customers and
that broker-dealers move toward asset-based compensation models. This
development triggered regulatory uncertainty regarding the treatment of
broker-dealer accounts that received non-discretionary advisory services
but charged asset-based fees. Under the IAA, broker-dealers who
provide investment advice that is “solely incidental” to their acting as a
broker are not deemed investment advisers.131 However, the brokerdealer “solely incidental” exception counts the receipt of commissions
as compensation, a disqualifying factor for the exception under the
statute, rather than some excluded form of special compensation.
Allowing broker-dealers to charge asset-based fees with respect to
servicing non-discretionary advisory accounts, without registering as an
investment adviser, marked a change.132
The SEC adopted a rule that would have permitted brokers to
receive asset-based compensation for servicing non-discretionary
advisory brokerage accounts, thereby preserving for broker-dealers the
regulatory distinction between non-discretionary advisory broker-dealer
business (as a broker-dealer) and asset management for clients

129. The effect on eliminating fixed commission rates was immediate for the
industry. See Aharon R. Ofer & Arie Melnick, Price Deregulation in the Brokerage
Industry: An Empirical Analysis, 9 BELL J. ECON. 633, 640 (1978) (“As with the
breakdown of any cartel, prices did decline significantly.”). This process has inexorably
led to very low and even zero commissions for retail investors today. See Lisa Beilfuss
& Alexander Osipovich, The Race to Zero Commissions, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2019);
Jason Zweig, Lessons of May Day 1975 Ring True Today, WALL ST. J. (April 30, 2015).
130. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES (1995). The Committee was formed at the
request of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, but it was not an official agency advisory
committee. The Chair of the ad hoc Committee was Daniel P. Tully of Merrill Lynch &
Co. Inc.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). Of course, broker-dealers who actually managed
client accounts were treated as investment advisers who had to register as such at least
with respect to those client-managed accounts. Broker-dealers in this context operated
as dual registrants: registered broker-dealers for purposes of normal brokerage
operations and advisory-only accounts, and as registered investment advisers for
purposes of who-for purposes.
132. Id.
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conducted by broker-dealers (as an investment adviser), regardless of
how broker-dealers were compensated by customers.133 However, the
SEC rule was challenged by the Financial Planners Association (FPA)
and struck down by the D.C. Circuit.134 The FPA objected to the rule
because it allowed broker-dealers to service advisory-only relationships
while receiving asset-based fees without registering as investment
advisers.135 From the FPA’s perspective, this put financial planners at a
competitive disadvantage relative to broker-dealers in servicing
advisory-only accounts because financial planners are treated as
investment advisers, and therefore, unlike broker-dealers, are subject to
higher conduct standards in dealing with clients.136
Although the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s rule, controversy
continued with an SEC-commissioned study completed in 2008 by the
RAND Corporation, which found that retail customers with brokerdealer accounts that received incidental investment advice (and therefore
were within the ambit of the IAA) did not understand the difference
between standards of conduct governing investment advisers and
broker-dealers.137 As noted then, and to a lesser extent now, brokerdealers providing advice (again, in the non-discretionary advisory sense)
are subject to a lower (non-fiduciary) standard of conduct, in contrast to
the higher standard of conduct applicable to investment advisers in those
circumstances.138 The RAND Report triggered interest by regulators and

133. See Fin. Plan. Ass’n v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 481, 485–86 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(summarizing the SEC rule adopted with the release referenced at note 128 supra).
134. Id. at 483.
135. Id. at 486.
136. Id. at 486–87.
137. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND CORP., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 117–18 (2008)
[hereinafter RAND BROKER-DEALER REPORT].
138. An underlying point of contention that is not specifically relevant to this article
concerns whether the standards, although different in formulation, are not all that
different in practice. Commentators disagree. Compare Laby, supra note 20, at 276–77
(“When providing advice to customers, brokers are subject to a ‘suitability’
standard . . . . The theory behind the suitability rule is that when a broker recommends a
security, he is making an implied representation that the security is consistent with the
investor’s objectives and therefore a suitable investment . . . . Under the Advisers Act,
advisers are subject to a higher ‘fiduciary’ standard of care . . . . [A]n adviser’s
recommendation must not only be ‘suitable,’ it also must be in the client’s best
‘interest.’”), with Wrona, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“Media reports have repeatedly
described the differences between the two standards by stating that advisers are subject
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investor advocates in more closely examining the standard of conduct
for broker-dealers providing retail customers with investment advice.
The divergence in standards of conduct governing broker-dealers
and investment advisers was something considered by Congress in
connection with the mammoth Dodd–Frank Act. The 2009 Treasury
Report explicitly recommended action on the issue.139 In turn, this led to
competing legislative proposals in Congress that were reconciled in a
provision of the Dodd–Frank Act—Section 913.140
The solution crafted in the final legislation was intricate. Congress
settled on an agency inquiry mandate coupled with intertwined
rulemaking provisions. First, Congress charged the SEC with producing
a report on the effectiveness of standards of conduct of securities
professionals in providing personalized investment advice to retail
customers and enumerated numerous factors that it urged the SEC to
consider relating to the need for harmonization of the standards of
conduct among securities professionals.141 Second, in Section 913(f),
Congress gave the SEC expansive rulemaking authority to address the
legal and regulatory “standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment
advisers, [and their associated persons in] providing personalized
investment advice about securities to . . . retail customers.”142 Third, in
Section 913(g), Congress established a separate grant of rulemaking
authority to the SEC to mandate a “best interest” standard for broker-

to a stringent fiduciary duty requiring them to act in their customers’ best interests,
while broker-dealers are subject to a weaker duty that merely requires their
recommendations be suitable for their customers. That interpretation of the fiduciary
duty and of the suitability rule has begun to shape, and to a great extent skew, the
debate. If the goal of the debate ultimately is to lead to meaningful regulatory reform,
this mischaracterization is unhelpful as a starting point.”).
139. See TREASURY REFORM REPORT, supra note 109, at 71–72 (the
recommendation, which can be traced back to legislative hearings in the preceding year,
was grouped with various consumer and investor protection measures, including
establishment of a consumer financial protection agency).
140. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824–30.
141. See § 913(b), 124 Stat. at 1824. The staff completed its report in 2011. See
infra notes 144 & 264. Senate Hearings specifically addressed the possibility of a
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers in providing
personalized investment advice to retail customers. See Implementing the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 55 (2010) (statement of Daniel K. Akaka,
Member, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs).
142. See § 913(f), 124 Stat. at 1827–28 (so-called “913(f)” rulemaking).
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dealers and investment advisers “when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers.” 143
The various sub-parts of Section 913 at the very least reflect a
congressional inability to reach a bright-line legislative consensus.
While it is clear that the statutory language seems to have been designed
to encourage the SEC’s exercise of its rulemaking authority, in the end
the statutory language did not compel rulemaking. What ensued was a
delayed and uneven response to the legislative aspirations expressed in
the Dodd–Frank Act. The SEC staff issued a report that endorsed
significant elements of harmonization with respect to a standard of
conduct for securities professionals,144 but the SEC failed to move
forward and ultimately, with more than a few twists and turns in the
intervening years,145 completed a watered-down, multi-part rulemaking
(referred to herein as the “Regulation Best Interest Initiative”).146 For
purposes here, however, these efforts have yielded an unintended effect:
confusion about fiduciary obligations of investment advisers under the
IAA. The issue of regulatory confusion in the SEC’s approach to
fiduciary concepts under the IAA is addressed in Part IV. At this point
in the article, however, it is sufficient to point out that Congress reached
a new legislative insight in 2010: There is a regulatory logic in making
sure that Securities Professionals who engage in advisory-only
activities, even if only incidentally to other professional activities, are
subjected to fiduciary obligations in order to ensure greater alignment in
143. § 913(g), 124 Stat. at 1828 (so-called “913(g)” rulemaking). The provision
amended both the Exchange Act’s broker-dealer requirements and the IAA’s
investment adviser requirements. Specifically, a new sub-section (k) was added to
Exchange Act Section 15 to give the SEC the rulemaking power to establish a flexible
fiduciary duty for broker-dealers in providing personalized investment advice to retail
customers relative to the standard of conduct fixed pursuant to IAA Section 211’s
rulemaking powers. In addition, Congress amended IAA Section 211, creating a new
sub-section (g), to give Congress rulemaking power to provide the standard of conduct
for investment advisers and other securities professionals when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers, including a best interest standard.
Congress also added parallel companion provisions requiring the SEC to harmonize
enforcement efforts under such rules with respect to securities professionals.
144. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS (2011); see also Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote
Remarks at the Investment Management Institute: A Tale of Two Studies (Feb. 10,
2011).
145. See infra note 264.
146. See infra note 265.
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the relevant standard of conduct applied to the securities professional. In
other words, and again as relevant to the limited purview of this article,
standards applicable to investment advisers, a category introduced by
the IAA, may need to be rationalized relative to standards applicable to
other securities professionals, and most notably, broker-dealers and their
personnel.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IAA: MIXED MESSAGES ABOUT
FUNCTION AND CONTEXT
The Supreme Court has considered the IAA and its underlying
legislative intent in only three decisions. These decisions offer a judicial
counterpoint to the narrative regarding Congress’s legislative
transformation of the IAA. The Supreme Court’s three IAA decisions,
issued over many years, are incremental stopping points that do not
share a common message: SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc.147 in 1963; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis148 in
1979; and Lowe v. SEC149 in 1985. Two cases addressed providers of
investment advice acting in an impersonal purely advisory capacity,
while one concerned an adviser acting in an impersonal managerial
capacity. The two decisions concerning purely advisory services are
heavily reliant on legislative history to give meaning to the IAA’s text.
Capital Gains exhibits a functional, principles-based approach that
advances a remedial and flexible reading of the statute that nevertheless
is tethered to text.150 In contrast, Lowe offers a non-textual reading of the
statute, relying heavily on a selective reading of the IAA’s legislative
history to derive a self-limiting statutory purpose that attempts to
artificially cabin the Act’s scope.151 The remaining IAA decision,
reflecting a sharply-divided court, addressed implied private rights.152
That issue transcends the confines of the IAA, but Transamerica was
one of several decisions that foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s
inexorable movement toward textualist principles of statutory

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

375 U.S. 180 (1963).
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
472 U.S. 181 (1985).
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra notes 171–180 and accompanying text.
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construction generally, as well as in the context of federal securities
law.153
Supreme Court decisions interpreting a statute are on a different
footing from congressional legislation as discussed in Part I. Statutory
construction by courts is necessarily reactive to language choice made
by Congress and is circumscribed by the way litigants frame issues for
judicial review. There is another complicating factor: Judicial
interpretations are snapshots in time, and these snapshots can take on a
life of their own in subsequent Supreme Court dicta,154 or may exhibit
methods of statutory construction that are less favored in contemporary
jurisprudence.155 These considerations suggest a need for caution in
evaluating the role of the Supreme Court in shaping the IAA’s
regulatory arc.156
A. CAPITAL GAINS’ FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DECEIT
Capital Gains addressed the scope of the IAA’s antifraud provision
(Section 206 and more specifically Sections 206 (1) & (2)).157 The
defendant in an SEC civil proceeding, Capital Gains Research Bureau,
made recommendations to subscribers of its newsletter to purchase the
stock of various issuers without disclosing the adviser’s practice of
acquiring modest positions in the recommended issuer in advance of the
adviser’s recommendation, or the frequent selling of the firm’s positions
shortly after disseminating recommendations.158 The strategy, while
153. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 23–43 (2006) (tracing the various strands in the emergence of modern textualism and
the consensus regarding core principles). For an excellent detailed historical analysis of
these issues in shaping securities law analysis, see A.C. Pritchard & Robert B.
Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit and
the Triumph of Purpose over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (2018); see also infra
Section IV.A.2 (discussing how modern textualist principles undercut the Adviser
Conduct Interpretation).
154. Indeed, dicta has played a conflating role in understanding the IAA. See infra
note 315.
155. See infra Section IV.A.2.
156. For example, contemporary theories of statutory interpretation are of great
relevance in reaching a proper understanding of the status of fiduciary concepts under
the IAA and indeed provide grounds for viewing the SEC’s Adviser Conduct
Interpretation skeptically. See infra Section IV.A.
157. SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963).
158. Id. at 182–83.
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profitable for the adviser, was a marginal source of profit for the firm.159
The SEC sought injunctive relief to prevent this practice as fraudulent,
or at least deceitful, within the meaning of the Act based on violations of
Section 206(1)–which prohibits use of “any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud any client”–and Section 206(2)–which prohibits participation in
“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client.”160 A divided en banc appellate court
affirmed the district court’s denial of an injunction on grounds that the
SEC had failed to show an intent consistent with either fraud or deceit in
Capital Gains Bureau’s actions.161 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that proof of an intent to deceive (scienter) was not
required, at least under Section 206(2).162 The Court’s holding rested on
a disclosure-based rationale, or as the Court described it, liability
“encompass[ing] nondisclosure of material facts.”163 In the Court’s
159.
160.

See id. at 202 (Appendix to the Opinion of the Court).
The Court’s opinion did not explicitly distinguish between Sections 206(1)
(i.e., the fraud prohibition) and 206(2) (i.e., the prohibition of practices that operate as a
fraud or deceit). However, the language the Court used to justify its holding tracked
Section 206(2): “operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”
Id. at 191 (internal quotations omitted); accord id. at 192. The SEC explicitly sought
relief under both subsections of Section 206. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, SEC v. Cap.
Gains Rsch. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (No. 42) (urging Court to hold that “this
breach of respondent’s fiduciary duty violated sections 206(1) and (2)”).
161. SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
162. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 201. The Court did not specifically invoke the
term scienter, but rather requirements of “intent to injure” and “deliberate dishonesty.”
See id. at 192, 195, 200. The Court’s subsequent explanations of similar language in the
federal securities laws clarified the holding in terms of scienter. Specifically, the
Supreme Court held a decade later that “fraud” under the Securities Exchange Act
required scienter (that is, an intent to deceive or a culpable state of mind). See Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1977). In a post-Hochfelder discussion of
language in Section 17 of the Securities Act (language similar to Section 206(2) of the
IAA), the Court held that prohibitions of “untrue statements” or practices that operate
as a deceit on investors do not require scienter. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695–
97 (1980). In the Court’s view, the plain language found in Section 17 of the Securities
Act and Section 206(2) of the IAA (in light of its earlier decision in Capital Gains)
made clear that such language does “not require ‘a showing [of] deliberate dishonesty
as a condition to protecting investors.’” Id. at 697 (citing Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at
200).
163. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186; see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196–97
(“Accordingly, we hold that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 empowers the courts,
upon a showing such as that made here, to require an adviser to make full and frank
disclosure of his practice of trading on the effect of his recommendations.”). Congress
understandably included not only a general fraud prohibition but a “specific
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view, Section 206(2) was intended to cause advisers to disclose all
material conflicts of interest to clients in connection with advisers’
investment recommendations.164
The significance of this decision cannot be overstated, as it is easily
the most influential judicial decision in the IAA canon. However, its
treatment of the fiduciary status of investment advisers, and its meaning,
remain a source of continuing uncertainty even today. The Court’s
purposive interpretation underscored the Act’s expansive remedial
purposes, but did not wholly depart from the statute’s language. 165
Although the Court noted that the legislative history’s primary focus
was on “personalized counseling to investors,” the Act’s language was
not so limited.166 In other words, the IAA’s plain language should not be
given an unduly narrow reading to forestall a result consistent with the
statutory purpose ascribed to it by the Court.167

proscription against nondisclosure,” given that common law courts contemporaneous
with the IAA’s enactment were “merging the proscription against non-disclosure into
the general proscription against fraud.” Id. at 198.
164. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–92 (The IAA reflects “a congressional
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an
investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously–to render advice which was not
disinterested.”); see also id. at 187 (SEC report urged that “all conflicts of interest
between the investment counsel and the client [be] removed”).
165. See id. at 195 (Congress intended that the IAA should “be construed like other
securities legislation . . . not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purpose.”). In this respect, Professors Pritchard and Thompson’s views are
slightly overstated. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 153, at 396 (arguing that
Goldberg’s majority opinion for the Capital Gains Court secured the “ultimate victory”
for the dissenters in the Second Circuit over the en banc majority opinion that had
rejected the claim on the theory that purpose could not trump text). The two authors
conclude that the Supreme Court opinion in Capital Gains implicitly endorsed a
philosophy that “statutory text was no match for the flexible/remedial interpretive
canon, fueled by fiduciary duty analysis.” See id. While Justice Goldberg’s opinion
admittedly exhibits a strong purposivist orientation, the opinion nevertheless attempted
to find a textual foothold for its argument and specifically in the meaning of the elastic
statutory phrase of “‘practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit’
upon any client . . . .” Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191.
166. Id. at 187 n.15.
167. Id. at 199–200. The Court separately rejected an argument that the expansive
rulemaking authority conferred on the SEC to “prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent . . . fraud[]” in the 1960 Amendments (new authority which was prospectively
available to prohibit the conduct of the Capital Gains Research Bureau) did not compel
an unduly narrow construction of the original IAA Section 206 from 1940. Id. at 199.

2021]

BENDING THE REGULATORY ARC

49

The discussion of the fiduciary nature of relation between an
adviser and its client in Capital Gains is critical to contemporary
understandings and misunderstandings of the IAA. Capital Gains did
not hold, nor did the Court’s language state, that the IAA established a
broad self-effectuating fiduciary standard for investment advisers.
Instead, the Court referred to the fiduciary nature of an adviser’s
relationship to its client as an operative feature of common law.168 In
other words, the Capital Gains Court subscribed to a fiduciary standard
of disclosure, as argued for by the SEC at that time.169 Subsequent
isolated Supreme Court dicta have misstated the point, and recent SEC
pronouncements have sought to bolster such dicta, a point that is
addressed in Part IV below.170 For now, it is sufficient to note that the
opinion’s expansive reading of the statute came from reading its textual
proscriptions in light of then-emerging common law fiduciary duties,
rather than construing the statute as itself establishing an enforceable
federal fiduciary duty for investment advisers.
Transamerica, decided a little more than fifteen years after Capital
Gains, involved an action against a fund asset manager (i.e., a form of
impersonal managerial advice, unlike in Capital Gains).171 The
underlying private cause of action sought rescission of the adviser’s
advisory agreement, recovery of management fees, and monetary
damages for fiduciary misconduct of the adviser.172 Substantively, the
Court offered general support for the holding in Capital Gains, and

168. See id. at 191 (The statute “reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship . . . .’”); id. at 194 (“Congress
recognized the investment adviser to be [a fiduciary] . . . .”); id. at 201 (“The statute, in
recognition of the adviser’s fiduciary relationship to his clients,” imposes
requirements.).
169. Id. at 201:
To insure [disinterestedness, the IAA] empowers the courts to require disclosure of
material facts . . . . [W]hat is required is ‘a picture not simply of the show window,
but of the entire store . . . not simply truth in the statements volunteered, but
disclosure.’ . . . Experience has shown that disclosure in such situations, while not
onerous to the adviser, is needed to preserve the climate of fair dealing which is so
essential to maintain public confidence in the securities industry (internal citations
omitted).

(quoting in part Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 48 YALE L.J.
227, 242 (1933) (discussing a similar philosophy animating the Securities Act of
1933)).
170. See infra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.
171. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 13 (1979).
172. Id. at 14.
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arguably expanded its scope in dicta.173 Nevertheless, the only issue
before the Court concerned implied rights of action under the IAA. A
closely divided court held that while a cause of action for equitable
relief could be implied under the language of Section 215,174 a similar
private action could not be implied for monetary damages under Section
206.175
The issue of implied rights of action may appear unrelated to the
IAA’s regulatory arc, but it has had significant unanticipated regulatory
consequences. First, foreclosure of implied private actions has served as
a check on expansive theories of liability under Section 206 and instead
generally confined liability determinations to SEC-initiated
proceedings.176 Second, by foreclosing implied private actions for
damages under the IAA, any lack of parity in conduct standards
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers does not manifest
itself in terms of remedies for damages under the federal securities
law.177
173. Id. at 17 (“As we have previously recognized, § 206 establishes ‘federal
fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers . . . .” (citations
omitted)). Indeed, the Act’s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended
to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”). The dicta is ambiguous in an important
respect as discussed in Part IV. One reading is consistent with the interpretation of
Capital Gains offered above, namely that any fiduciary standard was tethered to (and
hence qualified by) practices that operate as a fraud or deceit by a fiduciary (which is
referred to herein as the “tethered” theory of fiduciary obligation). The alternative
reading is that the Transamerica Court construed Capital Gains as imposing an
untethered generalized fiduciary obligation on investment advisers under the IAA
(which is referred to herein as the “untethered” theory of fiduciary obligation).
174. Id. at 18–19.
175. See id. at 19–24.
176. The Court has at times commented on the expansive effect created by private
securities law actions. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748
(1975); cf. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1006
(1994). In contrast, although the SEC frequently seeks to extend application of liability
principles, it does so in ways that tends to be incremental and disciplined. See id.
177. The scope of IAA Section 206 is not identical with the antifraud provision of
the Securities Exchange Act (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder). Most clearly,
there is no purchase and sale requirement under Section 206. In addition, Section
206(2) does not require scienter. See supra note 162. While the conduct of advisers
involving a purchase or sale of securities could be subject to private actions to the same
extent as broker-dealers under Rule 10b-5, the adviser will not face actions for
monetary damage liability under Section 206. Compare Hennessee Grp. LLC,
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The Court’s decision is important in another respect. The Court
framed the issue of implied private rights of action as one of “statutory
construction” under the IAA.178 While the analysis involving implication
of private actions has not always been viewed on the same statutory
construction footing as statutory construction in other contexts,
Transamerica signaled a new sensibility regarding principles of
statutory construction.179 It specifically rejected resorting to statutory
purpose in the absence of evidence of statutory intent to achieve the
asserted result.180 Although confined to the seemingly narrow issue of
the existence of implied right of action, Transamerica’s statutory
analysis in fact signaled a more cautious approach to statutory
construction generally, including under the IAA. Transamerica’s textual
analysis of the IAA stands as a harbinger for renewed focus on textual
analysis in matters arising under the IAA specifically as well as other
statutes generally, an issue that reappears in Section IV.A.2 below.
B. LOWE AND CONTEXTUAL DYSFUNCTION
Unlike the Supreme Court’s flexible textual reading of the IAA in
Capital Gains or the more searching textual reading in Transamerica,
Lowe181 represents a puzzling exploration of the IAA by the Supreme
Court. The decision exemplifies an unapologetically purposivist
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2871, 2009 WL 1077451, at *11 (Apr. 22, 2009)
(finding fraudulent and deceitful conduct under the IAA), with S. Cherry St. LLC v.
Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of private
investor private action under Rule 10b-5 for failure to allege facts satisfying the
relevant scienter pleading requirement).
178. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15 (“The question whether a statute creates a cause
of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory
construction.”).
179. See id.; see also Molot, supra note 153, at 20–23 (discussing how implied right
of action jurisprudence served as a precursor for the modern shift in Supreme Court
case law on statutory interpretation). This shift began with a very malleable
textual/purposive approach (see generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)) that has
given way to a much more searching textual approach. See generally Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Transamerica, as well as another securities law case,
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, signaled some discomfort with the Court’s Cort
jurisprudence. 422 U.S. 560 (1979).
180. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24 (“But the mere fact that the statute was designed
to protect advisers’ clients does not require the implication of a private cause of action
for damages . . . . The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create
any such remedy.” (citations omitted)).
181. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
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approach to interpreting the statute and in this case, an unusually
unpersuasive reading of the legislative history and text.182 Before the
Supreme Court, the case concerned the propriety of an injunction
against continued publication of an investment newsletter by a former
(and therefore unregistered) investment adviser who had been the
subject of an administrative order barring him from the industry.183 The
injunction presented a constitutional issue of enjoining continued
publication of an investment newsletter (that is, a form of prior restraint
of publication).184
A threshold issue for the majority turned on the construction of the
statutory term “investment adviser” and its exclusion of a publisher of
“any bona fide newspaper . . . or financial publication of general and
regular circulation”–the so-called publisher exclusion.185 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens invoked principles of constitutional avoidance
to indicate that construction of the publisher’s exclusion should be given
the widest possible latitude to either narrow or eliminate any
constitutional question.186 With that, his opinion launched into a
consideration of the purposes of the IAA to inform its understanding of
the publisher exclusion.187 After an extensive survey of the legislative
history and hearings leading to enactment of the IAA, Justice Stevens
concluded that “the Act was designed to apply [only] to those
persons . . . who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s
concerns,”188 rather than persons providing communications that
“remain entirely impersonal and do not develop into . . . fiduciary,

182. See infra notes 322–325 and accompanying text (discussing purposivist
approaches to statutory construction).
183. Id. at 183. Lowe had previously been sanctioned by the SEC for misconduct in
operating an investment advisory firm that he owned and was barred from the industry
by an SEC enforcement action. Subsequently, he began to market two different
investment newsletters and another publication that provided stock charts. The SEC
contended that Lowe was acting as an investment adviser in violation of the injunction
barring him from the industry. See id. at 184–86.
184. Id. at 211, 228–35 (White, J. concurring). For Justice White and two other
justices, prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment was the central issue: one
which the majority opinion avoided based on its finding that Lowe was not acting as an
investment adviser.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D); see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203.
186. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 189–90.
187. See id. at 190–202.
188. Id. at 207–08.
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person-to-person relationships.”189 Because Lowe came within the
publisher’s exclusion, the majority opinion concluded he had not acted
as an investment adviser.190 Since he had not violated the original
injunction, the Court reinstated the district court’s decision that had
denied the SEC’s request for an injunction prohibiting Lowe from
publishing his investment newsletters.191
Justice White’s concurrence for three justices zeroed in on the
problematic features of Justice Stevens’ analysis, beginning with the
majority’s invocation of constitutional avoidance as a justification for its
statutory construction.192 Prior restraint, whether applied to the press or
commercial speech, as Justice White observed, is disfavored under wellestablished constitutional doctrine, and therefore, avoidance principles
provided no basis for a contorted reading of the IAA.193 Instead, Justice
White provided a close reading of the statute and legislative history to
rebut the idea that the statute enacted by Congress in 1940 was solely
limited to personalized advice.194 Although the legislative history
contained multiple references to examples of personalized investment
advice (as Justice Stevens noted), this “hodgepodge of materials”
showing that Congress was indeed focused on personalized advice in
part, could not exclude or narrow the meaning of “investment adviser”
given the statute’s language and a legislative history that explicitly
encompassed impersonal investment advice as well.195 The statute’s text
expressly indicated that the statute went beyond personalized advice. 196

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211–36.
See id. at 212–13, 227. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P.
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 2109 (2015) (discussing how constitutional avoidance frequently functions to
mask judicial activism through statutory construction).
194. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 219–23.
195. Id. at 221 n.7.
196. Id. at 218. The plain language of the investment adviser definition by its own
terms is not limited to personalized advice, but rather expressly encompasses
impersonal forms of written advice provided by businesses which “issue[] or
promulgate[] analyses or reports concerning securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). The
concurrence also noted that the Act’s narrower term “investment counsel” in Section
208, which in 1940 was regarded primarily as a form of personalized investment
management, served as further statutory evidence that the more general term
“investment adviser” was broader in scope than merely personalized advice. Id. at 221
n.7. Finally, the use of a “bona fide publication” in the exclusion suggested that there
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Moreover, the majority’s view was at odds with the Court’s own prior
observations regarding the statute’s scope in Capital Gains.197
Contrary to the majority’s straightjacketed version of the statute,
the IAA, as enacted in 1940, imposed only modest regulatory burdens.
The SEC’s original legislative goal in proposing the adviser legislation
in 1940 was mainly to gather information in an unsupervised area,
which implicitly signaled an open-ended agenda in terms of future
initiatives for a more comprehensive regulatory approach.198
There is also some irony to the majority’s opinion in Lowe. As
noted, the investment management industry regulates asset managers
that provide impersonal asset management services to pooled investment
vehicles with respect to assets in the tens of trillions of dollars. Justice
Stevens’ theory of the statute as exclusively focused on personal
investment management advice was anachronistic, even at the time of
the Lowe decision. Again, as noted, Congress had specifically amended
the IAA in 1970 to eliminate the registration exemption for managers
that exclusively served registered investment companies, namely asset
managers providing impersonal advice.199 The antiquated view of
investment advice as wholly personalized has given way in practice to a
brave new world of layered advisory services in which an investor
receives overlapping investment services from different sources. For
example, retail investors may frequently receive personalized
investment advice from a wealth manager who consults research
materials prepared by other advisers to select an investment portfolio
whose components are investment funds managed by asset managers
providing impersonal management services. Thus, the role of the IAA is
not, as Lowe suggests, to explain one of many layers of investment

were impersonal publications that would not come within the exclusion. In addition, the
majority was silent as to how impersonal forms of asset management (involving pooled
investment vehicles) came within the statute, given that, in its view, the statute was
exclusively designed to address personalized advice.
197. See SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 n.15 (1963) (“While
the [Investment Trust Study] concentrated on investment advisory services which
provide personalized counseling to investors . . . [the relevant Senate Committee] did
receive communications from publishers of investment advisory services . . . and the
Act specifically covers ‘any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings.’”) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2).
198. See supra Section I.A.
199. See supra Section I.C.
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advisory services, but rather an attempt to encompass the many layers of
investment advice within a single overarching statutory model.
Finally, Lowe needlessly created an unnecessary regulatory
loophole for the incipient internet age. The internet enables purveyors of
impersonal investment advice to blast (i.e., disseminate) their
recommendations to the public, including in targeted form through
social media. Is such information personalized if it is part of a targeted
social media campaign? Analytically, there is no reason to think such
electronically mass disseminated communications (e.g., blast e-mails)
are any more personalized than a newsletter disseminated by ordinary
mail. If there is no distinction, social media would constitute an apparent
expansive loophole created by the Lowe Court’s reasoning.
Notwithstanding the obstacle created by Lowe in applying the IAA to
advice disseminated over social media, the SEC has successfully worked
around the problem.200
***

What can be said about the Supreme Court’s mixed messages? In
the end, the legal consequences of the Court’s decisions have varied.
Capital Gains represented a huge stride in understanding the scope of
the Act’s antifraud provision as encompassing a fiduciary disclosure
standard tethered to practices that might operate as a fraud and deceit
through a functional interpretation of the statute’s language.
Transamerica underscored the significance of the IAA text in
understanding its regulatory arc and indirectly elevated the significance
of the SEC by largely sidelining any private actions for damages for
clients under the IAA (though not foreclosing private remedies under the
Exchange Act). Lowe stands out as an unfortunate decision that is
difficult to square with the statute’s language or regulatory arc. The
200. See SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (distinguishing Lowe
because blast e-mail created the semblance of personalized communications). In
addition, the SEC has sidestepped Lowe’s insulation of material arguably covered by
the “publisher exclusion” by recourse to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act
where the content disseminated is actually fraudulent (thus, eliminating the need to
show that the malfeasor acted as an investment adviser). See, e.g., SEC v. Pirate Invs.
LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming judgment against publisher for violating
Exchange Act’s antifraud provision in connection with its recommendation of an
issuer’s company that contained false information); SEC Brings Fraud Charges Against
Former CBS MarketWatch Columnist Thom Calandra for Illegal Trading Scheme,
Litig. Release No. 19028 (Jan. 10, 2005) (TV news commentator touting stocks for
personal gain found to have violated Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions).
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Supreme Court’s contribution to the IAA’s regulatory arc ultimately
stands as a detached and intermittent one, which has shaped the statute’s
application, but not its direction.
III. THE SEC’S EXPANDING ROLE IN SHAPING THE IAA’S
APPLICATION
Unsurprisingly, the SEC has proven an integral force in shaping
policy under the IAA. As the agency charged with administering the
federal securities laws, including the IAA, the SEC’s administration is
continuous and ongoing and, therefore, the SEC performs a role unlike
the roles performed by either Congress or the Supreme Court. Its role is
necessarily subordinate to Congress’ statutory role in shaping policy, but
the agency has had a more pronounced effect in shaping policy than the
Supreme Court (and other courts) which, as noted, have had more of an
effect in shaping application rather than policy.201 The SEC has been
influential in shaping policy in three broad respects. As previously
discussed in Part I, the SEC has been a key proponent of many
legislative initiatives, an SEC role that is not revisited in this section. In
its more conventional role of administering the IAA, the agency
exercises a direct policy-setting role through its expansive rulemaking
powers. Finally, the agency is able to affect standards of conduct and
practice through its enforcement and examination powers.
In this section, the article turns toward these latter roles of
rulemaking and enforcement and, in particular, how the agency has
changed its orientation over time. The first sub-section of this Part
provides a synopsis of SEC agency rulemaking and enforcement action
prior to 2000 in the IAA context and the second section provides a
comparative synopsis of agency action after 2000.
The SEC’s role under the IAA has expanded over time with respect
to asset management issues relative to its historic emphasis on oversight
of personalized investment management. The SEC’s role in shaping
policy in the asset management sphere has grown significantly for two
reasons. First, in conjunction with continuous expansion of the IAA’s
scope and the SEC’s rulemaking, asset management issues have loomed
large in presenting more difficult and intricate challenges. Over time, the
SEC has exercised its enforcement powers with greater assertiveness,

201.

See supra Part II.
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which two commentators have dubbed “regulation by accretion.”202 In
addition, the agency has used its rulemaking powers to enhance
structural safeguards where asset managers have garnered increased
regulatory attention because of their rapid growth (from something
around several billion dollars in assets managed in 1940 to managed
assets in the tens of trillions of dollars today).203
A. THE SEC’S ACTIONS PRIOR TO 2000
As noted, the statute was originally inadequate through its failure to
provide the SEC with the necessary rulemaking authority or an ongoing
presence to ensure enforcement. What is most significant in the period
prior to 2000 was that the SEC gained the rulemaking power and
enforcement resources that enabled it to exercise a significant role in
shaping the IAA’s regulatory arc.
1. The SEC Flexing Its Rulemaking Muscles
The 1960 IAA Amendments fundamentally altered the SEC’s role
in administering the IAA by expressly granting rulemaking in two
specific areas.204 The SEC acted first with respect to recordkeeping
issues. Congress gave the SEC new rulemaking powers over books and
records to accompany the amendment that gave the SEC examination
powers.205 As would be expected, such rules were tightly focused in
response to the Congress’s rulemaking grant.
The other relevant area of rulemaking authority related to the
SEC’s prophylactic antifraud rulemaking authority pursuant to IAA
Section 206(4). As noted earlier, this grant of rulemaking authority
entailed a broader degree of administrative discretion that empowered
the SEC to adopt rules which “prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent” fraudulent and deceptive practices.206 These rules expressly

202. See generally Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of
1940: Regulation by Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2008).
203. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Section I.B.
205. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1961). The rule had the desired effect of opening up
adviser activity to regulatory review judging by decisions that followed. See, e.g., SEC
v. Olsen, 354 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1965) (sustaining civil contempt order against
investment adviser based on the adviser’s withholding of its public business records
from the SEC based on a generalized assertion against self-incrimination).
206. See supra Section I.B.
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encompass practices that are not themselves fraudulent or deceitful (i.e.,
rules designed to rein in practices that might lead to fraud or deceit) and,
therefore, the subject matter of such rules may have a broader scope
than fraud and deceit limitations of Sections 206(1) and Section
206(2).207
The agency, in short, moved forward with prophylactic
rulemakings in two areas which it perceived as having the highest
priority in terms of curbing abusive practices. It began with an
advertising rule (Rule 206(4)-1)208 motivated by seemingly obvious
investor protection considerations in the form of a conduct integrity rule:
Investment advisers are skilled professionals dealing in specialized
information in situations, while “prospective clients . . . are frequently
unskilled and unsophisticated in investment matters.”209 Such clients are
likely to lack the ability to meaningfully assess the quality of the
services they receive when rendered. Neither the proposing nor adopting
releases identify sources for the rule’s proscriptions, but they bear some
relationship to those found in the Statement of Policy relating to
investment company sales literature that set forth disclosure principles
to minimize deceptive practices in connection with the sale of fund
shares.210 Commentators in the immediate wake of the advertising rule’s
proposal expressed some misgivings as to its potential scope. 211
However, that rule has stood the test of time, and only recently did the

207.
208.
209.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (2010).
See Adoption of Rule 206(4)-1 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
Investment Advisor Act Release No. 121., 26 Fed. Reg. 10548 (Nov. 9, 1961); see also
Investment Advisers Act Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Investment Advisor Act
Release No. 113, 26 Fed. Reg. 3070 (Apr. 11, 1961).
210. At the time, Securities Act Rule 156, regarding investment company sales
literature, did not exist. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.156. However, a prototype for Rule 156
did exist in the form of a statement of policy. See Statement of Policy, Securities Act
Release No. 3385, 15 Fed. Reg. 5469 (Aug. 14, 1950) (a statement of policy with
respect to the use, form, and content of sales literature and advertising employed by
dealers and underwriters in the sale of investment company securities); see also Donald
C. Cook, Vice Chairman & Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Policy Regarding
Supplemental Literature of Investment Companies (Aug. 29, 1950) (addressing the
Mutual Fund Sales Conference).
211. See generally Allen E. Throop & Thomas A. O’Boyle, Developments in
Federal Securities Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 828 (1961); Peter A.K. Reese, Securities
Legislation of 1960–Part 1, 17 BUS. LAW. 412 (1962).
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SEC give it a significant facelift in light of changes in the industry and
in marketing practices.212
The other rule—Rule 206(4)-2, the so-called “custody rule”—
addressed custody of client assets managed by advisers, a structural
integrity issue.213 While a similar rule already existed for brokerdealers,214 that rule was promulgated pursuant to rulemaking authority
tailored to the SEC’s authority to oversee the financial solvency of
broker-dealers.215 In contrast, the IAA custody rule confers authority to
prescribe “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent and
deceptive practices.216 While it is easy to see how custody requirements
might deter certain abusive practices and promote integrity, such
requirements are less directly related to prevention of fraud and deceit
than, for example, rules against deceptive advertising. In other words,
from the SEC’s perspective, its prophylactic rulemaking authority was
capacious indeed, and encompassed preventative measures consistent
with cultivating accountability as well as measures targeting business
conduct and practices linked to patterns of malfeasance.
Notwithstanding Section 206(4)’s expansive possibilities, the
SEC’s prophylactic rulemaking authority remained dormant for nearly
another 20 years. This is somewhat surprising, because the SEC had
advocated for, and indicated an intent to use, the new rulemaking
authority more freely.217 Although the rule regulating use of cash
solicitations by advisers in marketing their services through professional
solicitors was initially proposed in 1968, it was not adopted until 1979
in a revised form.218

212. See Investment Adviser Marketing, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 5653,
86 Fed. Reg. ___ (Dec. 22, 2020) (adopting release).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2010).
214. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2003).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)(A) (a far more specific grant of rulemaking authority to
“prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors to provide safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility and related
practices of brokers and dealers including, but not limited to, the acceptance of custody
and use of customers’ securities and the carrying and use of customers’ deposits or
credit balances”).
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–6.
217. See Special Study Report, supra note 78, at 386–87.
218. Although a rule regulating use of cash solicitations by advisers in marketing
their services through professional solicitors was initially proposed in 1968 (see
Proposed Rule 206(4)-3, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 231, 33 Fed. Reg. 15669
(Oct. 23, 1968)), a final rule was not adopted until 1979 in a revised form. See
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Once again, the SEC paused before again seeking to invoke its
prophylactic rulemaking powers under the IAA.219 In 1994, the SEC
sought to implement a suitability requirement under the IAA.220 The
rulemaking was an early, ambitious attempt to use the prophylactic
rulemaking authority to extend or at least clarify the fiduciary
obligations of investment advisers (especially in the area of personalized
advice to retail investors) under the IAA.221 The SEC retreated in the
face of opposition, though maintaining that many aspects of its
rulemaking were implicit in Sections 206(1) and (2) as reflected in prior
enforcement actions. As the century drew to an end, it was fair to say
that the SEC chose to refrain from using its prophylactic rulemaking to
address personalized investment advice in an assertive fashion, though
clearly subsequent rules have imposed requirements affecting both
institutional asset managers as well as advisers providing personalized
advice.
2. The SEC’s Evolving Enforcement Priorities
In the IAA’s early years, the SEC’s enforcement activity was
noticeably low. There were sporadic cases, typically triggered by either
egregious conduct or instances where a firm acted as both broker-dealer
and investment adviser,222 presumably because the firm was already on

Requirements Governing Payments of Cash Referral Fees by Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 688, 44 Fed. Reg. 42126 (July 18, 1979).
219. In 1987, the SEC did adopt IAA Rule 206(4)-4 which required an investment
adviser to disclose to clients material financial and disciplinary information. See
Financial and Disciplinary Information that Investment Advisers Must Disclose to
Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1083, 52 Fed. Reg. 36915 (Sept. 25,
1987). This requirement was subsequently rescinded and restated as a disclosure
requirement in the advisory brochure pursuant to Rule 204-3. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.2043 (1961). In other words, the original (and thoroughly unremarkable) requirement did
not really require invocation of the SEC’s prophylactic rulemaking powers.
220. See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers;
Custodial Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1406, 59 Fed. Reg. 13464 (Mar. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Suitability of
Investment Advice Release].
221. Id.
222. For an early example in this regard, see Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 970, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding broker-dealer registration was properly revoked when dual
registrant’s conduct, acting as a fiduciary, violated both Exchange Act and IAA
antifraud prohibitions). Another significant case, of somewhat later vintage, applied the
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the SEC’s regulatory screen. The SEC could also bring actions against
investment advisers that advertised publicly, such as impersonal
subscription services that provided investment advice.223 Activity
increased somewhat in the retail area after the mid-1960s,224 but the
cases, by contemporary standards, were still relatively few in the
institutional asset area.225
The SEC did not bring many enforcement actions against asset
managers prior to 1990.226 In the case of registered companies, the SEC
sometimes seemingly exercised restraint to avoid cumulative violations
under both the ICA and the IAA.227 This practice began to change in the

antifraud proscriptions of the Exchange Act and the IAA to a large branch-office
broker/dealer-investment adviser firm and found significant supervisory deficiencies in
the branch office structure. See Shearson, Hammill & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
7743, 1965 WL 87139 (Nov. 12, 1965).
223. See, e.g., SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 284 (1963); SEC v.
Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 710 (1985) (imposing sanctions where investment newsletter
violated the IAA in failing to register as an investment adviser). Subscription services
were an area of focus in the Special Study. See Special Study Report, supra note 78, at
359–69 (describing abusive practices in which subscription service produced reports
that could be used by broker-dealers to tout security).
224. See Suitability of Investment Advice Release, supra note 220, at n.5.
225. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., Investment Advisor Act Release No.
232 (Oct. 16, 1968) (sanctioning firm and associated person in settled administrative
proceeding for trading activities in a unit (Special Investment Advisory Service) dealing
with either institutional asset managers or very wealthy clients). Part of the explanation
for the lack of activity before 1960 can be attributed to the lack of books and records
requirements and examination authority until 1960. See Requirement to Maintain
Specified Books and Records, Investment Advisor Act Release No. 111, 26 Fed. Reg.
987 (Feb. 1, 1961) (adopting release).
226. There are some rare examples. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Investment
Company Act Release No. 14773 (Oct. 29, 1985) (finding adviser violations of the ICA
and antifraud provisions of the IAA relating to purchases and redemptions of fund
series shares at incorrect prices, which in turn resulted in miscalculation of investor
share holdings and fees); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 92–94 (1981) (in addressing
relevant standard for burden of proof, noting that case had arisen from a proceeding
which alleged violations by the petitioner of the IAA and ICA).
227. See, e.g., Fred Alger Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company Act Release No.
17358, 45 SEC Docket 790 (Feb. 26, 1990) (finding adviser aided and abetted
misstatements in a registered investment company registration statement regarding
adviser’s performance record with advisory accounts (without any IAA antifraud
finding), but compelling, as a condition of settlement, that the adviser employ
a compliance officer); Stein Roe & Farnham, Inc., Investment Company Act Release
No. 17316, 45 SEC Docket 502 (Jan. 22, 1990) (finding ICA violation of affiliate
compensation prohibition relating to fund brokerage allocation practices but silent as to
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1990s,228 and was all but abandoned in the 21st century in the face of the
Late Trading and Market Timing scandal and the adoption of new
rules.229 While this difference may seem largely technical, combined
ICA and IAA actions have the effect of framing the adviser as a primary
violator in connection with ICA violations. As seen below, the IAA can
no longer be viewed as focused solely on enforcement against advisers
who serve retail clients. Rather, it is the primary statute for
accountability under the federal securities laws of investment advisers of
all stripes, whether retail advisers or asset management firms.
B. ENHANCED SEC ENGAGEMENT AFTER 2000
The 21st century did not begin auspiciously for the SEC on the
advisory regulatory front.230 In 2003, the mutual fund industry
experienced the massive Late Trading and Market Timing scandal (the
“LTMT Scandal”).231 In relatively short order, it suffered two significant

possible IAA antifraud violations). The SEC’s failure to assert cumulative ICA and
IAA violations was not compelled by statute, but rather was a matter of self-imposed
restraint. The Supreme Court had previously established that violations under federal
securities statutes are cumulative. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 386 (1983) (“A cumulative construction of the securities laws . . . furthers their
broad remedial purposes.”).
228. See, e.g., Strong/Corneliuson Cap. Mgmt, Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1425, Investment Company Act Release No. 20394, 1994 WL 361971
(June 12, 1994) (finding violations by adviser of the principal transaction prohibition of
the ICA and IAA antifraud provision in connection with cross-trades between private
fund and registered investment companies managed by the adviser); Van Kampen Inv.
Advisory Corp. & Alan Sachtleben, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1819,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23996, 70 SEC Docket 1213 (Sept. 8, 1999)
(finding both ICA and IAA antifraud violations by adviser and its personnel in
connection with dissemination of performance figures in sales literature that was
misleading in failing to alert investors that figures were based on sui generis gains that
could never be realized in the future).
229. See infra notes 237 & 240.
230. Independent of advisory regulatory issues, Congress and the SEC responded
separately to massive public company accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002 that led to
Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No.
107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)) and a corresponding intensive round of rulemaking and
enforcement by the SEC.
231. For a description of the scandals, see Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006); Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Fund
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IAA rulemaking defeats in the D.C. Circuit,232 not to mention the
revelation of a massive Ponzi scheme where the SEC appeared to have
failed to pursue red flags.233 Nevertheless, robust regulatory responses,
aided in part by post-Financial Crisis congressional action, emerged
from these temporary setbacks and ultimately left the SEC with a more
robust regulatory arsenal than where it had started in 2000. As noted, the
SEC responded aggressively to trading scandals and in other areas as
well. This subsection focuses on two rules adopted during this period
that greatly expanded its regulatory focus with respect to institutional
asset managers and, concomitantly, its enforcement arsenal: the IAA’s
compliance rule and the private funds antifraud rule.234 In the case of
institutional asset managers, these rules illustrate the indispensable value
of the SEC’s prophylactic antifraud rulemaking authority to effect both
structural and conduct integrity objectives.
1. The Compliance Rule and Its Enforcement
The SEC adoption of separate compliance rules under the IAA and
ICA represented both its first and most powerful rulemaking response.
Arbitrage, Frequent Trading and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal,
42 HOUSTON L. REV. 1271 (2006).
232. See Fin. Plan. Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (striking down
a rule than excluded broker-dealers charging asset-based fees from the definition of
investment adviser and therefore as beyond the scope of the IAA); SEC v. Goldstein,
451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down an SEC rule that had the practical
effect of requiring hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA (the rule itself related
to the method of counting clients for purposes of the then-existing Section 203(b)(3)
registration exemption for advisers with less than 15 clients)).
233. See OFF. OF INVESTIGATIONS (INSPECTOR GENERAL), SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
REP. NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (2009) (Public Version); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The
SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. STATE
L. REV. 899, 900–01 (2009).
234. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8, respectively. Other rules adopted
pursuant to § 206(4) had similar, but more specialized, consequences for institutional
asset managers in particular. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 (prohibiting the provision of
investment advisory services to government entity clients when the investment advisor
or affiliated personnel make time proximate political contributions to a related
government official of the prospective client) (adopted 75 Fed. Reg. 41069 (July 14,
2010); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (Rule 206(4)-6) (prohibiting an adviser from
exercising proxy voting authority on behalf of client with respect to the client’s
securities, absent safeguards to ensure proper exercise of authority and information to
client regarding the exercise of such authority).
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Although the Compliance Rule, Rule 206(4)-7, was adopted in the wake
of the LTMT Scandal,235 the Rule had actually been proposed before the
scandal revelations.236 Revelation of the scandals added urgency to the
adoption of that rule and others.237 The Compliance Rule imposes three
critical affirmative obligations on advisers:
(1)
Adoption and implementation of written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to prevent securities law violations;
(2)
Annual reviews of the policies and procedures for
adequacy and effectiveness; and
(3)
Designation of a chief compliance officer (CCO) to
administer the policies (in other words, there must be someone who
is legally answerable for ensuring adherence to the compliance rule).

The Compliance Rule was adopted pursuant to the agency’s
prophylactic antifraud rulemaking authority and, like the Custody Rule,
is a notable application of that rulemaking authority. These rules are not
directed at a specific type of conduct that typically entails misconduct.
Rather the rules enable the SEC to effectuate structural regulatory
requirements to ensure integrity and accountability generally (while no
doubt preventing specific incidents of abuse). The Compliance Rule
specifically mandates a self-policing infrastructure for investment
advisers. The requirements apply equally to large and small advisers, but
the mandate necessarily scales to the asset management firm’s operating
risk. In other words, the more complex the advisory firm, the more
demanding the obligation to provide “policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent violations” (i.e., the more sophisticated
235. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003)
(adopting release).
236. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 25925, 68 Fed. Reg. 7038 (Feb. 5, 2003)
(proposing release).
237. The adopting release focused on the timing scandals in the first three of four
paragraphs of the release, even though it had not figured in the proposing release. See
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 25925, supra note 236, at 74714–15. The LTMT
Scandal was also instrumental in the Adviser Code of Ethics Rule. See Rule 204A-1 (17
C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2004)) (mandating adviser obligations to adopt Code of Ethics
and minimum requirements therefor) (adopted in Investment Advisers Codes of Ethics,
Investment Company Act Release No. 2256, 69 Fed. Reg. 41696 (July 2, 2004)).
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and far-flung the asset management firm, the more sophisticated the
requisite policies and procedures for the firm).238 Moreover, the fact that
the obligation contains an ongoing annual review requirement ensures
that existing policies and procedures must be regularly updated to keep
abreast of evolving best practices.
The Rule’s requirements were arguably novel, and the SEC
announced reassuringly that its initial application of the rule would be
collaborative and deferential to industry judgment.239 Early enforcement
proceedings involved basic violations of the Compliance Rule where an
adviser either lacked, or had patently inadequate, written compliance
policies and procedures.240 The rule applies equally to all investment
advisers, whether small or large, or whether retail or institutional. Over
time, administrative proceedings finding violation of the Compliance
Rule have become voluminous. Examples of the Compliance Rule’s
application to the increasing complexity of institutional asset managers
operations show how it functions to address subtle forms of misconduct
as well as enable a form of fluid regulatory oversight.241 For example,
the SEC determined that advisers had failed to meet their compliance
obligations when:
•

A firm (i) failed to detect coding errors in complex computer
program used to implement quantitative investment portfolio
strategy, (ii) failed to detect discrepancies in the performance of

238. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.6(4)-7(a). The result follows from the rule’s language. The
policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to prevent violations and, for
more complex advisory firms, what is “reasonable” in terms of policies and procedures
will scale up to align with the complexity of the organization’s business.
239. See, e.g., Chairman William H. Donaldson, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks
before the Mutual Fund and Investment Management Conference (March 14, 2005)
(describing new SEC “CCOutreach Program” designed “to communicate with CCOs,
answer their questions, and give them the information and support they need from the
Commission to perform their critical oversight function”).
240. See, e.g., Omni Inv. Advisors, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3323, 102
SEC Docket 1878 (Nov. 28, 2011) (sanctioning a firm that lacked a compliance
program for two years and thereafter named as CCO an executive located much of the
time in a foreign country).
241. As discussed infra in note 338 and the accompanying text, the Compliance
Rule serves to fill in a gap in the antifraud protection afforded by Section 206(2) with
respect to the duty of care of advisers. As argued there and in Section IV.A.2., Section
206(2) addresses only duty of care violations involving deceit and does not encompass
a duty of care generally. The Compliance Rule provides a structural integrity rule that
makes it possible to address duty of care issues indirectly through a duty to have
adequate policies and procedures to prevent violations of the IAA and rules thereunder.
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the model portfolio over a two year period; and (iii) lacked
adequate quality control over development, testing and
alteration in model by the portfolio manager.242
•

An adviser to registered funds and institutional accounts failed
to identify misstatements made by a sub-adviser (a separate
asset management firm) regarding historical performance of a
quantitative sector rotation strategy managed by the sub-adviser
that in turn caused the adviser to make misstatements to its own
clients in reliance on the sub-adviser’s misstatements (i.e., the
adviser failed to maintain adequate oversight of the integrity of
the sub-adviser it retained to provide portfolio management
services).243

Findings of pervasive or egregious substantive violations of the
IAA are typically coupled with a finding of a Compliance Rule
violation.244 The logic of this pattern is straightforward: A substantive
violation is circumstantial evidence of the absence of policies and
procedures, or lack of enforcement of such policies or procedures,
reasonably designed to prevent the violation that actually occurred.
Firms with “adequate” policies and procedures should not have
violations, at least according to this type of logic.245 However, if applied

242. See AXA Rosenberg Grp. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3149,
100 SEC Docket 1126 (Feb. 3, 2011); see also Barr M. Rosenberg, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 3285, 101 SEC Docket 4053 (Sept. 22, 2011) (related proceeding
involving the portfolio manager responsible for quantitative model whose violations
went undetected by the parent firm’s compliance program).
243. See Virtus Inv. Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4266,
112 SEC Docket 5581 (Nov. 16, 2015); see also F-Squared Investments, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3988, 110 SEC Docket 2953 (Dec. 22, 2014) (related
proceeding involving substantive violations of the sub-adviser).
244. Barclays Cap., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3929, 109 SEC
Docket 5029 (Sept. 23, 2014) (finding compliance violation when dually-registered
adviser with significant compliance resources had numerous substantive violations in
newly acquired advisory business from another investment bank which went undetected
because the compliance program had not completed its integration of the new unit).
245. An exception to this pattern is found in the Matter of Paradigm Capital
Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3857, 109 SEC Docket 430
(June 16, 2014), but even there the adviser agreed, as part of its sanction, to retain the
services of an independent compliance consultant (a common feature in administrative
settlements.
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too stringently, such logic has perverse effects because it creates a form
of strict liability for compliance officers and compliance programs.246
A more aggressive consequence in application of the Compliance
Rule has been compliance violations in situations involving substantive
violations arising in intricate or highly specialized areas of operation, 247
or failure to follow existing policies and procedures in seemingly novel
and sui generis contexts.248 In another variation of the Compliance
Rule’s application, the existence of suspicious circumstances without a
showing of a substantive violation led to a finding of deficient
compliance procedures, though the insufficient policies and procedures
meant that there was no evidence to show whether the suspicious
activity actually involved misconduct.249 Such a regulatory approach
flips the typical pattern of policies and procedures that would have
prevented a violation from happening. In effect, the adviser must have
effective policies and procedures that enable the regulator to determine

246. For one compliance officer’s lament, see Court E. Golumbic, The Big Chill:
Personal Liability and the Targeting of Financial Sector Compliance Officers,
69 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2017).
247. See, e.g., Lockwood Advisors, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4984, 2018 WL 3854609 (Aug. 14, 2018) (the advisor’s violation was limited to the
Compliance Rule based on other parties’ possible substantive violations). In that matter,
the adviser, a sponsor of a significant wrap fee program (an investment program that
matches individual advisory clients with an investment strategy, then groups together
clients in a particular strategy whose accounts are managed by a sub-adviser portfolio
manager) with hundreds of sub-advisers, failed to have policies and procedures that
would allow the adviser to monitor the routing of client brokerage transactions by subadvisers to brokers outside the purview of the wrap-fee program.
248. See Ares Mgmt. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5510, 2020 WL
2743940 (May 26, 2020). In that matter, an investment adviser which had internal
policies governing the handling of material non-public information failed to fully
adhere to the letter of those policies when an investment committee of the adviser
authorized purchases of restricted securities under the adviser’s policies (in this case, a
portfolio company’s equity securities) because an employee of the adviser sat on the
portfolio company’s board, a circumstance which should have triggered additional
precautionary steps by the adviser’s compliance staff.
249. See Structured Portfolio Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3906, 109 SEC Docket 3803 (Aug. 28, 2014) (inadequate procedures to oversee
allocation of trades among accounts by head trader, but no showing of actual
misconduct); see also First W. Cap. Mgmt. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
5543, 2020 WL 4038959 (July 16, 2020) (finding a violation of the Compliance Rule
where adviser did not have policies and procedures to prevent allocation of Securities
Act Rule 144A securities to ineligible client accounts, even though no substantive
violation of the IAA was found).
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whether violations have in fact occurred. Finally, the SEC has increased
the pressure on compliance officers themselves through prosecution of
conduct that appeared erroneous and deficient in hindsight, even though
the compliance officer may have made careful and deliberate judgments
as events unfolded that later prove indefensible.250
As noted, the Compliance Rule involved a use of the SEC’s
prophylactic antifraud rulemaking authority to achieve structural selfpolicing regulatory objectives on enhanced integrity and accountability.
Undoubtedly, it has increased adherence to regulatory requirements by
investment advisers of all sorts in all phases of their operations.
Nevertheless, it has proven particularly valuable in enabling the SEC to
use its regulatory resources effectively in its oversight of institutional
asset managers.
2. The Private Funds Advisers Rule and its Enforcement
The post-2000 period has also witnessed a major push by the SEC
in its oversight of private funds, both in terms of information collection
and conduct integrity oversight. This development has undoubtedly
contributed to greater accountability among hitherto large asset
managers. The SEC’s enhanced oversight in the context of private funds
resulted from two contributing factors under the IAA that by themselves
hardly signaled a material reorientation.
The first factor arose from the failure of the Hedge Fund Rule.251
The D.C. Court of Appeals analysis cast into doubt the actionability of
private fund adviser misconduct that harmed investors in private
funds.252 The SEC, rather than seeking further review of the Hedge Fund
Rule, instead opted to promulgate a rule under its prophylactic antifraud
rulemaking authority: Rule 208(4)-8, the Private Fund Fraud Rule.253
The rule prohibits material misstatements and all fraudulent and

250. See, e.g., BlackRock Advisors, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4065, 111 SEC Docket 1721 (April 20, 2015) (sanctioning a chief compliance officer
who failed to alert fund board of possible conflicts of interest vetted by the CCO).
251. See supra Section I.E.1 (discussing SEC efforts to regulate hedge fund advisers
in the early 2000s).
252. See SEC v. Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
253. 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-8 (2011) (captioned “Pooled investment vehicles”).
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deceptive acts, practices, or courses of conduct by registered advisers
that harm investors or potential investors in private funds.254
The second factor was the Dodd–Frank Act’s expansion of the
registration requirements relating to advisers to private funds and
additional reporting requirements for unregistered investment
advisers.255 As a result, most, if not all large, private fund advisers were
required to register as investment advisers under the IAA and fell within
the SEC examination purview. This result greatly expanded the SEC’s
ability to gather information about private funds and their advisers. In
other words, private advisers and their businesses were more visible to
regulators.
These two factors in tandem allowed the SEC to marshal regulatory
resources to afford closer scrutiny beginning in 2012 of industry
practices, especially by means of examination.256 This increased
presence in turn enabled the SEC to conclude administrative
proceedings and impose sanctions on some of the biggest private equity
advisers in the United States (such as Kohlberg Kravis, Roberts & Co.,
LP,257 Blackstone Management Partners, LLC,258 and Fenway Partners,
LLC).259 Such actions have revealed undisclosed conflicts of interest
(discovered through examination of operating agreements and financial
records) touching on, according to one practitioner summary,
undisclosed fees and expenses, misallocation of expenses, undisclosed
loans and investments, undisclosed relationships with third parties, and

254. Id. The rule refers to “pooled investment vehicles,” defined as funds that would
come within the ICA’s definition of investment company but for the exclusions from
that definition found in ICA Section 3(c)(1) or (7), which was subsequently adopted as
the statutory definition of private funds under the IAA.
255. See supra Section I.E.2 (discussing amendments to the IAA’s registration
provisions relating to private funds in the Dodd–Frank Act).
256. See Marc Wyatt, Acting Dir., Off. of Compliance & Inspections, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Private Equity: A Look Back and a Glimpse Ahead (March 13, 2015)
(summarizing early activities of SEC examination office with examinations and noting
enhanced expertise gained with experience in private equity).
257. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., LP, Investment Adviser Act Release No.
4131, 111 SEC Docket 4904 (June 29, 2015).
258. Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, LLC, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 4219,
112 SEC Docket 3484 (Oct. 7, 2015).
259. Fenway Partners, LLC, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 4253, 112 SEC
Docket 4868 (Nov. 3, 2015).
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undisclosed discounts for service providers.260 According to one SEC
official, these enforcement actions have affected practices in the private
equity industry by “increas[ing] the level of transparency into fees,
expenses, and conflicts of interest,” and in other cases causing sponsors
to rethink those very practices.261
While SEC findings in these matters have addressed conduct
violations of IAA Rule 208(4)-8 as well as IAA Section 206(2), these
matters have also frequently involved findings of violations of the
Compliance Rule.262 While findings of conduct violations serve to put
private funds on notice of what the SEC finds substantively problematic,
the compliance policy and procedures enlists all firms’ self-policing
infrastructure prospectively as well. In short, the combination of
statutory and regulatory changes in the post-Financial Crisis
environment have significantly extended the SEC’s purview over asset
managers in the private fund space, thereby more completely regulating
under the IAA the universe of investment asset managers.
IV. THE FIDUCIARY CONUNDRUM IN THE IAA’S REGULATORY ARC
The IAA’s evolving regulatory arc has seen substantive statutory
and regulatory changes that have altered its structural scope precisely at
a time when the industry, especially in terms of institutional asset
managers, has experienced staggering growth. This account of the
statute and its application provides a deeper understanding of the
resulting regulatory scheme, but also reveals deficiencies in certain
regulatory initiatives. This Part delves into one such misconceived

260. See Eva Ciko et al., SEC Enforcement against Private Equity: A Practical
Guide for Private Funds, in THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW 1 (William Savitt ed.,
5th ed. 2019).
261. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Private
Equity Enforcement (May 12, 2016) (keynote address to the Securities Enforcement
Forum).
262. See, e.g., First Reserve, LP, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4529,
114 SEC Docket 6593 (Sept. 14, 2016) (finding Compliance Rule violation where
adviser lacked written policy and procedures with respect to the allocation of expenses
between the adviser and the funds it managed); TPG Cap. Advisors, LLC, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4830, 118 SEC Docket 2189 (Dec. 21, 2017) (finding
Compliance Rule violation where adviser lacked written policy and procedures
regarding necessary disclosure prior to fund investors’ commitment of capital regarding
conflicts of interest associated with the receipt of accelerated monitoring fees).
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initiative that reveals dissonance with the preceding exposition and
stems directly from a misunderstanding of the trajectory of the IAA’s
regulatory arc.
Over the last ten years, the SEC has been vexed by the task of
reconciling the standard of conduct for investment advisers (and their
associated persons) relative to the standard for broker-dealers (and their
associated persons) when providing personalized investment advice to
retail customers. The source of this challenge, as described earlier, lay in
the Dodd–Frank Act, in which Congress urged agency action on this
issue without mandating the terms of any solution.263 Following a very
twisted path of developments after the Dodd–Frank Act,264 the SEC
recently concluded an extensive multi-part rulemaking that attempted to
resolve the issues that the Dodd–Frank Act had urged for
reconsideration within the bounds of the IAA, in terms of the obligations
of investment advisers; and the Exchange Act, in terms of the
obligations of broker-dealers. The multi-part rulemaking commonly
referred to as the Regulation BI Initiative actually consisted of a
package of four different final agency actions.265 While there are many
263.
264.

See supra Section I.E.2.
After enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC consideration took
a circuitous nine-year path involving the issuance of an SEC Staff Report in 2011,
an SEC Advisory Committee Report in 2014, and the Department of Labor’s adoption
of a Uniform Fiduciary Rule in 2016 to apply to ERISA-qualified retirement accounts,
which was later struck down by a court of appeals decision. For a summary of this
protracted narrative, see Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 83062,
83 Fed. Reg. 21574, 21576–83 (May 9, 2018) (proposing release).
265. The four elements of the package were as follows: (i) rules governing the
standard of conduct of broker-dealers when providing recommendations to retail
customers (Regulation BI); (ii) promulgation of a new customer disclosure form
applicable to broker-dealers and advisers regarding their professional obligations with
respect to relationships with the particular client or customer (the Relationship
Summary Disclosure Document); (iii) an interpretation that set forth the standard of
conduct of advisers to their clients (the Adviser Conduct Interpretation); and (iv) an
interpretation regarding the “solely incidental prong” of the definition of an investment
adviser so that broker-dealer could determine when their advisory activities came
within the IAA and subjected the broker-dealer to the conduct standards of investment
advisers (the “Solely Incidental Interpretation”). The four initiatives were adopted on
June 19, 2019 and appear consecutively in the Federal Register: Regulation Best
Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Exchange Act Release No. 86031,
84 Fed. Reg. 33318 (July 12, 2019) [hereinafter Regulation BI Standard of Conduct];
Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, Exchange Act Release
No. 86032, 84 Fed. Reg. 33492 (July 12, 2019); Commission Interpretation Regarding
Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.

72

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

issues presented by the entire Regulation BI Initiative (especially as they
relate to broker-dealers’ obligations to their customers), that are not
relevant to this article, one component of the initiative is.
In the Adviser Conduct Interpretation, the SEC offered an extended
exposition of the fiduciary obligations of investment advisers that can be
analyzed separately from the Regulation BI Initiative as the latest
iteration in the changing shape of the IAA’s regulatory arc. As discussed
in Section II.A., the IAA’s antifraud section, Section 206, entails
fiduciary concepts, at minimum, in terms of its application. This aspect
of the IAA has produced conceptual confusion that goes to the core of
the statute and its mandate: Does the statute itself mandate a selfeffectuating federal fiduciary duty? The SEC’s Interpretation answers
this question in the affirmative. While undoubtedly well-meaning and
unobjectionable in many respects, the SEC’s Interpretation is patently
incorrect as a matter of statutory construction, and more importantly, as
argued here, deficient as a matter of policy.266 If the SEC reverted to a
more defensible statutory interpretation, namely the view that the IAA
imposes a heightened standard of disclosure on investment advisers
commensurate to the disclosure obligations of a fiduciary (what is
referred to herein as a “fiduciary disclosure” standard), the resulting
standard would have greater clarity than a stand-alone fiduciary duty
that lacks any textual grounding. More importantly, abandoning its
questionable interpretation would enable the SEC to pursue a more
assertive investor protection agenda that seeks to supplement the
existing fiduciary disclosure standard with targeted bright-line rules to
enhance investor protection for average retail investors.

5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33669 (July 12, 2019); Commission Interpretation Regarding the
Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of
Investment Adviser, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5249, 84 Fed. Reg. 33681
(July 12, 2019). The SEC explicitly noted the relationship between the Advisers
Conduct Interpretation and Regulation BI. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra
note 10, at 33669 & n.3.
266. Although the Adviser Conduct Interpretation was promulgated as part of the
larger Regulation BI Initiative, the legal merits of other components of the Regulation
BI Initiative are independent of the legal merits of the Advisers Conduct Interpretation.
Regulation BI was unsuccessfully challenged in XY Plan. Network, LLC v. SEC, 963
F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2020) (sustaining SEC’s Regulation BI rulemaking authority
under the Dodd–Frank Act § 913(f)).
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A. THE SEC’S FIDUCIARY CONFUSION
The SEC’s interpretation rests on a mistaken premise that “[t]he
Advisers Act establishes a federal fiduciary duty on investment
advisers.”267 This assertion stands or falls as a matter of statutory
construction, and perhaps the most salient feature of IAA is that the
statute is silent on the fiduciary obligation of investment advisers. That
fact, given the importance and breadth of fiduciary obligations, should
give any student of contemporary statutory construction jurisprudence
pause, even if the substance of the interpretation itself provides prudent
guidance for investment advisers. As noted below, much of the
Interpretation’s substance remains enforceable under the alternative, and
more persuasive, fiduciary disclosure standard.
1. The SEC’s Case for a Statutory Fiduciary Duty
When the Dodd–Frank Act was enacted, some, but not all,
members of Congress appeared to assume that investment advisers are
bound by a federal fiduciary obligation.268 In Section 913(g) of the Act,
Congress specifically authorized the SEC to adopt a fiduciary standard
for broker-dealers and such other rules of conduct for investment
advisers providing that the duty of such securities professionals “shall be
to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial
or other interest of” the relevant securities professional in providing
personalized retail advice.269 Instead, in Regulation BI, the SEC fixed,
and arguably elevated the standard of conduct for broker-dealers in
some cases pursuant to Dodd–Frank Section 913(f).270 However, the
final Regulation BI standard for broker-dealers fell below the standard
of conduct applicable to investment advisers either under a putative
267.
268.

Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33670.
While it is commonly assumed that Congress collectively concluded that the
IAA imposed a federal fiduciary standard in connection with the Dodd–Frank Act, the
legislative record is mixed. The strongest evidence in this regard is the House report
that served as the basis for the House bill’s investor protection measure. See generally
H.R. REP. NO. 111-687 pt. 1, at 49 (2009). Both the Senate Report (S. REP. NO. 111176, at 105 (2010)) and the Conference Committee Report (H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at
870 (2010)) appear deliberately non-committal on the existence of a federal fiduciary
duty.
269. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–29 (2010).
270. See XY Plan. Network, 963 F.3d at 249–50 (summarizing the record that led to
Regulation BI’s adoption).
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federal fiduciary duty (as articulated in the Adviser Conduct
Interpretation) or, as discussed below, a federal fiduciary disclosure
standard. Accordingly, in its Interpretation, the SEC sought to provide
guidance regarding what the agency perceived as the standard of
conduct for investment advisers,271 and specifically “reaffirm[]—and in
some cases clarif[y]—certain aspects of the fiduciary duty” under the
IAA.272
As the SEC itself concedes, the fiduciary principle applicable to
investment advisers is “not generally set forth in” the IAA, nor is the
“fiduciary duty to which advisers are subject . . . specifically defined.”273
The SEC nevertheless implied a federal statutory fiduciary duty and
framed it in terms of the familiar common law constructs of duty of
loyalty and duty of care.274 The Interpretation’s discussion of a federally
enforceable duty of loyalty is easiest to square with the fraud and deceit
prohibitions found in the IAA. Breaches of the duty of loyalty will
generally go hand in hand with conduct evidencing fraud or deceit.275
The more difficult challenge for the SEC’s position is to locate the
duty of care component of the fiduciary duty in terms of fraud or deceit.
Although breach of a duty of care can entail deceit, a breach need not
involve such conduct.276 Unlike a duty of loyalty where breaches will
generally implicate fraudulent or deceitful conduct, the duty of care is
only weakly associated with fraud or deceit and may turn upon

271.
272.

Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33669.
Id. at 33670. Unlike the standard of conduct in the case of Regulation BI, the
fiduciary duty found in the interpretation extends beyond providing advice to retail
investors, and encompasses obligations applicable to a broad spectrum of investment
clients and advisory services. Id. at 33671.
273. Id. at 33670.
274. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, The Fiduciary Obligations of Financial
Advisors under the Law of Agency, 27 J. FIN. PLAN. 42 (2014).
275. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: DUTY OF LOYALTY § 78.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 2007) (“Whether acting in a fiduciary or personal capacity, a trustee has a duty in
dealing with a beneficiary to deal fairly and to communicate to the beneficiary all
material facts the trustee knows or should know in connection with this matter.”).
276. For example, suitability when viewed as an antifraud principle (which requires
some form of deception) requires much more than a general suitability duty imposed by
self-regulatory rule. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability
in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557 (1999) (distinguishing between the old
NASD (now FINRA) self-regulatory approach and the more demanding standard to
state a substantive suitability claim under Securities Exchange Act Section 10 and Rule
10b-5 thereunder).
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negligence or inadequate diligence.277 The Interpretation describes the
duty as consisting of three components: (i) A duty to provide advice that
is suitable for and in the best interests of the client based on reasonable
inquiry relating to client objectives;278 (ii) a duty to seek best execution
for the client;279 and (iii) a duty to provide continuing advice and
oversight over the course of the client relationship.280 However, while
undoubtedly a violation of any of these independent duties could involve
conduct that operates as a fraud or deceit, no attempt is made to show
that a failure to satisfy such duties necessarily operates as a fraud or
deceit under federal law.
According to the SEC, an adviser’s “obligation to act in the best
interest of its client is an overarching principle that encompasses both
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.”281 It is unclear whether the SEC
means that the fiduciary duty is equivalent to a best interest standard, or
merely that a best interest standard is a guiding principle.282 The “best
interest” language figured prominently in the debate about parity in
conduct standards,283 but it is better known and more firmly established

277. To be sure, a breach of the duty of care can implicate issues of fraud or deceit,
such as situations where the fiduciary misrepresents to the principal the nature of its
activities undertaken on behalf of the principal. See infra note 338. But just as surely,
duty of care deficiencies may implicate conduct that is merely negligent and does not
involve or operate as a deceit.
278. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33672–74. As previously
discussed, the SEC had attempted a rulemaking under its prophylactic antifraud
rulemaking authority, a rulemaking that was abandoned. See supra note 219; Adviser
Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33362 n.34 (noting the history of the
abandoned suitability proposal).
279. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33674–75. The duty of best
execution is something that the SEC has referenced, especially in the context of the
prohibitions and exclusions for principal trades with clients, or cross-agency
transactions among clients, and undoubtedly inheres in the common law notion of
fiduciary duty. However, the enforcement proceedings cited by the SEC are limited to
situations also implicating a breach of the duty of loyalty where a conflicted adviser
deliberately arranges for an inferior trade execution for its own gain.
280. Id. at 33675.
281. Id. at 33671.
282. Best interest in the securities law context is not a defined term. As one
commentator noted prior to Regulation BI, “[t]here is . . . precedent defining a best
interest standard as it pertains to broker-dealers.” Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note,
Defining a New Punctilio of an Honor: The Best Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers,
92 B.U. L. REV. 291, 313 (2012).
283. The phrase acquired some currency in the debates that led to the Dodd–Frank
Act, where it was codified in IAA Section 211(g) (15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)) (Dodd–Frank

76

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

in the trust law fiduciary context.284 Although the SEC has now
mandated a best interest standard for broker-dealers by virtue of
Regulation BI, that rule provides a significant safe harbor.285
For purposes here, it is unnecessary to go through the
Interpretation’s substance in detail since, as will be argued, its
fundamental flaw is in its very premise, which presupposes the existence
of a stand-alone federal fiduciary duty. In addition, however, the
putative federal fiduciary duty raises other interpretive problems that
may lead to confusion. The problem presented by “informed consent” is
the most obvious. At common law, liability for breach of a fiduciary
duty can be avoided by informed consent, a necessary fiduciary
principle that the SEC acknowledges.286 Moreover, as noted by the SEC,
informed consent can be express or implicit.287 The SEC, however,
mistakenly suggests that full and fair disclosure alone that puts a client
in “a position to be able to . . . provide informed consent” is sufficient to
find implied consent, which is not the case.288 As described by the SEC,
implied consent is no longer a volitional act of the client, but rather
nothing more than the failure to object when the client was in a position

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124
Stat. 1376, 1828–29 (2010)). In that context, the genesis appears to have been the
RAND BROKER-DEALER REPORT, supra note 137, at 89–90. It is found in isolated IAA
case law involving conflicts of interest situations rather than pure due care situations.
See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33671 n.23 (quoting language
from two cases).
284. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole
Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 980–82 & nn.265–66 (2005) (advocating
a best interest defense for a breach of loyalty by a trustee based on existing authority in
the area of trust law).
285. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1 (2019) (creating a safe harbor for persons subject to
the rule where specified obligations of disclosure, care, conflict of interest management,
and compliance are satisfied). If, as it appears, one would not satisfy the SEC’s IAA
fiduciary standard merely by satisfying the broker-dealer standard, then it would follow
that the SEC seemingly believes a best interest standard operates differently in the two
contexts. This is most clear from the fact that the broker-dealer standard applies only to
broker-dealers providing personalized advice to retail investors whereas an adviser’s
fiduciary obligation under the IAA extends to any advice provided to any client.
286. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33677, 33680–81 (and
sources cited therein); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: EFFECT OF CONSENT,
RATIFICATION OR RELEASE § 97 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
287. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33677.
288. Id.
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to object.289 In contrast, and as noted below, a failure to object after full
and fair disclosure may be sufficient to rebut a finding of fraud or deceit
(i.e., overcome the fiduciary disclosure standard).290
Another problem created by the Interpretation relates to the scope
of the putative federal duty. According to the SEC, the fiduciary duty
should be viewed contextually in terms of the “agreed-upon scope of the
relationship between the adviser and the client.”291 The application of
fiduciary principles will vary depending on the nature and scope of the
relationship.292 Significantly, however, the Interpretation notes that
under federal law there are circumstances where, contrary to common
law, a client cannot waive enforceable duties by virtue of IAA’s antiwaiver prohibition.293 An obvious problem is that the “agreed-upon
scope” qualification could in practice serve to waive fiduciary
obligations in some contexts. The “agreed-upon scope” caveat is vague
and imprecise, and lacking a textual foundation.
A final lurking and unresolved issue in the SEC’s Interpretation
concerns the relationship between federal and state conduct standards,
and specifically, whether the IAA or SEC rules might preempt elevated
state fiduciary or other conduct standards in the investment adviser
area.294 Although the Interpretation did not address preemption of
enhanced state conduct standards relating to investment advisers, the
issue was explicitly raised as to broker-dealer regulation in connection

289.
290.

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: EFFECT OF BENEFICIARY CONSENT,
RATIFICATION OR RELEASE § 97 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (Comment (a): “Consent or
ratification ordinarily requires more than mere failure of the beneficiary to object to
conduct that the beneficiary was aware would or did constitute a breach of trust . . . the
consent or ratification is normally expressly communicated to the trustee, orally or by
delivery of a writing, although the consent or ratification may be implied by the
beneficiary’s conduct in some circumstances.”); see also RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF
AGENCY: GENERAL FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
291. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33671.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 33672. The sum of these three features—(i) the overarching fiduciary
principle, (ii) viewed contextually in light of agreed-upon scope, (iii) subject to the
proviso that any agreed-upon scope limitations do not violate anti-waiver constraints–
yield the SEC’s principles-based federal fiduciary duty.
294. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWS §§ 9.1, 9.2 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing conflict preemption (the most relevant form
in this situation) because of the impossibility of complying both with state and federal
law, or because a state requirement stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
purposes or objectives of federal law).
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with Regulation BI.295 The IAA arguably implicates parallel concerns.
As to preemption under the IAA, however, the statute, if anything,
supports an inference that Congress intended a cooperative federal-state
scheme under the IAA with respect to investment advisers (i.e., one
preserving state law conduct requirements).296 The savings provisions
generally preserve state law requirements from preemption, except in
cases of actual conflict.297 There does not appear to be any conflict
between the objectives of federal regulation of investment adviser

295. Compare Regulation BI Standard of Conduct, supra note 265, at 33327 (“We
note that the preemptive effect of Regulation Best Interest on any state law governing
the relationship between regulated entities and their customers would be determined in
future judicial proceedings based on the specific language and effect of that state law.”),
with Robert J. Jackson Jr., SEC Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Final
Rules Governing Investment Advice (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-jackson-060519-iabd [https://perma.cc/N58E-PFK7] (criticizing
the Commission’s ambivalence as to preemption and stating: “We can and should say
unequivocally that today’s release sets a federal floor, not a ceiling, for investor
protection. Our failure to do so invites extensive and expensive litigation over the scope
of the rule—and its effects on nascent state regulation.” (emphasis added)). For an
example of a state regulation that imposes on broker-dealers a higher conduct standard
than federal law, see 950 MASS CODE REGS § 207 (2020).
296. The bifurcated registration scheme codified in Section 203A (15 U.S.C.
§ 80b–3a) mandates shared responsibility with respect to registration of investment
advisers. As noted, most investment advisers (generally the smaller ones who manage
only a small fraction of assets under management) are prohibited from registering with
the SEC if state registration (and in some cases, examination) is available. In addition,
the IAA contains explicit savings clauses: Sections 203A(b)(2) (15 U.S.C. § 80b–
3a(b)(2)) and 222 (15 U.S.C. § 80b–18a). Of these, Section 203A(b)(2) is the more
straightforward: It indicates that state securities commissions will retain jurisdiction to
investigate and enforce matters relating to fraud or deceit whether the relevant adviser
is state or federally registered. Section 222, captioned “State regulation of investment
advisers,” is more in the nature of a traffic control provision between conflicting state
and federal non-conduct provisions and conflicting non-conduct provisions among the
states.
297. Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 (1979) (noting the ICA and IAA
generally “do not require that federal law displace state laws [with respect to fund
governance issues] unless the state laws permit action prohibited by the Acts, or unless
‘their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of
action . . . .’” (citations omitted)); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(i)(1) & 78bb(a) (two provisions
under the Exchange Act, with the former effecting field preemption as to select nonconduct requirements relating to broker-dealers and the latter providing a savings clause
for other requirements (including broker-dealer conduct standards) except in instances
of actual conflict).
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conduct and the possibility of more stringent state law conduct
standards. Indeed, as discussed in Capital Gains, federal conduct
standards in this area stand on the shoulders of underlying state conduct
regulation.298
Notwithstanding these problems, there is a more fundamental
problem in the SEC’s position: It cannot withstand textual scrutiny.
2. The SEC’s Fiduciary Textual Deficit
The statutory construction problem can be stated plainly: The
IAA’s textual silence as to an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty is a
fatal flaw in the SEC’s theory and stands as an insurmountable obstacle
to finding a freestanding federal fiduciary statutory mandate. For at least
thirty years, the Supreme Court has been at pains to address competing
theories of statutory construction.299 Most obviously, the SEC’s
298. Rulemaking by the SEC represents a final avenue for arguably preempting
enhanced state conduct standards, but agency preemption stands on weaker grounds and
cannot supervene Congress’ statutory design. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 22 (2007) (savings clause did not preclude an agency rule that was
consistent with the overarching preemptive sweep of the National Bank Act). Agency
preemption nevertheless stands on shakier ground and has elicited a fair amount of
scholarly commentary. Compare, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against
Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008) (arguing for a judicial presumption
against agency preemption, absent clearly delegated statutory authority), with Brian
Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law Federalism: Preemption, Delegation,
and Agencies, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1934 (2008) (arguing “for a more nuanced set of
rules that would permit agencies in many instances to preempt or regulate without the
need for express congressional approval).
299. The literature in this regard is truly voluminous. While this article offers
neither the occasion nor space to rehash the in-and-outs of the debate or even to canvas
its many unresolved nuances, it is sufficient for purposes here to emphasize a broad
consensus now exists that statutory text must occupy a primary role in resolving issues
of statutory construction. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 153, at 43 (2006) (“Textualism
seems to have been so successful–indeed, far more successful that its defenders or
detractors care to admit–that we are all textualists in an important sense.”); Jonathan R.
Seigel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,
1057 (1998) (“In a significant sense, we are all textualists now.”). Purposivism, the
main competing interpretive doctrinal strand, itself has accordingly moved in a
direction that affirms the importance of text in statutory construction. See John
Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119 (2011) (“This article
argues that the Court’s modern approach to letter and spirit, although commonly
justified as an aspect of textualism, fits equally well with the most fundamental
premises of purposivism, properly understood.”). See generally Richard Fallon, Three
Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation–
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interpretation is entirely non-textual; the IAA nowhere provides any
textual support for finding that Congress created a federal fiduciary duty
for advisers. The omission of the term “fiduciary” in Section 206 (i.e.,
what Congress did not say) counts against assuming such a missing term
should be included within the statute.300 Federal securities law is not an
exception to the trend toward textual-based statutory construction as
demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s pithy admonition of petitioners in
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund: “The statute
says what it says, or perhaps better put here, does not say what it does
not say.”301 The Cyan admonition cuts to the heart of the position

and the Irreducible Roles of Values of Judgment with Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685
(2014).
300. See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)
(“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1989) (“We
have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“[P]eople are entitled to rely on the law as written,
without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extratextual
consideration.”). Of course, Supreme Court decisions make clear that modern textualist
approaches should not be conflated with simple literalism per se; still, statutory context
matters. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 546 (2015) (holding fish was
not a “tangible” object whose concealment was intended to impede a federal
investigation as contemplated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, such as tangible objects used
to record or preserve information). Such cases show what is not at issue here, namely
that language actually used must nevertheless be read in light of the statute’s structure
and revealed intent. In other words, textualism does not compel literalism, but does
preclude augmenting Congress’s language with new terms.
301. 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018) (construing provisions of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) intended to conform SLUSA’s operative
provisions with the Securities Act of 1933); see also Digit. Realty v. Somers, 138 S. Ct.
767, 782 (2018) (“Because ‘Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,’ we do not accord deference to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule
21F–2. The statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short, precludes the
Commission from more expansively interpreting that term.” (citations omitted))
(rejecting an SEC non-textual interpretation of the Dodd–Frank Act securities law
whistleblower definition that equated the definition with a related but differentlyworded whistleblower definition in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Lawson v. FMR LLC,
571 U.S. 429, 440–41 (2014) (“In determining the meaning of a statutory provision,
‘we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.’ . . .
Absent any textual qualification, we presume the operative language means what it
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advanced in the Interpretation: Section 206, and, in particular, Section
206(2) do not say anything about a “fiduciary” duty or advisers as
“fiduciaries.”
The dispositive significance of the textual omission of “fiduciary”
in the IAA is only bolstered by corroborating contextual factors,
including the legislative history relating to the IAA’s drafting. In that
regard, Professor Arthur Laby’s able summary of the IAA’s legislative
history notes that the enacted version of the IAA expunged an explicit
reference to “fiduciary obligations” of advisers that had been contained
in the original legislation as proposed.302 Moreover, in contrast to the
IAA, the term “fiduciary” was used expressly by Congress in the ICA,
the IAA’s companion statute which was enacted in the same public law
as the IAA.303 This sequence was repeated in 1970, when Congress
added Section 36(b) to the ICA,304 a provision which expressly creates a
limited “fiduciary” duty for advisers with respect to the receipt of
compensation. Yet in those very same amendments, Congress enacted
amendments to the IAA without including any express language
recognizing an enforceable federal fiduciary duty under the IAA.305 The
fact that Congress did not show any reticence in imposing specific
fiduciary obligations in the ICA, at the very time it either enacted or
amended the IAA’s text, argues against finding any intent to create such
obligations in the IAA.306

appears to mean . . . .” (citation omitted)) (holding that whistleblower provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act encompass employees of a contractor for public company).
302. See SEC, Capital Gains, and the IAA, supra note 25, at 1069–70 (2011)
(setting forth legislative history).
303. The ICA’s original Section 36 (now codified as Section 36(a) (15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35)) codified the fiduciary duties of registered investment companies’ directors
and officers and the role of the SEC in enforcing such duties.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 80-36(b) (augmenting the statutory federal fiduciary duty found in
sub-section (a) by further providing “the investment adviser of a registered investment
company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation . . . . paid by such investment company.”). As the Supreme Court
guardedly noted in construing that statutory duty, “[t]he meaning of § 36(b)’s reference
to ‘a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services’ is hardly
pellucid . . . .” Jones v. Harris Assocs. LP, 559 U.S. 335, 345 (2010). This guarded
approach to fiduciary duties expressly provided by Congress argues for caution in
implying such duties where not provided by statute.
305. See supra Section I.C.
306. The treatment of fiduciary obligations under other federal statutes similarly
undercuts implying the existence of an implied broad-based fiduciary duty under the
IAA. For example, a later enacted statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security
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Moreover, the SEC must contort the fiduciary duty found in the
statute to make it fit. As previously noted, the SEC-found fiduciary duty
in Section 206(2) duty does not operate like fiduciary duties generally.
For example, the SEC agrees that, under 206(2), Capital Gains requires
no more than disclosure of conflicts of interest between the adviser and
its client.307 Such a principle does not accord with common law notions
of fiduciary duty, where a fiduciary satisfies its duty to disclose conflicts
of interest only if the principal both receives notice and consents to the
conflict.308 In other words, disclosure makes no sense as a sufficient
remedy, if in fact the investment adviser is subject to an asserted
fiduciary duty under federal law.
This point is underscored by the text of Section 206(3), which
immediately follows Section 206(2). For that provision and that
provision only, an adviser who acts as a principal for his own account,
or as an agent for another client’s account, is prohibited from trading
with its client “without disclosing to such client in writing before the
completion of such transaction the capacity in which [the adviser] is
acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.” 309
Unlike Section 206(2), Section 206(3) expressly articulates a high,
fiduciary-like standard of conduct, requiring the customary means for
obtaining a client’s consent to cure potential fiduciary misconduct.310
Congress’s establishment of an explicit federal fiduciary-like prohibition

Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., addresses fiduciary requirements, but
unlike the IAA, the statute expressly refers to “fiduciaries.” See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109(a) (“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach . . . .”). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has had no
difficulty in concluding that Congress imposed fiduciary obligations on such persons.
See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008) (discussing
§ 1109). Recognition of a federal fiduciary absent a statutory mandate lacks precedent,
except in bankruptcy where federal judicial powers in equity are extensive. See, e.g.,
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (disallowing claim under federal bankruptcy
statute based on inherent equitable powers finding a breach of fiduciary duty by
controlling stockholder).
307. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33671.
308. See supra note 290.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3).
310. Id.
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in 206(3) weighs against implying a mini-fiduciary principle in Section
206(2) in the face of the statute’s silence.311
Similarly, the SEC’s Interpretation sits uneasily with Congress’s
1960 IAA amendments that granted the SEC prophylactic antifraud
rulemaking authority to adopt “means reasonably designed to prevent”
acts, practices, or courses of conduct that are fraudulent or deceptive.312
The need to expand the SEC’s rulemaking authority in this way would
not have been nearly as urgent if the statute had already imposed a
generalized fiduciary duty on investment advisers. The amendment’s
purpose was addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Capital
Gains, where the Court acknowledged that such rulemaking could be
used to address fiduciary conduct of investment advisers, but concluded
that rulemaking was not necessary to address deceitful conduct by
investment advisers acting in a fiduciary capacity under Section
206(2).313 The seemingly sharp distinction in Capital Gains between
deceitful conduct by a fiduciary, actionable under Section 206(2), and
the authority conferred by Section 206(4) to address non-deceitful
conduct by rule, is largely inexplicable if the SEC’s Interpretation is
correct.
Against these overwhelming contextual considerations, the SEC’s
position basically rests on two arguments. First, the Interpretation relies
on dicta from dated Supreme Court decisions suggestive of an
unarticulated (but nevertheless intended) fiduciary duty.314 Supreme

311. As noted, the Interpretation does not explain why disclosure alone is sufficient
to discharge the putative fiduciary duty found in Section 206(2). As discussed in the
next section, the fiduciary standard of disclosure approach to Section 206(2), the
alternative to the SEC’s Interpretation, explains the result: The duty is merely one of
disclosure and thus full and accurate disclosure discharges the duty. See infra Section
IV.B.
312. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4). See supra Section I.A.
313. See SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 199 (1963).
314. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33670 n.15 (citing
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979), which stated that
“§ 206 establishes federal fiduciary standards to govern the conduct of investment
advisers”; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 & n.11 (1977) (Capital
Gains was “premised on its recognition that Congress intended the Investment Advisers
Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”)); id. at 33670 n.16
(citing Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 194 in which the Court noted that in drafting the
Advisers Act, Congress was influenced by developments in the common law of fraud
which had begun to change with respect to actions brought against a fiduciary, “which
Congress recognized the investment adviser to be”); id. at 33671 n.20 (citing
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Court dicta must be rejected as a basis for interpretation when
unsupported by statutory text.315 In a detailed analysis of the Supreme
Court dicta in Capital Gains (the very dicta relied on by the SEC in its
interpretation), Professor Laby rejected those dicta and concluded: “A
careful reading of the Act and its legislative history . . . demonstrates
that, although Congress recognized certain advisers to be fiduciaries, it
did not create or impose a fiduciary duty on advisers.”316
The SEC could seek to defend its Interpretation (in the parlance of
the APA, an interpretive rule)317 under administrative deference
principles grounded in the Chevron doctrine.318 Although Chevron
deference principles command judicial deference to reasonable agency
constructions of ambiguous statutory language, Chevron requires in the
first instance genuine statutory ambiguity.319 Although the parameters of

Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18, which states: “[T]he Act’s legislative history leaves no
doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”).
315. The Supreme Court has rejected ill-considered prior Court dicta in matters of
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257–60
(2009) (rejecting dicta in a prior Court decision based on judicial policy which sought
to introduce a qualification to a statute where Congress had not so provided). In one
federal securities law case, SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004), the Court curtly
dismissed dicta from two prior Court decisions. See id. at 396 (“[W]e will not bind
ourselves unnecessarily to passing dictum that would frustrate Congress’ intent . . . .”);
cf. Jeffrey Lipshaw, The False Dichotomy of Corporate Governance Platitudes,
46 J. CORP. L. 345, 366 n.94 (forthcoming 2021) (illustrating the unreliability and
malleability of dicta in Delaware corporate law decisions).
316. SEC, Capital Gains, and the IAA, supra note 25, at 1103.
317. “[I]nterpretive rules . . . are ‘issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.’” Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015) (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
318. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Like the debate on textualism and purposivism in statutory interpretation,
Chevron’s meaning and justification elicits much debate. See generally Michael Herz,
Chevron is Dead, Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015).
319. See, for example:
Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference
unless, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” we find
ourselves unable to discern Congress’s meaning . . . There is no room in this
scheme for a wholly unmentioned [statutory device implied by the agency] . . .
[W]e [may not] defer to an agency official’s preferences because we imagine some
“hypothetical reasonable legislator” would have favored that approach. Our duty is
to give effect to the text that 535 actual legislators (plus one President) enacted
into law.
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the statutory phrase “operates as a fraud and deceit” on a client may not
be precise, that alone does not render the provision ambiguous. A
statutory prohibition of conduct that operates as a fraud or deceit, by
definition, cannot encompass a non-deceitful breach of a fiduciary
obligation.320 Thus, even if the scope of fraud and deceit were deemed
ambiguous, any attempt to read into those terms a fiduciary mandate
beyond what is fraudulent or deceitful would be rejected as arbitrary and
capricious.321
***
In the end, what can explain the SEC’s misconceived efforts at
statutory construction in the Interpretation? Quite simply, the SEC
employed an outdated approach to statutory construction relative to
contemporary standards.322 The SEC’s reading of the IAA should be
viewed as a purposivist reading of the statute: an interpretation that
accords controlling weight to policy considerations that may have
informed legislators in enacting the statute. Even in a purposivist
approach, “a statute’s language almost invariably furnishes the best

SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018) (citations omitted).
320. This is the ratio decidendi of the Court’s holding in Santa Fe Industries. See
infra note 334 (discussing the Court’s holding in Santa Fe Industries).
321. Where a statue speaks clearly to an issue, the Court need not even determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is arbitrary and capricious since the statute itself
controls. See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 569–73 (2011) (rejecting a
Defense Department interpretation of FOIA Exemption 2 where the interpretation had
no connection to the exemption’s text and notwithstanding longstanding appellate court
precedent supporting the interpretation); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 119–21
(1994) (rejecting 60 year old VA regulatory policy requiring claimants seeking
compensation from the VA to prove that disability resulted from negligence in
treatment where fault-based standard found no support in the relevant statute’s
language, and notwithstanding repeated amendment by Congress of the statute without
expressing disapproval of the agency’s policy). In addition, both of these cases show
that the Supreme Court’s fidelity to unambiguous statutory text is not altered merely
because of the purported longstanding nature of the agency’s interpretation when that
interpretation does not comport with the statutory text. By the same token, the Adviser
Conduct Interpretation’s reliance on earlier SEC releases does not provide any authority
for the SEC’s demonstrably mistaken statutory construction, but merely evidences the
consistency of the SEC’s mistake.
322. See supra notes 299 & 300; see also Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 153, at
430 (after describing how purposive methodology shaped securities law decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit in the 1960s, concluding that Supreme Court
decisions in the latter 1960s “marked the end of the purposive era for securities law in
the Supreme Court”).
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evidence” of purpose.323 The Supreme Court shows little appetite for
non-textual purposive approaches to statutory construction (as discussed
above) and the federal securities laws are no exception. 324 The argument
for a generalized fiduciary duty may well be stronger today than in
yesteryear given intervening changes in the investment management
industry. Even if true, the agency’s construction of the IAA cannot be
motivated by counterfactual speculation: Had Congress then only known
what we know today, then surely they would have opted to impose a
fiduciary duty in the IAA.325
B. AN ANSWER TO THE IAA’S FIDUCIARY CONUNDRUM: THE FIDUCIARY
DISCLOSURE STANDARD
Though unpersuasive, the SEC’s reading of Section 206(2) is
appealing in one respect: Investment advisers, because of their fiduciary
status under state law, should be held to a higher standard of conduct
under federal law in dealing with clients. How can this intuition be
squared with the idea that an adviser is not a fiduciary under federal
law? Although an adviser’s state common law duty is not directly
enforceable under the IAA, the common law fiduciary status of
investment advisers determines how the IAA’s antifraud disclosure
obligations apply: Advisers, because of their state-law fiduciary status,
have a heightened disclosure obligation under federal law. This
approach, as previously noted, is referred to in this article as a fiduciary
disclosure standard.
A fiduciary disclosure standard comports with the text of Section
206(2) and fully captures the Supreme Court’s holding and rationale in
Capital Gains. Specifically, it represents a more natural reading of
Section 206(2). The IAA proscribes fraud as well as “any transaction,
practice or courses of business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client.”326 The common law fiduciary status of an adviser is critical
323.
324.

Fallon, supra note 299, at 705.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (stating, in
rejecting the Solicitor General’s purposive construction of Section 28 of the Exchange
Act on behalf of the SEC: “It is our function to give the statute the effect its language
suggests, however modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might
be used to achieve.”); see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
325. The Supreme Court’s admonition, quoted supra note 319, rings especially true
in this regard.
326. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2).
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in applying Section 206(2)’s disclosure standard. An adviser’s conduct
may operate as a deceit in contexts where an adviser’s common law
fiduciary status triggers a heightened disclosure obligation. This natural
reading of the statute is bolstered by the legislative history, which made
reference to the fiduciary character of investment advisers and
investment counsel, while modestly providing for registration of
advisers and tools to deal with so-called “rogue” professionals who use
fraudulent and deceitful practices.327
The fiduciary disclosure standard reading of Section 206(2) also
conforms to Capital Gains as well as existing SEC administrative
practice. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasized that the violation
followed from the adviser’s failure “to make full and frank disclosure of
[its] practice of trading on the effect of [its] recommendations” to
customers (i.e., in advance of client trading that typically increased the
price of the recommended security).328 One particularly revealing
passage rhetorically juxtaposed so-called technical constructions of
fraud and deceit with construction of those terms in light of adviser’s
fiduciary status: “Congress codified the common law ‘remedially’ . . . to
the prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by ‘fiduciaries,’ not
‘technically’ as it has traditionally been applied in damages suits
between parties to arm’s-length transactions involving land and ordinary
chattels.”329
How can the IAA impose a federal fiduciary disclosure standard if
the statute itself does not make advisers fiduciaries under federal law? In
effect, a fiduciary disclosure standard presupposes that investment
advisers have a common law fiduciary duty under state law. While the
common law provides ample support for such a premise, it does not
follow that all states subscribe to a uniform fiduciary standard with
respect to all types of investment advisers classified as such under
federal law. Moreover, if the IAA’s fraud and deceit prohibition is based
on state common law fiduciary obligations, does that mean its
application will necessarily require a state-by-state analysis of state law
327.
328.
329.

See supra note 43.
SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197 (1963).
Id. at 195. In other words, where undisclosed conflicts of interest exist, a
fiduciary standard of disclosure creates an affirmative duty to disclose on the part of
fiduciaries such as investment advisers analogous to the “disclosure or abstain”
obligation that underpins federal insider trading law. A further passage articulates this
standard as follows: “The statute, in recognition of an adviser’s fiduciary relationship to
his clients, requires that his advice be disinterested. To insure this, it empowers the
courts to require disclosure of material facts.” Id. at 201.
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fiduciary obligations to determine whether a particular adviser is a
fiduciary in the state where challenged conduct occurs? If so, the IAA’s
prohibition of fraud and deceit arguably would not apply uniformly
across the United States.
The Capital Gains Court did not address this issue, but there is a
clear solution. Under federal law, federal courts are empowered to
fashion uniform federal common law where application of federal law
requires legal concepts or principles not set forth expressly in federal
law.330 Resort to federal common law standards under the securities laws
is illustrated in a Supreme Court securities law decision issued after
Capital Gains, Reves v. Ernst & Young.331 Reves dictates that, where
federal law requires uniformity, federal courts should fashion a uniform
federal rule of law, derived from available non-uniform state law
principles, consistent with the federal statute’s remedial purposes.332
Such an approach provides a compelling explanation for Capital
Gains’ holding. Courts should apply a fiduciary disclosure standard
under Section 206(2) because, when enacted, it was commonly
recognized that investment advisers were common law fiduciaries in
many state jurisdictions.333 Courts and the SEC need not give effect to
the fiduciary standards of each of the fifty states in applying the IAA.
Rather, courts should apply a uniform federal standard for deceit that
presumes that an adviser under the IAA is acting in a fiduciary capacity,

330. The topic of federal common law is beyond the bounds of this article, but it is
invoked here in its most general sense. See generally, Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (Federal
common law “refer[s] to any rule of federal law created by a court (usually but not
invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by
federal enactments–constitutional or congressional.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (“‘Federal
common law’ . . . means any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of
some authoritative federal text–whether or not that rule can be described as the product
of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or unconventional sense.”).
331. 494 U.S. 56 (1990). In Reves, the Supreme Court addressed, in part, whether
demand notes fell within an exclusion from the definition of security in the Exchange
Act known as the short-term paper exclusion. Id. at 72–73. When a demand note is
deemed to have matured is a matter of state law that varies from state to state. Id. at 72.
In fashioning a uniform federal standard, the Court looked to the standard of the states
whose principles were most consistent with the underlying purposes of federal law. Id.
at 72–73.
332. Id.
333. See supra note 168.
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a result that entails heightened disclosure obligations. Thus, even though
the IAA does not make investment advisers fiduciaries under federal law
(and all that entails), advisers do face heightened disclosure obligations
commensurate with a fiduciary disclosure standard.
The fiduciary disclosure standard offers a more persuasive reading
of Section 206 in another respect. As noted, Section 206(2) claims are
foreclosed by disclosure to the client, a point recognized by the Supreme
Court in Capital Gains.334 But as previously noted, notice alone does not
waive or constitute consent to a fiduciary’s breach of its duties. For
example, clients must consent to any conflict,335 something that is
actually required in Section 206(3).336 However, under a fiduciary
standard of disclosure, the significance of full and fair disclosure makes
perfect sense. Full and fair disclosure fully satisfies the Section 206(2)
requirement because such disclosure satisfies the heightened disclosure
requirement and not because it necessarily discharges any fiduciary
duty.
Ironically, notwithstanding the Interpretation, the fiduciary
disclosure standard gloss on Section 206(2) most closely tracks agency
practice in administrative proceedings. As noted, fiduciary breach
involving conflicts of interest typically will be conjoined with acts of
334. See supra notes 328 & 329 and accompanying text. This point is also made
emphatically in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, one of the Supreme Court’s
decisions on whose dictum the SEC sought to rely in its Interpretation. See 430 U.S.
462, 471 n.11 (1977). While noting Capital Gains had been premised on the belief that
Congress had established federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers, the Santa
Fe Court more importantly underscored the fact that Capital Gains involved actionable
“non-disclosure” under the statute’s antifraud provisions (i.e., for purposes here,
involved a breach of the fiduciary disclosure standard). Id. Moreover, Santa Fe’s actual
holding undermines the SEC’s generalized fiduciary duty theory. The Court held a
claim for fraud under the antifraud rules of the Exchange Act could not lie where
plaintiffs solely alleged a breach of fiduciary duty but did not complain of disclosure
failures. Id. at 471. To hold otherwise, would “add a gloss to the operative language of
the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.” Id. at 472 (citation
omitted). But cf. Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary
Duty, 31 J. CORP. L. 877, 882 (2006) (describing Santa Fe as “usher[ing] in a new era
of restrictive” application of securities law antifraud standards when challenging
corporate mismanagement).
335. As noted earlier, the relevant requirement under trust law to discharge a
fiduciary obligation is informed consent that entails more than a mere failure to object.
See supra note 289.
336. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (imposing specific requirements for conflicts involving
trading with a client or acting as the agent in trades among clients). See supra notes 309
& 310 and accompanying text.
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fraud or deceit.337 Thus, it is no surprise that such administrative actions
necessarily involve fraud or deceit that only further evidence selfdealing or other forms of disloyalty. What is more revealing about
agency practice, however, are the administrative proceedings based on
negligence or even gross negligence arising from a breach of the duty of
care. In the relatively small group of proceedings arising out of such
situations, the SEC’s administrative orders invariably recite
misstatements and other acts of deception to tether the alleged violation
to Section 206(2).338 The absence of any “pure” duty of care in SEC
proceedings, which is to say cases in which deceit is absent, strongly
implies that the SEC harbors doubts about the legal validity of actions
based solely on a breach of fiduciary duty, absent deceit. In short, the
Interpretation’s fiduciary analysis conflates a federal fiduciary duty with
a federal fiduciary disclosure standard.
In addition, the Interpretation’s fiduciary duty analysis creates
imprecision in the case of duty of care, which is avoided under a
fiduciary disclosure standard approach. It can be difficult for securities
professionals to decipher the contours of duty of care from the broad
standards invoked by the Interpretation. Moreover, the SEC’s view of
that duty makes mere negligence the relevant legal threshold for
liability,339 an approach inconsistent with corporate law duty of care
analysis where gross negligence is the relevant threshold for duty of care
breach.340

337.
338.

See supra note 275.
See Hennessee Grp., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2871, 2009
WL 1077451, at *9 (2009) (finding that respondents “owed fiduciary duties to their
clients to not misrepresent the services that they were providing [namely, due diligence
on prospective hedge fund investments] and to disclose all material departures from the
representations [of due diligence] that they made to their clients”); Charter Cap. Mgmt.,
LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 5226, 2019 WL 1773512, at ¶¶ 15–17
(2019) (finding investment adviser negligently breached its fiduciary duties to private
funds managed and its investors, but also noting adviser failed to disclose conflicts of
interest and made affirmative misrepresentations relating to adviser’s level of due
diligence and “buy-in” of outside professionals in connection with the investment);
Pennant Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5061, 2018 WL 5814398, at
¶ 1 (2018) (finding violations of IAA Section 206(2) based on finding that the adviser
“negligently failed to perform adequate due diligence and monitoring of certain
investments contrary to representations” made to clients and in its advisory brochure).
339. Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33671 n.20.
340. Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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C. INVESTOR PROTECTION RULEMAKING UNDER THE IAA: THE ROAD
FORWARD
The Interpretation is a move out of sync with the IAA’s regulatory
arc. What should the SEC do to correct this misstep? This section will
discuss three possibilities: (i) Do nothing and go on as before; (ii)
attempt to salvage the Interpretation’s substance through legislative
rulemaking; or (iii) begin to think seriously about ways to supplement
the existing fiduciary disclosure standard with targeted rules to augment
investor protection for average retail investors.
1. Do Nothing
The SEC’s adherence to the Interpretation’s fiduciary duty theory
could be justified on a “no harm, no foul” rationale: Even if it is
wrong—as it almost surely is—there is no harm in pretending it is right.
After all, the Interpretation is not subject to direct judicial challenge as
in the case of challenges to a rule adoption.341 However, the future of
sticking to a mistaken legal theory is not free of legal consequences in
terms of coherence or collateral legal challenges. Most directly, the SEC
would face uncertainty should it bring administrative or civil actions
based on the Interpretation’s theory of actionable non-disclosure
fiduciary breaches. If, as argued here, the merits of such claims are
dubious at best, such proceedings would afford an avenue to challenge
the Interpretation’s theory. Fortunately, as noted above, most Section
206(2) actions are fully consistent with a fiduciary disclosure standard.
Moreover, proceedings settled prior to adjudication involving a nondisclosure based fiduciary claim will not entail litigation risk, and most
SEC administrative proceedings are settled. Thus, the SEC may be able
to continue to assert enforcement positions consistent with the
Interpretation, even if it is invalid in some respects.
The most likely legal challenge, however, would arise in actions
against associated persons of individual advisers, as primary or
341. As noted, the SEC’s Interpretation would be classified as an interpretive rule
rather than a legislative rule. See supra note 317. Legislative (or substantive) rules are
subject to direct judicial challenge while interpretive rules are not. See, e.g., Azar v.
Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1813–14 (2019) (distinguishing the difference
between interpretive and legislative rules for purposes of judicial review). For an
example of a successful legislative rule challenge, see Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC,
482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In the case of legislative rules under the IAA, direct
judicial review can be obtained from a U.S. Court of Appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13.
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secondary violators (e.g., as a “cause” of an investment adviser’s
violation or as an aider and abettor).342 Individuals face a different
reputational calculation in deciding whether to settle than firms, and
therefore, are more likely to refuse to settle. If so, the SEC will need to
be cautious in charging ancillary individuals who cannot be tied to
actual disclosure misconduct when bringing a non-disclosure fiduciary
claim against an asset management firm.343
In order to avoid significant litigation uncertainty in “pure” nondisclosure fiduciary actions, the SEC will likely avoid actions against
individuals associated with advisers in “pure” non-disclosure fiduciary
claims, such as duty of care actions. In other words, defects in the
Interpretation’s theory could affect the SEC’s enforcement strategy in
non-disclosure fiduciary actions. In effect, the controversial aspects of
the Interpretation’s fiduciary position will stand as a sermon from a
bully pulpit rather than enforceable regulatory policy.344
2. Salvage the Interpretation’s Fiduciary Standard of Conduct Through
Legislative Rulemaking
An entirely different approach to salvaging the Interpretation would
be for the SEC to use delegated rulemaking authority to impose a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers pursuant to Section 206(4), a
course of action that it expressly declined to do in the Interpretation. 345
While such an explicit rule would go beyond simple fraud or deceit, it
almost surely comes with the ambit of means reasonably prescribed to
342.
343.

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 80b-3(k).
Compare State St. Bank and Tr. Co., Securities Act Release No. 9107, 97 SEC
Docket 2425, at ¶ 33 (2010) (bank liable for misrepresentations made to asset
management clients), with Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2015) (senior State
Street bank executive could not be held liable on similar theory where the executive’s
precise role in causing the misrepresentations was unclear). For technical reasons, the
action was premised on violations of the Securities Act antifraud provisions rather than
the IAA.
344. To the extent that the SEC wishes to pursue non-disclosure based duty of care
claims against individuals, a more defensible position would be to allege that the
individuals’ lack of due care caused a breach of a compliance policy or procedures
under the Compliance Rule. Although there is no private litigation that will be affected
by the SEC’s overbroad interpretation, it could provide fodder for an equitable action
for recovery of advisory fees. See supra notes 176–179 and accompanying text.
345. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33670 & n.14 (rejecting
comment letters favoring rulemaking).
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prevent practices that operate as a fraud or deceit, the touchstone for a
Section 206(4) rulemaking.346
Rulemaking appears to be an approach favored by Congress under
a different IAA rulemaking grant. As part of the Dodd–Frank Act,
Congress amended IAA Section 211(g) to provide that investment
advisers, and other securities professionals, “shall . . . act in the best
interests of the customer without regard to the financial or other interest
of the broker, dealer, or investment advisor providing the advice” when
“providing personalized investment advice about securities” to retail
customers.347 The amendment, in part, delegated to the SEC rulemaking
discretion to fix standards of conduct for investment advisers and others
in advising retail investors. Although the formulation of Section 211(g)
may be opaque, the more important point is that Congress believed that
such a process should be calibrated through agency rulemaking.
One might ask why the SEC opted for a statutory interpretation
rather than a straightforward rulemaking. This is a matter for
speculation, and may have reflected nothing more than an inability to
get a consensus at the Commission level on a rulemaking approach.
Rulemaking could easily raise concerns. First, a rulemaking would have
been subject to judicial challenge upon adoption. Second, rulemaking
might have been viewed as triggering additional burdens under IAA
Section 211(g).348 This complex provision arguably would have required
a rule that imposed commensurate fiduciary burdens for broker-dealers
in at least in some respects, a result that a majority of the Commission
may have opposed.349 Thus, although the SEC could have accomplished
much, if not most, of what it hoped to have accomplished in the
Interpretation through rulemaking, it deliberately decided to foreswear
rulemaking in this context.
This article has no strong view on the desirability of an IAA
fiduciary rule because, as noted, it largely overlaps with the fiduciary
disclosure standard provided in Section 206(2). Moreover, any rule
would have to achieve greater precision than the Interpretation in order
to be workable. However, at a policy level, exclusive reliance on a
346.
347.
348.

See supra note 73.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g).
See 15 U.S.C § 80b-11(g). Through this provision, Congress arguably was
more concerned with elevating the standard of conduct for broker-dealers than
investment advisers and that may well have been a sticking point.
349. This echoes the issue that was considered by the Second Circuit’s recent XY
Planning decision (see supra note 266), which turned on the difference between
rulemaking under Sections 913(f) and 913(g) of the Dodd–Frank Act.
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fiduciary-only standard would likely achieve very little in the way of
new substantive protection for average retail investors, unless
supplemented by targeted rules-based standards. Thus, the issue of a
legislative rule fiduciary-only standard is the sufficiency of such an
approach in addressing investor protection for average retail investors.
There are both practical and philosophic reasons to question the
sufficiency of a fiduciary standard-only approach to investor protection
for average retail investors. A fiduciary duty-only approach may offer
only a relatively low bar for adviser conduct in some cases. For
example, the Interpretation addressed an adviser’s fiduciary obligation
to recommend the lowest-cost comparable investment product, or fund,
to its client, explaining that it is not the case because any
recommendation is inherently conditioned on many different facts and
circumstances.350 The Interpretation further emphasized that “an adviser
would not satisfy its fiduciary duty to provide advice that is in the
client’s best interest by simply advising its client to invest in the lowest
cost (to the client) or least remunerative (to the investment adviser)
investment product . . .”351 While it is true that all investment
recommendations must reflect a balancing of various facts and
circumstances, this sort of temporizing is not very useful in affording
protection to average retail investors. The SEC’s emphatic explanation
of this point sounds more like a rationalization than a call to a higher
standard of conduct. The very same point, with a more forceful investor
protection focus, could have been offered by emphasizing that advisers
should select the least expensive fund among funds of similar
objectives, strategies, and styles, unless the adviser has affirmative
reasons to believe that less expensive funds will be less desirable in
some respect for the investor than a recommended fund that is more
expensive.
The latter approach places the onus on the adviser to justify
recommendations that result in greater investment costs, especially
where funds have very similar investment strategies and styles (e.g.,
actively managed broad-based large cap equity funds with sharply

350. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33674 (noting factors
“such as an investment product’s or strategy’s investment objectives, characteristics
(including any special or unusual features), liquidity, risks and potential benefits,
volatility, likely performance in a variety of market and economic conditions, time
horizon, and cost of exit”).
351. Id.
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different costs). The larger point, however, is that a vague general
federal fiduciary duty alone potentially de-emphasizes investor
protection considerations relative to a fiduciary standard supplemented
by rules targeted to provide an investor or consumer protection
orientation for average retail investors.352
The Interpretation’s fiduciary standard-only approach also rests on
a dubious policy assumption, namely that an exclusively principlesbased approach is more desirable than any other approach, such as the
one advocated here (supplementing a fiduciary disclosure standard with
targeted rules-based standards). The SEC described the purported IAA
fiduciary duty as an inherently “principles-based”353 approach that
properly provides “sufficient flexibility to serve as an effective standard
of conduct for investment advisers, regardless of the services they
provide or the types of clients they serve.”354 In its endorsement of the
sufficiency of an exclusively principles-based and common-law-inspired
fiduciary duty for purposes of investor protection, the SEC rejected (as
noted above) any need for augmentation of retail investor protection
pursuant to rulemaking authority.355
The economic and legal literature on rules-based and principlesbased standards is vast, and makes clear that the choice of one approach
over the other, depends on the nature of the problem that is being

352. See generally Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer Protection Approach to Mutual
Fund Disclosure and the Limits of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter A Consumer Protection Approach] (discussing consumer protection
principles and the underlying financial economics literature).
353. See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33670–71 (repeated in
various formulations).
354. Id. at 33671.
355. Id. at 33670 (“In our view, adopting a rule text is not necessary to achieve our
goal in the Final Interpretation of reaffirming and in some cases clarifying certain
aspect of the fiduciary duty.”). The SEC identified several comment letters that
advocated adoption of a fiduciary duty by rule as would be permitted by IAA Section
206(4) or possibly Section 211. See id at 33670 n.14.
Similarly, in Regulation BI, the SEC argued that investor choice supported a principlesbased rulemaking approach with respect to the standard of conduct for broker-dealers:
Affording investment clients choice allows advisers and clients to shape legal
obligations in a way that is mutually beneficial. See Regulation BI Standard of Conduct,
supra note 265, at 33332 (stating that imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers in
providing advice to retail investors “would significantly reduce retail investor access to
differing types of investment services and products, reduce retail investor choice in how
to pay for those products and services, and increase costs for retail investors of
obtaining investment recommendations”).
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addressed by the standard.356 The SEC’s conclusion oversimplifies this
issue by assuming that choice of rules-based and principles-based
standards is an either-or situation. On that assumption, the SEC is
probably correct that highly variegated facts and circumstances are
intrinsically relevant to understanding fiduciary obligation of advisers.
However, that does not mean that an exclusively principles-based
approach to a conduct standard for advisers will always be superior. A
rules-based standard may serve to supplement principles-based
standards in specific circumstances to strengthen investor protection
(e.g., rules in dealing with small retail investors).357
Unvarnished investor choice rationales should be viewed
skeptically in the context of the IAA for two reasons. First, the
underlying assumption of the IAA’s investor protection scheme is that
investors are seeking help from professionals because the investors
frequently lack the same knowledge and expertise to make investment
decisions on their own. Investor choice is not irrelevant to the IAA’s

356. See Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based AntiComplicity Strategy under Federal Securities Law, 14 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 27–31
(2011) (discussing the debate on the utility of legal norms couched as standards or
rules); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles,
Rules and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710, 721 (“[T]here is no onesize-fits-all answer to the appropriate balance between specific rules and more
generalized standards and principles.”). Speed limits are classic examples of laws that
take the form of rules whereas the negligence standard in tort law exemplifies a
standard. The standards (principles)-versus-rules debate is well-known in the legal
literature. The SEC employs “principles” as a synonym for “standards” in the
Interpretation. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 130–42 (2012) (discussing enforcement policy
implications and distinguishing between rule-based and principles-based legal
prohibitions).
357. The SEC itself seems to have conceded this point in its recent proposal to
revise the IAA advertising rule, Rule 206(4)-1 (17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1997)).
There, although generally endorsing a principles-based methodology for its revisions of
the rule, the SEC conceded that a purely principles-based approach would jeopardize
investor protection in the case of testimonials, endorsements, and third-party ratings.
See Investment Adviser Advertisements; Compensation for Solicitations, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 5407, 84 Fed. Reg. 67518, 67520–21, 67537–38 (2019). This
approach is reflected, but with some modification, in the adopting release for the final
rule. See Investment Adviser Marketing, supra note 212, at 66–67 n.205, 86 F.R. ___
n.205 (“[T]he amount and type of information that may need to be included in an
advertisement directed at retail investors may differ from the information that may need
to be included in an advertisement directed at sophisticated institutional investors.”).
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regulatory scheme, but neither should automatically override other
factors shaping investor protection. Rather, only where investor choice
is consistent with a belief that investors are well-informed and likely to
make rational decisions under conditions of full information should
regulation give heavy value to investor choice.
Herein lies the second reason for skepticism regarding opposition
to rules-based standards as creating an obstacle to investor choice. As a
practical matter, the evidence of fully-informed and rational investor
choice among average retail investors is not supported by a wealth of
legal and financial literature.358 Accordingly, investor choice should be
given only modest weight when addressing the needs of average retail
investors. Instead, policy should focus on ways to enhance average
investors’ ability to make informed decisions and receive fair treatment
by making investment professionals accountable for the guidance they
render.
To be sure, broad fiduciary mandates serve a purpose in providing
sufficiently flexible standards that can be applied to address countless
situations. However, the cost of generality is that such a standard is less
likely to yield a meaningfully constraining standard of conduct.
Supplementing a broad fiduciary standard with rules-based standards
that are narrowly targeted would likely result in a more robust form of
investor protection. Rules-based standards can delineate between
different classes of investors and accounts (e.g., small retail investors,
retirement accounts, and institutional investors) as well as an assortment
of advisory contexts (impersonal asset managers, personalized money
managers, and personalized advice to retail investors).
3. Targeted Investor Protection Rulemaking to Supplement the
Fiduciary Disclosure Standard
As noted, Congress gave the SEC wide-ranging rulemaking
authority both in Section 206(4), to adopt means reasonably designed to
prevent fraud, and in Section 211(g), to prescribe an appropriate
standard of conduct with respect to retail investors. This untapped

358. See A Consumer Protection Approach, supra note 352, at 42–48 (discussing
research showing factors that lead to irrational investor behavior in the context of
mutual fund selection); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1045 (2009) (noting
that behavioral economics literature “support[s] the idea that investors act less than
fully rationally with enough frequency to cause concern.”).
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reservoir of rulemaking authority is sufficiently robust to allow the SEC
to create and shape standards of conduct for an adviser that go beyond
mere fiduciary obligations in order to advance investor protection
objectives. As discussed below, a hybrid approach to rulemaking–one
that relies on well-defined fiduciary floors for conduct and rules that are
specifically tailored through rulemaking to target patterns of problematic
practices and irrational investor behavior–is more likely to achieve a
higher degree of investor protection than an aspirational common law
fiduciary mandate alone (exemplified by the SEC’s Interpretation).359
The merits of any particular example of targeted investor protection
rules for average retail investors are beyond the scope of this article.
However, some possible examples are offered to illustrate how
rulemaking itself can be targeted in ways that are more likely to help
average investors achieve cost-effective investment strategies without
foreclosing investor choice.
The hypothetical investor protection rules discussed share three
general features. First, the rules are formulated either as default norms
or disclosure rules to establish prudential guardrails rather than as
mandatory rules.360 This approach would minimize intrusiveness on

359. An incidental benefit of a targeted rules approach (supplementing a basic
fiduciary disclosure standard) is that it would prove helpful in making sense of the
Dodd–Frank Act’s attempt to bring about conduct standard parity between brokerdealers and investment among securities professionals providing advice to retail
customers. The effort to bring about greater alignment among the standard of conduct
of securities professionals and a meaningful enhancement of investor protection for
retail investors has failed in part because the range of clients and functions discharged
by these two types of securities professionals made a single all-encompassing conduct
rule impractical. A targeted rulemaking approach to standards of conduct for
investment advisers dealing with average retail investors could offer a path for
reconciling standards of conduct among these two types of professionals in selected
areas. Rather than trying to devise a grand common standard to govern both sets of
securities professionals, parallel targeted rules-based standards in select areas may
provide a basis for reaching consensus on a conduct standard in limited areas (e.g.,
should variable annuities be marketed differently by investment advisers as opposed to
broker-dealers?). In other words, it may be easier to achieve parity in conduct standards
by specifically limiting the scope of the areas where parity is sought.
360. Cf. Daniel Clarry, Mandatory and Default Rule in Fiduciary Rules, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 435, 438 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019)
(“A ‘default rule’ applies absent a binding expression of party intention that the rule
ought not to apply or that it is to be modified.”).
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investor choice; an investor is able to choose to disregard the guardrails
in place.
Second, investor protection rules can be targeted at specific classes
of investors, such as an average retail investor, rather than all retail
investors, regardless of wealth or sophistication. The financial situation
and objectives of investment adviser clients are varied. The
Interpretation is expressly framed in terms of principles applicable to all
retail clients, leaving it to advisers to make appropriate distinctions
based on facts and circumstances, and permits reasonable restrictions in
the agreed-upon scope of the relationship between any adviser and its
client.361 In contrast, targeted default rules are better suited to address a
large class of average retail investors with limited financial
sophistication, modest resources and well-defined objectives (saving for
retirement).362 In this group especially, tailored rulemaking could be
used to establish heightened default standards of conduct depending on
the nature of the investment product and the financial circumstances of
those retail customers.
Third, targeted rules can be used to ensure presentation of
meaningful comparative information for evaluating personalized
recommendations in context. The rules discussed are weighted to
facilitate comparisons by retail investors between actively-managed and
passively-managed investment strategies. While advisers are free to
offer whatever advice they believe is appropriate, targeted rules can be
used to ensure greater accountability in recommendations by requiring
that advice be contextualized with respect to comparable generic
passively-managed strategies.
Here are three examples of what personalized targeted investor
protection rules might look like.
(a)
A simple targeted rule with respect to recommendations of
active over a comparable passive fund. Such a rule would obligate
an adviser to supplement its disclosure in providing personalized
advice recommending an actively-managed fund when a comparable

361.
362.

See Adviser Conduct Interpretation, supra note 10, at 33671.
As to limitations faced by average retail investors, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1077 (2018)
(noting that “studies uniformly conclude that Americans are not financially literate”);
Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes?
An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 6112014) (noting the
“relative lack of sophistication” among average mutual fund investors); see also supra
note 358.
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passively-managed fund is also available to average retail investors.
In such circumstances, the adviser would be required to: (i) alert the
average retail investor of the existence of comparable lower cost
funds, (ii) state reasons for recommending the actively-managed
fund, and (iii) provide comparative standardized performance
information regarding the active and managed funds in a
consolidated format.
(b)
A targeted rule relating for recommendations relating to
personalized portfolio-wide strategies (for example, a retirement
portfolio). Such a rule might obligate an adviser to maintain
documentation when providing personalized advice to an average
retail investor where the amount of portfolio assets held in activelymanaged funds exceeds a percentage threshold (such as 30-40%). In
such circumstances, an adviser would be required to maintain written
records of an assessment regarding the cost effectiveness of the
chosen portfolio relative to a passively-managed portfolio (with
assets allocated similarly across asset classes) from a portfolio-wide
perspective.
(c)
A targeted rule to increase the disclosure obligations of
fund advisers when selling classes of fund shares marketed by
personalized investment advisers or broker-dealers. This type of rule
would seek to impose additional disclosure obligations on asset
managers of funds where such funds’ shares are sold to average
retail investors by personalized advisers. Specifically, in the case of
actively-managed funds, the asset manager would be required to
provide enhanced disclosure regarding the types of portfolio
strategies for which the fund is not suitable—disclosure that advisers
would need to take into account when providing personalized advice
to average retail investors. As discussed below, such a rule would
seek to target a common issue in two-tiered advisory arrangements:
the potential disconnect between the product strategies of asset
managers and the recommendations of personalized advisers.

These examples of targeted rules are admittedly impressionistic and
would require significant work to tailor them for general application.363

363. The illustrative rules employed rely heavily on the potential misuse of activelymanaged funds in a retail investor portfolio. This is not meant to suggest that activelymanaged funds are in any way inherently undesirable for retail investors. See generally
K.J. Martijn Cremers, Jon A. Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the
Conventional Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of
Academic Literature on Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 4, 8–9
(2019) (“Our review of the literature suggests that the conventional wisdom judges
active management too negatively.”).
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Nevertheless, they illustrate how targeted rules might be fashioned to
implement basic investment rules-of-thumb, a form of prudential
guardrails, as default norms. Rules of this sort would function
differently than traditional fiduciary-only standard and might better
serve the needs of average retail investors. Targeted rules could
encourage investment behavior that the SEC determines offers lower
risks and lower costs for average retail investors without necessarily
foreclosing alternative more aggressive investment strategies for those
investors. In contrast, a fiduciary-only standard gives wider berth to any
adviser’s advice provided it is arguably reasonable (i.e., cannot be
shown to be unreasonable) under the given facts and circumstances.
The rules discussed above represent a means to address two
specific problems not well addressed by fiduciary principles alone: the
problem of evaluating advice relating to portfolio strategies for average
retail investors, and the problem of gaps and misalignment of strategies
created by two-tiered investment arrangements. As to the first of these
problems, there is only limited oversight of portfolio strategies under
conventional fiduciary principles beyond mere diversification axioms.
For example, an adviser rendering personalized advice who
recommends that a client diversify his portfolio by holding many fund
investments may not be pursuing diversification principles in a sound
manner. A diversification strategy that uses many actively-managed
funds (e.g., funds with relatively large management fees that have
overlapping investment strategies within a given asset class) may not be
a sound diversification strategy. Combining actively-managed strategies
within an asset class only serves to render an investor’s combined
portfolio more correlated with the market as a whole (i.e., more similar
to a broad-based passive strategy), and less likely to benefit from the
active management of any one manager. Such a portfolio and its
performance can typically be replicated at lower cost by holding a
passively-managed fund.364
364. See generally K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Funds Get
What They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31
(2016). It should be noted that Cremers and Curtis focus on potential rules of liability
for active funds that closet index, but their logic suggests that portfolios that combine
many actively managed equity mutual funds raise the same concerns about closet
indexing. Is this the fault of the adviser giving personalized advice, or the individual
fund asset managers? Admittedly, the adviser giving personalized advice arguably is
committing advisory malpractice. However, explicit disclosure from fund asset
managers could provide clear guidance on the potential inefficiency of combining many
similarly managed actively-managed funds in a single portfolio.
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The potential for gaps or misalignment in advisory strategies in
two-tiered investment arrangements can also be a source of problems
that is difficult to attack with fiduciary principles alone. Average retail
investors increasingly participate in investment strategies that involve
dual advisory relationships: personalized advice from an adviser
regarding investment products, such as different funds, where each
particular fund is overseen by an asset manager, itself another adviser.
The asset manager is technically advising the fund that it manages and
not the fund’s individual investors regarding their investment portfolio,
while the personalized advice from an investment adviser makes
recommendations as to which funds the individual should include in the
individual’s investment portfolio.
Under federal law, the obligations of the fund, and indirectly, the
adviser, with respect to retail investors are primarily twofold: full and
fair disclosure, and ensuring the fund’s financial and operational
integrity. The fund manager is subject to the IAA and its rules but, as
noted, the adviser’s client is the fund itself. In this type of investment
arrangement, the relationship of the asset manager and the investor is
almost wholly disclosure-based, and an investor’s recourse against the
asset manager is largely limited to disclosure-based remedies. No
assessment about suitability or appropriateness is made by the asset
manager for the investor other than the impersonal information
conveyed by means of public disclosure.
The investor, however, may rely on advice from an investor adviser
providing personalized investment recommendations regarding selection
of fund investments. A personalized adviser has considerable discretion
in formulating personalized investment recommendations. The
constraints on the investment adviser’s judgment are few, and the
adviser’s judgement cannot be easily challenged if it is not
unreasonable.365 The risk of misalignment in advisory strategies arises to
the extent that a particular fund is not well-suited for the personalized
adviser’s strategy for a client.

365. The two tiers result in in fees to retail investors, whether direct or indirect, to
compensate the two levels of advisers. The fund manager charges an asset-based
management fee based on the fund’s strategy and style that holders of fund shares
absorb indirectly when the fund pays the management fee out of fund assets. The fund
investor may also incur fees, directly or indirectly, to compensate the investor’s
personalized adviser. A fund asset manager, of course, has no way of knowing what
funds are in an individual fund shareholder’s total investment portfolio.
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Generally, misalignment in advisory strategies between an asset
manager in managing a fund and the way a personalized adviser might
envision the fund fitting within a retail investor’s portfolio is not subject
to regulatory oversight, except in unusual circumstances. For example,
the SEC has challenged conduct of securities professionals for causing
the client account to rack up unnecessary transaction fees involving
mutual funds, and these cases could be viewed as attempts to police
some aspects of two-tiered intermediation abuses.366 The SEC also
recently brought a new type of case that might be dubbed a platform
case in which it found that an investment adviser breached its fiduciary
duties of disclosure in maintaining certain funds on the investment
adviser’s approved fund platform that was used by registered investment
advisers relying on the screening decisions performed by the platformsponsoring adviser.367 However, what is common to these approaches is
that the personalized adviser bears the entire responsibility to avoid any
situation arising from misalignment as long as the fund adviser has
caused the fund to fairly disclose its principal objectives and strategies.
A targeted rule of the sort described in example (c) above would afford
greater protection for average retail investors in a world where twotiered advisory intermediation is present by forcing asset managers to be
clear about how a fund product should be used in an average retail
investor’s portfolio. Personalized advisers would need to consider such
guidance in making recommendations with respect to a retail investor’s
portfolio.

366. For example, the SEC has recently concluded a massive enforcement initiative,
involving the imposition of administrative sanctions on investment advisers that
improperly recommended unnecessarily expensive share classes for investors without
disclosing their own conflicts of interest in such recommendations. See DIV. OF ENF’T,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SHARE CLASS SELECTION DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE (May 1,
2018) (summarizing cases brought and terms of settlement that would be imposed on
advisers that self-report violations); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Share Class
Initiative Returning More than $125 Million to Investors (Mar. 11, 2019) (announcing
settlement against 79 self-reporting investment advisers for share selection
misconduct). Subsequent cases involving self-reporting were also completed. The SEC
also subsequently brought administrative actions against broker-dealers and investment
advisers that failed to self-report under the SEC’s program. See, e.g., VALIC Fin.
Advisors, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release Nos. 5550 & 5551 (Jul. 28, 2020)
(ordering a combined $20,000,000 civil penalty for violations of a variety of IAA and
other securities law provisions).
367. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 4989, 2018 WL 3970539 (Aug. 20, 2018).
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CONCLUSION
The Advisers Act is eighty years young. It started as something
very different from what it has become, but its mandate has evolved
through legislative amendment, financial and economic realities of the
business of investment management, and regulatory adaptation of the
mandate. Congress has been an active, although not necessarily a fully
cognizant agent, in recasting the IAA mandate. However, the changes
have been sufficient to allow the IAA to evolve with the times,
especially by enabling the SEC to use administrative powers to respond
to a rapidly changing environment. For the most part, the SEC has been
successful, even though it probably has not always executed such a
vision flawlessly or coherently. Its recent Adviser Conduct
Interpretation is a disappointment in this regard, as it purports to find an
explicit fiduciary duty in the text of the IAA, where none reasonably
exists. As a result, the agency convinced itself to do nothing more in
terms of investor protection than what it asserts inheres in the statute.
The position is both wrong as a matter of law and policy. This missed
regulatory opportunity by the SEC shows that, notwithstanding a
regulatory arc that has overcome many obstacles, many obstacles remain
until the IAA’s full promise as a robust source for investor protection is
fulfilled.

